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Critical  Study  ol  Geman  Tactics 


AND  OF 


Tlie  New  German  Regulations 


BY  MAJOR  DE  PARDIEU. 


Authorized  Translation 

By  CAPTAIN  CHARLES  F.  MARTIN 

Third   U.  S.  Cavalry 


•    -»     »»•»■»•< 


UNITED  STATES  CAVALRY  ASSOCIATION, 

Port  Leavenworth,  Kansas. 

1912 


COPYRIGHT,   1912, 
BY  CAPTAIN  CHARLES  F.  MARTIN. 


/    ...    .- 


PRC:SS  OF  KETCHESON  PRINTING  CO. 
LEAVENWORTH,  KANSAS,  U.  S.  A. 


TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE. 


This  study  of  German  Tactics  by  Major  Pardieu, 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Military  Governor  of  Dunquerque, 
was  immediately  after  its  publication  in  France  trans- 
lated into  German  and  into  Russian ;  it  would  not  have 
received  this  prompt  attention  by  the  Germans  and  the 
Russians  had  it  not  been  a  work  of  unusual  importance. 

The  translator  ventures  to  hope  that  it  will  be  of 
special  value  to  officers  of  our  service,  not  only  because 
it  presents  a  comprehensive  resume  of  the  German  tacti- 
cal creeds,  but  also,  and  more  especially,  because  it  con- 
stantly compares  the  German  and  the  French  tactical 
methods.  It  shows  the  essential  difference  between  the 
tactics  of  the  two  great  miHtary  nations. 

"A  Russian, "  says  the  author,  "is  different  from  a 
Japanese,  a  Turk  from  an  Italian. "  So  a  Frenchman 
is  different  from  a  German,  and  an  American  is  not  like 
either.  It  is  well  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  principle,  often 
enunciated  by  Major  Pardieu,  that  no  given  system 
of  tactics  can  be  applied  in  the  same  manner  to  men  of 
different  temperaments.  The  psychology  of  the  soldier 
must  be  studied  and  the  system  adapted  thereto. 

It  seems  to  the  translator  that  it  is  because  of  this 
necessity  of  studying  the  psychology  of  the  soldier  that 
we  should  find  valuable  the  work  of  Major  Pardieu, 
who  points  out  where  and  why  the  greatest  military 
thinkers  of  France  and  Germany  differ  in  their  methods 
of  application  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  tactics. 

Charles  F.  Martin, 

Captain  Third  Cavalry. 
Ft.  Leavenworth,  Kansas, 

September  30.  1912. 

259822 


FOREWORD. 


The  Germans  followed  with  the  keenest  interest  the 
war  in  Manchuria,  in  which  were  engaged  their  pupils 
in  tactics — the  Japanese.  It  was  with  just  pride  that 
they  learned  of  the  successful  application  by  the  Nip- 
ponese of  the  principles  of  tactics  which  they  had  taught 
them. 

This  war  in  Manchuria  had  a  considerable  influence 
upon  German  military  opinions.  Its  teachings  were 
passionately  discussed;  and  often,  upon  information 
shown  by  subsequent  investigation  to  have  been  false 
and  exaggerated,  systems  were  built  up  and  theories 
expounded. 

For  many  years,  thinking  men  had  already  been 
debating  the  regulation  principles  in  force ;  von  Scherff , 
Balck  and  Boguslawski  on  one  side  and  von  der  Goltz, 
Loringhoven  and  Schlichting  on  the  other  were  arguing 
over  the  questions  of  forms  of  combat,  the  initiative 
to  be  left  to  subordinates,  methods  of  instruction,  etc. 

After  the  experience  of  the  battles  in  the  Far  East, 
it  appeared  necessary  to  revise  the  existing  regulations, 
which  dated  from  the  period  between  1888  and  1895. 
The  work  of  revising  the  German  Regulations,  which 


The  following  abbreviations  are  used  in  the  course  of  this  work: 
I.  R. — Infantry  Regulations;  A.  R. — Artillery  Regulations;  H.  A. 
R. — Heavy  Artillery  Regulations;  C.  R. — Cavalry  Regulations; 
M.  G.  R. — Machine  Gun  Regulations;  F.  S.  R. — Field  Service 
Regulation. 

The  numbers,  usually  in  parentheses,  indicate  the  paragraphs 
of  these  various  regulations. 


[6] 

was  commenced  in  1906,  has  just  been  terminated.     All 
of  them  have  been  revised  and  made  to  agree. 

They  bear  the  following  dates : 

Infantry  Regulations:     May  29,  1906. 
Artillery  Regulations:     June  25,  1907. 
Field  Service:     March  22,  1908. 
Heavy  Artillery:     November  10,  1908. 
Cavalry  Regulations:     April  3,  1909. 
Firing  Regulations:     October  1,  1909. 

The  study  of  these  regulations  is  most  interesting 
and  most  useful;  we  glean  from  them  the  general  and 
special  principles  of  the  German  tactics. 

It  seems  now  to  be  opportune  to  make  a  resume  of 
them  in  a  work  treating  of  them  as  a  whole,  and  to  dis- 
cuss their  various  precepts. 

But  the  study  of  its  regulations  is  not  sufficient  to 
gain  a  knowledge  of  an  army  from  a  tactical  point  of 
view.  One  must  know  first  its  habits,  its  traditions, 
its  morale;  its  doctrines  must  be  studied  in  the  book 
of  its  authors  of  repute  who  represent  the  thought  of  the 
staff  and  of  the  different  arms. 

''When  regulations  are  conceived  in  a  spirit  as 
broad  as  that  of  the  present  regulations,"  says  very 
judiciously  La  Revue  Militaire  des  Arniees  Etrangeres 
(No.  982,  p.  251),  "not  even  a  very  careful  analysis  of 
the  texts  can  suffice  to  fix  definite  and  undebatable  in- 
terpretations of  the  principles,  set  forth  in  them. 

"Regulations  are  of  value  only  through  the  spirit 
in  which  they  are  applied;  it  is  only  in  the  long  run 
then  that  their  influence  can  be  exercised,  especially  in 
;an  army  in  which  the  force  of  tradition  is  as  strong  as  it 
is  in  the  German  Army." 


[7] 

Likewise  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  tactical 
methods  of  an  army  must  conform  to  the  physical  and 
moral  characteristics  of  the  soldiers  that  compose  it. 
The  great  strategical  or  tactical  principles  of  war  are 
the  same  for  all  armies;  but  the  details  of  execution, 
the  procedure  must  vary  according  to  the  morale,  the 
temperament  and  the  mentality  of  the  men  to  whom 
they  are  applied.  A  Russian  is  different  from  a  Jap- 
anese, a  Turk  from  an  Italian.  It  is,  therefore,  natural 
that  regulations  should  differ  from  one  army  to  another. 

The  great  difficulty  in  the  adaptation  of  the  regula- 
tions to  the  tactical  necessities  imposed  by  the  armament 
and  to  the  special  character  of  the  army  for  which  they 
are  made. 

Before  studying  the  regulations  of  an  army,  it  is 
necessary  in  order  well  to  understand  the  spirit  of  them 
to  be  acquainted  with  the  special  aptitudes  as  well  as 
with  the  character  of  the  nation. 

The  German  army  is  sufficiently  well  known  for  us 
not  to  have  to  speak  of  it.  It  is  known  what  a  good 
material  for  war,  as  we  may  term  it,  the  German  soldier 
is.  He  is  thoroughly  disciplined,  he  is  vigorous,  he  is 
brave.  Moreover,  at  the  last  large  maneuvers  he  showed 
admirable  endurance. 

What  he  lacks  most  is  the  spirit  of  initiative,  quick 
intelligence,  the  faculty  of  getting  out  of  difficulty. 

Excellent  when  supported  and  when  under  a  chief, 
whom  he  blindly  obeys,  he  is  lost  as  soon  as  he  is  alone 
or  when  he  no  longer  feels  himself  to  be  led.  His  morale 
weakens,  he  is  incapable  of  making  resistance  or  of 
taking  the  initative. 

The  German  soldier  is  heavy  physically  and  morally. 
He  has  less  fiber  than  the  French  soldier.     He  allows 


[8] 

himself  to  be  discouraged  less  easily,  but  when  he  has 
lost  his  moral  force  he  is  incapable  of  again  getting 
himself  in  hand  like  the  latter.  After  Jena  and  Auer- 
stadt  Prussia  no  longer  made  the  slightest  resistance. 

As  will  be  ascertained  in  the  course  of  the  present 
study,  the  new  tactics  imposed  by  the  armaments  favor 
the  French  soldier  and  appear  prejudicial  to  our  neigh- 
bors on  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine. 

German  authors  confess  it  themselves.  We  borrow 
from  the  famous  book,  A  Summer  Night's  Dream,  (by 
an  old  infantryman),  which  made  such  a  stir  in  military 
circles  twenty  years  ago,  the  following  estimate,  which 
is  still  accurate: 

"The  German  soldier,  accustomed  in  time  of  peace 
to  strict  discipline,  rigid  attitudes  and  absolute  obedi- 
ence, is,  in  action,  disconcerted  by  disorder,  and  thrown 
into  confusion  by  the  absence  of  his  leaders.  He  has 
need  in  the  hour  of  danger  of  the  presence  of  an  officer. 
Under  the  influence  of  his  officers  he  will  do  anything 
that  duty  and  discipline  demand;  he  will  follow  his 
leader  to  certain  death  with  calm  and  dignified  enthusi- 
asm, but  left  in  a  crowd  he  will  quickly  lose  his  head  and 
forget  what  his  education  in  time  of  peace  will  have 
taught  him. 

"It  is  not  so  with  the  soldier  of  a  Latin  race,  who  has 
a  strong  tendency  to  act  for  himself  and  in  whom  in- 
dividual qualifications  stand  out  to  a  very  marked 
degree." 

In  the  pages  that  follow,  has  been  sketched  a  study 
of  the  principal  points  of  German  tactics  as  they  are 
deduced  from  the  new  regulations  and  from  the  discus- 
sions to  which  they  have  given  rise. 


[9] 

An  effort  has  been  made  to  find  the  spirit  and  the 
tendency  in  the  letter  of  the  regulations,  and  to  make 
an  estimate  of  their  value  according  to  the  German 
character  and  temperament.  We  have  passed  through 
the  sieve  of  criticism  (which  has  been  made  as  impartial 
as  possible)  the  "regulation"  precepts  and  the  tactical 
ideas  of  our  powerful  neighbors. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Page 

Translator's  Preface 3 

Author's  Preface 5 


PART    I 

DETAILS  PERTAINING  TO  THE  THREE  ARMS; 
Infantry,  Artillery,  Cavalry. 

Infantry 

Squad  leaders 15 

Chiefs  of  platoons 17 

Deployment 18 

Marching  under  fire. 18 

Bayonet  action 21 

Use  of  ground 22 

Artillery 

Reasons  for  German  Artillery  increase 25 

Protection  of  the  artillery 29 

Fire 32 

Reconnaissance 33 

Communication 35 

Mission  of  the  howitzers 37 

Heavy  howitzers, 38 

Curved  fire 39 

Value  of  the  German  howitzers 41 

Material  and  moral  effects  of  fire 43 

Moral  effect 48 

Cavalry 

Cavalry  combat 51 

Cavalry  screen 55 

Dismounted  action 57 


[12] 


PART    II 
THE  BATTLE. 

Preliminary  Remarks  page 

Spirit  of  the  offensive 64 

Development  of  initiative 65 

Necessity  of  communication 67 

The  united  attack 68 

The  Offensive 

Information 70 

Attacking  the  hostile  cavalry 71 

Cavalry  patrols 71 

Large  corps  of  advance  cavalry 73 

Cavalry  and  the  cyclist  corps 76 

Advance  Guards;  Marching  to  the  Attack 

Mission  of  the  advance  guard 79 

Organization  and  formation  of  the  advance  guard 81 

Marching  to  the  attack 82 

Deployment  from  column 82 

Directions  to  be  assigned  to  columns 84 

Meeting  Engagements 

Preliminary  combat 86 

Artillery,  The 

Deployment 86 

Opening  fire 87 

Critical  discussion  of  the  use  of  artillery 90 

Infantry,  The 

Deployment 93 

Fronts 95 

Fire 99 

Assault,  the 102 

Preparation  of  the  assault  by  the  artillery 104 

Infantry  batteries 105 

Advance  of  the  reserves 106 

Pursuit 107 

Retreat 109 

Breaking  off  the  action 110 

Attacking  the  Enemy  When  He  is  in  a  Fortified 
Position 

Enemy  on  the  defensive 112 

Attack  of  a  fortified  field  position 115 


[13] 


GENERAL  TACTICS. 

Critical  Study  of  the  German  Offensive  pagb 

1.  The  Advance  Guard 119 

Generalities 119 

The  offensive  advance  guard 120 

Secutity  and  Information 124 

Tactical  rdle  of  the  German  advance  guard 126 

2.  General  Reserve 128 

3.  The  Enveloping  Movement 130 

The  Decisive  Attack 130 

4.  Inviolability  of  Fronts^-. 132 

5.  General  Criticism 134 

THE  DEFENSIVE. 

German  Defensive  Combat 

Criticism  thereof 144 

Occupation  of  a  Defensive  Position 

Preparation  of  the  position 144 

Infantry  and  artillery 145 

Single  postition  to  be  defended 148 

Combat 

Counter  attack 155 

The  general  reserve 157 

Strategical  Synopsis 159 


A  Critical  Study  of  German  Tactics 

AND  OF 

The  New  German  Regulations. 


PART    I. 


Details  Concerning  the  three  Arms, 
Infantry,  Artillery,  Cavalry. 


CHAPTER  I. 


INFANTRY. 

The  Infantry  Regulations  of  May  29th,  1906,  are 
the  oldest  of  the  new  regulations.  They  have  been  the 
basis  of  the  tactical  development  effected  within  the 
last  few  years  in  Germany.  They  are  not  confined 
merely  to  the  precepts  pertaining  especially  to  the  In- 
fantry, but  contain  as  well  certain  rules  of  tactics  for 
the  three  arms.  These  latter  will  not  be  considered 
until  the  discussion  of  the  subject  of  the  battle. 

In  this  chapter  we  shall  take  a  glance  at  the  part 
that  especially  concerns  the  Infantry,  and  consider  the 
points  of  difference  from  the  French  Regulations. 

group  leaders. 
The  question  (which  we  have  already  referred  to) 
of  the  character  of  the  German  soldier,  i.  e.,  that  of  his 


K.^^>-v  [16] 

slow  wittedness  and  his  lack  of  initiative,  has  been  a 
cause  of  uneasiness  to  those  commissioned  to  revise  the 
regulations. 

The  extended  order,  absolutely  imposed  by  the 
conditions  of  modem  combat,  is  not  favorable  to  the 
German  infantry.  Hence,  the  regulations,  while  recog- 
nizing the  necessity  of  extended  formations,  have  sought 
to  preserve  at  least  a  certain  arrangement  of  groups 
under  the  authority  of  a  leader.  There  has  been  con- 
stituted what  is  called  a  group  or  squad,  that  is  to  say 
an  assemblage  of  four  files.  This  little  group  is  to 
maintain  its  cohesion  as  far  as  possible;  it  has  a  re- 
sponsible leader. 

This  leader  directs  the  march  in  open  order ;  he  re- 
peats the  orders  of  the  chiefs  of  section  or  takes  the 
initiative  as  to  orders  in  case  of  necessity;  he  urges  on 
his  men  in  the  advance.  According  to  the  orders  of  the 
chief  of  section,  the  squad  leader  regulates  the  fire;  he 
causes  it  to  begin  or  to  cease,  according  to  circumstances. 
"He  takes  part  in  the  firing  only  when  his  duties  per- 
mit him  to  do  so."     (I.  R.  165.) 

Thus  is  seen  the  attention  given  in  the  regulations 
to  the  matter  of  never  abandonning  the  soldier  to  him- 
self and  of  keeping  upon  him  as  much  as  possible  the 
yoke  of  authority  to  which  he  is  accustomed.  Even  in 
the  most  extended  formations  the  soldier  finds  near  him 
an  active  authority  and  a  vigilant  surveillance. 

We  have  nothing  similar  to  this  in  France;  we  do 
not  need  it.  Our  corporal,  it  is  true,  directs  his  squad 
when  it  is  isolated  or  separated ;  but  in  firing,  in  action, 
the  corporal  is  no  more  than  a  private.  He  takes  part 
in  the  firing  Hke  the  other  soldiers;  he  no  longer  com- 
mands ;  let  us  hope  only  that  he  will  set  an  example. 


[17] 

CHIEFS    OF    PLATOONS. 

The  subaltern  officer  finds  his  role  broadening  more 
and  more  in  modem  warfare;  he  must  be  a  brain,  he 
must  be  a  leader,  he  must  be  an  example. 

Even  more  in  Germany  than  in  France  has  the 
role  of  the  platoon  leader  become  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance; the  German  regulations  give  him  initiative 
but  also  responsibility ;  his  duties  are  the  same  as  those 
prescribed  in  France.  The  regulations  insist  upon  the 
necessity  of  his  getting  his  men  back  in  hand  as  soon  as 
circumstances  permit;  one  feels  that  our  neighbors 
always  fear  that  the  men  on  the  firing  line  may  escape 
from  the  authority  of  a  leader. 

The  Germans  count  absolutely  upon  the  bravery 
and  the  devotion  to  duty  of  their  officers;  they  are 
right.  More  and  more  will  warfare  of  the  present  age 
become  a  war  of  leaders,  more  and  more  will  it  be 
necessary  to  have  sterling  officers  in  whom  can  be  placed 
absolute  confidence. 

In  his  very  interesting  observations,  Captain  Solo- 
view,  after  returning  from  Manchuria,  wrote:  "From 
the  first  rifle  shot  the  center  of  gravity  is  found  in  the 
officer,  and  then  is  made  manifest  his  true  rdle,  the 
enormous  responsiblity  that  rests  upon  him.  In  action, 
the  officer  must  be  more  than  ever  a  leader,  and  the 
discipline  must  be  of  iron.  *  *  *  Unfortunate  are 
the  troops  that  are  not  in  time  of  peace  imbued  to  the 
core  with  the  principles  of  discipline!" 

The  Germans  are  imbued  with  these  principles.  In 
time  of  peace  their  officers  are  surrounded  with  prestige, 
under  conditions  that  to  us  may  seem  exaggerated  but 
which  correspond  well  to  the  roles  of  these  officers  on 
the  battlefield. 


[18] 

The  discipline  is  indeed  of  iron  in  a  country  where 
discipline  is  found  in  the  customs  and  manners;  nat- 
urally it  is  there  all  the  more  necessary  that  troops  shall 
advance  only  upon  the  condition  of  being  led. 

A  few  remarks  as  to  details:  In  Germany,  the 
officer,  who  is  posted  ten  paces  in  front  of  his  squad 
leaders,  is  accompanied  on  the  battle  field  by  a  bugler 
and  by  two  estimators  of  distance.  These  estimators,  in 
addition  to  their  special  duties,  have  that  of  observing 
the  enemy  and  the  neighboring  units;  the  bugler  has 
that  of  keeping  in  touch  with  the  captain.  Thus  is 
manifested  in  the  very  smallest  units,  the  anxiety  con- 
cerning the  maintaining  of  connection,  now  so  import- 
ant. 

If  the  Germans  require  the  oflficer  to  set  an  example 
in  time  of  danger,  they  have  also  been  careful  not  to 
mark  him  out  to  the  enemy's  blows ;  they  have  clothed 
him  so  that  in  combat  he  is  difficult  to  distinguish  from 
the  soldier.* 

DEPLOYMENT    AND    MARCHING   UNDER   FIRE. 

The  deployments  and  marchings  are  executed  after 
the  same  general  principles  as  in  France.  The  regula- 
tions recommend  throwing  out  at  the  beginning  a  dense 
line  of  skirmishers  in  order  to  acquire  at  once  the  su- 


*An  order  from  the  headquarters  of  the  Emperor's  government 
under  date  of  February  23, 1910,  directed  that  all  officers  have  a  field 
uniform  absolutely  similar  to  that  of  the  troops. 

In  France,  an  officer  can  be  recognized  at  the  greatest  distance 
in  the  midst  of  his  troops,  thanks  to  his  dissimilar  unform;  by  the 
aiguilletes  (as  conspicuous  as  they  are  useless),  which  ornament  his 
breast,  a  staff  officer  can  be  distinguished  from  a  troop  officer;  like- 
wise a  general  officer  is  recognizable,  his  uniform  differing  sufficiently 
from  that  of  other  officers.  Radical  measures  should  be  taken  to 
correct  this. 


[19] 

periority  of  fire.  To  this  end  a  company  will  deploy, 
usually,  not  more  than  one  or  two  platoons;  for, "upon 
the  offensive,  the  company  in  the  battalion  can  scarcely 
deploy  more  than  two  platoons  on  the  front  it  has  at  its 
disposal."  (I.  R.  463).  But  the  battalion  commander 
will  put  in  the  first  line  the  number  of  companies  neces- 
sary for  the  object  to  be  attained. 

The  Germans  fear  greatly  the  mixing  up  of  units, 
and  seek  by  every  means  to  avoid  it.  Hence,  they  al- 
ways recommend  fighting  with  units  distributed  in 
depth.  The  principle  is  entirely  correct;  but  in  a  par- 
ticular case,  for  the  deployment  of  a  company,  it  might 
be  debated.  If  a  very  dense  firing  line  is  desired,  there 
must  be  deployed  at  the  beginning  a  great  number  of 
platoons.  As  we  shall  see  farther  on,  the  fronts  are  be- 
coming more  and  more  considerable  in  modem  battles; 
the  battalion  has  therefore  ample  room  for  the  deploy- 
ment of  four,  five  or  six  platoons.  If  one  or  two  platoons 
in  each  company  are  deployed,  the  four  captains  re- 
main with  a  support  of  from  two  to  one  platoons  which, 
independently  of  one  another,  they  throw  into  action 
when  they  judge  it  proper.  These  little  successive  re- 
inforcements do  not  bring  to  the  firing  line  a  very  strong 
impulsion,  certainly  not  an  impulsion  that  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  carry  forward  the  firing  line  or,  because  of  the 
suddenness  of  the  support  given,  to  gain  the  superiority 
of  fire.  It  seems  preferable  to  put  into  the  first  line  one 
or  two  companies  at  full  strength;  the  battalion  sup- 
ports to  be  formed  by  the  other  companies.  The  bat- 
talion commander  will  then  cause  the  reinforcement  to 
be  made  by  entire  companies.     Such  a  reinforcement 


[20] 

produces  an  appreciable  effect  which  should  be  im- 
mediately turned  into  a  tangible  result.* 

Captain  Soloview  sees  this  matter  in  exactly  the 
same  light;  "The  deployment  on  the  firing  line,"  he 
says,  "should  be  made  by  entire  companies.  There  is 
DO  reason  for  company  supports;  they  suffer  losses,  they 
do  not  permit  the  immediate  deployment  of  the  power- 
ful fire  necessary  from  the  beginning. " 

The  advance  under  fire  is  made  as  a  rule,  in  Ger- 
many, by  rushes,  or  advances  of  entire  platoons,  the 
fire  of  one  platoon  supporting  the  advance  of  the  neigh- 
boring platoon.  The  chief  of  a  fraction  has,  in  France, 
full  liberty  to  take  the  measures  that  to  him  appear 
best  to  insure  movement  to  the  front. 

Up  to  the  present  time,  it  does  not  seem  that  the 
Germans  have  taken  sufficient  account  of  the  effects 
of  infantry  and  artillery  fire.  In  their  last  large  ma- 
neuvers we  still  saw  skirmish  lines  that  were  too  large 
advancing  imprudently  on  open  ground,  by  rushes  of 
50  to  80  meters.  Within  the  fighting  ranges,  between 
800  and  400  meters,  skirmishers,  on  open  ground, 
can  advance  only  by  infiltration,  or  at  least  by  small, 
widely  spaced  fractions  running  or  crawling.  The  ad- 
vance can  no  longer  be  made  other  wise:  the  engage- 
ments in  Manchuria  have  proved  this.  The  Russians 
and  the  Japanese  are  agreed  on  this  point;  it  no  longer 
permits  argument. 

Hence  the  methods  of  advance  still  employed  by 
the  Germans  appear  to  be  very  hazardous. 


*It  should  be  remembered  that  the  foreign  company  consists  of 
over  200  rifles;  as  a  rule  company  supports  are  considered.  We  as 
a  rule  do  not  contemplate  them. — Translator. 


[21] 

BAYONET   ACTION. 

"To  attack,"  say  the  regulations,  "is  to  carry  a 
firing  line  as  near  as  possible  to  the  enemy.  The  assault 
with  the  arme  blanche  definitively  seals  his  defeat." 
(I.  R.) 

For  a  long  time  the  Germans  believed  in  the  all- 
powerfulness  of  fire  action;  the  assault  was  only  the 
manifestation  of  the  victory  won  by  fire  action.  The 
old  Infantry  Regulations  said  indeed :  "In  the  majority 
of  cases  the  firing  will  produce  such  an  effect  that  the 
assaulting  troops  will  find  nothing  more  than  a  position 
feebly  defended  or  even  abandoned  by  the  enemy. " 

The  general  staff  wrote  in  its  "Conclusions  from 
the  War  of  the  Transvaal":  "The  assault,  the  final 
shock  will  merely  cause  a  ripe  fruit  to  fall. " 

Today  the  Germans  recognize  bayonet  action;  the 
War  of  Manchuria  gave  striking  proof  of  the  necessity 
for  and  the  importance  of  this  action. 

It  has  been  established,  of  course,  that  the  con- 
centrated fire  of  the  infantry  and  of  the  artillery  is 
necessary  to  prepare  the  attack,  but  that  however  vio- 
lent they  may  be  they  rarely  succeed  in  dislodging  the 
adversary. 

"Never,"  says  Captain  Soloview,  "were  our  posi- 
tions taken,  especially  fortified  positions,  by  fire  action 
alone.  If  we  abandoned  any  to  the  enemy  before  actual 
contact  with  him,  it  was  by  order  and  was  not  compelled 
by  the  adversary. " 

If  by  day  a  combat  of  fire  action  is  sealed  by  the 
hand-to-hand  struggle,  at  night  a  fight  is  not  made,  so  to 
speak,  except  with  the  bayonet. 

The  losses  experienced  in  Manchuria  from  side 
arms  amounted  to  eight  per  cent. ;  that  is,    they  were 


[22] 

almost  equal  to  those  caused  by  artillery  fire.  These 
figures  have  an  eloquence  that  needs  no  discussion. 

The  bayonet  has  maintained,  therefore,  a  prepon- 
derant role ;  the  Germans  have  recognized  that  fact. 

Their  regulations  give  no  definite  instructions  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  contact  is  to  be  produced  and  ac- 
complished ;  they  are  not  at  all  precise  as  to  the  method 
by  which  it  is  to  be  attained;  we  shall  speak  of  this 
again. 

The  Germans  do  not  like  fighting  with  the  bayonet, 
to  which  the  French  are  so  well  adapted.  It  is  a  method 
of  fighting  that  requires  suppleness,  initiative,  a  trans- 
port of  enthusiasm,  an  impetuous  fury.  In  all  times 
the  French  have  excelled  in  hand-to-hand  combat ;  the 
jurie  jrangaise  has  been  traditional  for  centuries. 

THE    USE    OF    GROUND. 

"Ground  can  be  utilized  judiciously  only  when  a 
reconnaissance  of  it  has  been  made  in  advance."  (I. 
R.  305). 

The  commanders  of  the  different  echelons  must  not 
hesitate,  before  the  fire  has  been  opened,  to  precede 
their  troops  for  the  purpose  of  reconnoitering  the  ground 
over  which  the  approach  to  a  position  is  to  be  made. 

The  advance  of  the  troops  must  be  adapted  to  the 
terrain,  but  from  the  time  the  firing  is  begun  the  care 
devoted  to  this  must  not  retard  the  forward  movement, 
nor,  above  all,  oblige  any  of  the  fractions  to  remain  in 
rear.     Art.  306. 

It  must  be  remarked  that  this  use  of  ground  is 
limited,  in  the  German  regulations,  to  the  preserving 
of  the  direction.  Hence  under  no  pretext  may  a  unit 
leave  the  zone  that  has  been  assigned  to  it.     The  Ger- 


[23] 

man  regulations  differ  in  this  respect  from  our  French 
regulations. 

"Whereas  the  French  regulations,"  says  the  Revue 
Militaire  de  VEtr anger,  ''accord  a  predonderant  in- 
fluence to  the  utilization  of  the  terrain,  the  German 
regulations  subordinate  it  pitilessly  to  the  matter  of 
maintaining  the  direction.  Each  tactical  unit,  bat- 
talion, regiment  or  brigade,  must,  within  the  marching 
zone  assigned  to  it,  utilize  to  the  best  advantage  the 
accidents  of  the  ground  but  Jt  has  not  the  right  to  en- 
croach upon  the  zone  of  its  neighbor ;  it  must  not  hesi- 
tate, it  if  has  at  its  disposition  nothing  but  open  ground, 
to  carry  on  the  fight  over  it  to  the  end." 

These  precepts  are  to  be  remembered,  we  shall 
consider  them  again;  they  are  pregnant  with  conse- 
quences. 

Exposed  ground,  then,  is  to  be  utilized  for  the  ad- 
vance of  an  attacking  force ;  but  the  distances  are  to  be 
increased  and  every  precaution  taken  to  avoid  losses. 

The  regulations  recognize  that  for  the  offensive 
open  ground  is  unfavorable,  but  if  some  is  found  in  the 
sector  of  an  assaulting  force  it  must  be  occupied  and 
utilized  as  advantageously  as  possible. 

The  riflemen  are  taught  to  make  use  of  the  shelter 
they  find  on  the  ground.  In  the  sector  reserved  to  a 
platoon,  the  men  may  move  as  they  will  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  shelter.  It  is  forbidden  to  the  chief  of  a 
platoon  to  halt  his  men  in  a  place  where  they  would  be 
unable  to  use  their  weapons  in  the  prone  position.  This 
last  prescription  should  be  in  the  French  regulations; 
it  is  inadmissible  that  the  skirmishers  should  be  obliged, 
in  order  to  fire,  to  uncover  themselves  by  taking  a  kneel- 
ing or  a  standing  position. 


[24] 

The  employment  of  hand  entrenching  tools  is  es- 
pecially recommended  for  the  defensive,  and  from  the 
examples  of  the  Turks,  the  Boers  and  the  Russians,  it  is 
quite  certain  that  in  future  wars  a  considerable  use  will 
be  made  of  field  fortifications. 

The  Germans  authorize  these  protective  works 
only  on  the  defensive. 

"On  the  offensive,"  say  the  Infantry  Regulations 
(Par.  313),  "the  tools  may  be  used  momentarily  in 
places  where  it  is  desirable  merely  to  hold  a  position 
taken.  It  must  not,  however,  be  forgotten  that  the 
time  of  every  halt  is  more  profitable  to  the  defenders 
than  to  the  assailants.  If  to  this  disadvantage  there  is 
added  the  tremendous  difficulty  of  getting  a  force  of 
infantry  out  of  the  shelter  which  it  has  painfully  dug 
for  itself,  to  throw  it  under  a  violent  fire  of  the  enemy, 
particular  prudence  will  be  exercised  in  using  the  spade 
in  the  course  of  an  attack." 

These  remarks  are  completely  justified,  and,  as  a 
rule,  the  Germans  never,  in  their  maneuvers  at  least, 
make  use  of  their  spades  in  offensive  movements.  It 
seems  that  they  are  quite  right. 


[25] 


CHAPTER  II. 


ARTILLERY. 

For  some  years  Germany  has  been  considerably 

increasing  her  armament ;   she  has  equipped  each  army 

corps  with  powerful  artillery  strength,  which  consists 

at  present  of: 

Guns, 

21  batteries  of  field  guns,  six  pieces  per  battery 126 

3  batteries  of  six  pieces  of  light  howitzers,  10.5  cm.  18 

Total 144 

Eventually : 
1  battalion  of  foot  artillery  of  4  companies  of  4 

heavy  howitzers  each,  15  cm J^ 

160 

Certain  army  corps  intended  to  operate  in  the 
zone  of  the  hostile  barrier  forts  will  receive  a  supple- 
mentary assignment  of  two  batteries  of  mortars  of  21 
cm. 

This  considerable  increase  of  artillery  has  just  been 
completed;  the  last  army  corps  received  in  1909  its 
complement  of  armament. 

France  has  had  to  follow  the  lead  of  Germany; 
she  has  recently  decided  that  her  army  corps  shall 
have  120  guns  of  7.5  cm.  In  spite  of  this  fact,  the 
French  artillery  will  remain  sensibly  inferior  in  numbers 
to  that  of  the  Germans. 

REASONS   FOR   THE   ARTILLERY    INCREASE. 

It  is  of  interest  to  seek  the  reasons  that  induced  our 
neighbors  to  make  the  large  increase  in  their  artillery. 


[26] 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  exigencies  of  modem  tactics 
in  compelHng  extended  order  in  infantry  action  were 
very  unfavorable  to  the  Germans;  their  infantry  had 
certainly  lost  some  of  its  strength.  The  Germans  them- 
selves admitted  that  they  were  inferior  to  the  Latins 
in  a  mode  of  action  in  which  individualism  and  initiative 
played  the  principle  roles.  The  German  authorities 
hav.e  sought  by  acquiring  numerical  superiority  in  artil- 
lery to  counterbalance  the  undeniable  loss  of  power 
suffered  by  their  infantry. 

Napoleon  made  the  statement:  "Mediocre  in- 
fantry needs  a  great  deal  of  artillery."  In  fact  he 
greatly  increased  his  artillery  in  1813  when  youthful 
infantrymen  replaced  those  he  had  lost  in  Russia  and 
in  Spain. 

Assuredly,  the  German  infantry  is  not  mediocre, 
we  have  recognized  that  fact ;  but  it  has  lost  some  of  its 
power.  No  longer  being  able  to  give  close  mutual  sup- 
port in  the  ranks  and  to  maintain  in  the  close  thrall  of 
discipline  an  infantry  command  scattered  about  over  a 
battle-field,  Germany  has  sought  to  frame  it  in  solidly 
with  cannon  and  to  keep  it  in  hand  by  a  never  ending 
support  of  shrapnel.  She  has  hoped  to  be  able  to  give 
it  satisfactory  support  by  causing  it  to  be  accompanied 
everywhere  by  artillery  fire. 

It  is  a  fundamental  principle  now  recognized  that 
infantry  in  modern  combat  needs  artillery  to  succeed 
in  an  attack  of  any  importance.  Simultaneous  and 
co-operative  action  of  the  two  arms  is  a  necessity. 

In  order  to  obtain  this  co-operation,  it  is  neces- 
sary always  that  the  artillery  be  able  with  its  fire  to 
strengthen  that  of  the  infantry.  There  are,  therefore, 
needed  guns  that  are  freed  from  all  the  strain  of  the 


[27] 

artillery  duel  and  are  able  to  devote  themselves  solely 
to  the  infantry  struggle. 

This  result  can  be  attained  only  by  acquiring  the 
superiority  of  artillery  fire.  The  French  field  piece  is 
unquestionably  superior  to  the  German.  To  obtain  in 
spite  of  that  fact,  a  superiority  on  the  battle  field  our 
neighbors  have  insisted  upon  acquiring  a  numerical 
superiority;  they  have  created  a  formidable  field  artil- 
lery. 

Since  artillery  protected  by  shields  is  scarcely  vul- 
nerable to  the  projectiles  habitually  used  in  field  pieces, 
they  have  supplied  their  armies  with  howitzers  capable 
of  destroying  opposing  artillery,  even  though  it  is  de- 
filaded, and  of  reaching  sheltered  objectives. 

Still  another  reason  has  incited  the  Germans  to 
provide  many  of  their  army  corps  with  heavy  howitzers. 
At  the  time  when -their  investigations  looking  to  the 
reconstruction  of  the  materiel  of  their  artillery  were 
being  made,  the  Russo-Japanese  War  had  just  ended. 
In  that  war  almost  all  the  battles  had  been  seen  to  de- 
velop about  fortified  positions;  it  had  been  observed, 
as  was  shown  at  Plevna,  what  little  effect  the  ordinary 
projectile  had  against  field  fortifications  and  what  diffi- 
culty was  experienced  in  approaching  a  position  that 
had  been  put  in  condition  for  defense.  It  had  been 
also  proven  how  difficult  it  is  with  the  field  projectile  to 
destroy  opposing  artillery  especially  when  it  is  defiladed. 

These  observations  have  led  the  Germans  to  create 
batteries  of  very  powerful  guns  using  curved  fire,  able 
to  destroy  fortifications,  to  reach  the  personnel  and  the 
materiel  when  sheltered,  and  to  destroy  artillery  with 
shields.  Plevna  had  caused  the  construction  of  Hght 
howitzers;   Mukden  produced  the  heavy  howitzers. 


[28] 

Germany  hopes  that  with  numerical  superiority^ 
with  the  power  of  her  light  howitzers  and  eventually 
that  of  her  heavy  howitzers,  she  will  be  assured  abso- 
lutely of  the  superiority  of  fire,  the  primary  object  of 
her  efforts. 

Furthermore,  the  formidable  increase  of  the  Ger- 
man artillery  has  been  induced  by  some  other  reasons  of 
a  tactical  nature.  Battles  in  future  will  be  fought  over 
very  large  fronts.  The  Germans,  as  we  shall  see  farther 
on  are  strong  partisans  of  enveloping  action;  they  are 
always  extolling  a  frontal  attack  combined  with  a  move- 
ment overlapping  a  wing.  In  order  to  effect  these 
overlapping  movements,  if  you  are  not  superior  in  num- 
bers, you  must  occupy  the  enemy  and  hold  him  on  the 
front.  The  enveloping  movement  might  become  dan- 
gerous if  the  line  in  front  should  happen  to  be  broken. 
A  numerous  artillery  facilitates  the  German  tactics. 
The  front  can  be  widened ;  the  gaps  in  open  ground  can 
be  guarded  by  the  artillery  and  the  machine  guns. 

Finally,  a  strong  artillery  is  very  useful  in  turning 
movements ;  it  permits,  with  its  converging  fire,  of  ob- 
taining a  crushing  effect  upon  the  points  of  attack  of  the 
outer  flank  of  the  enemy. 

The  motives  which  have  led  the  Germans  to  in- 
crease their  artillery  thus  clearly  appear.  They  arise 
from  moral  considerations,  from  studies  upon  the  effect 
of  fire,  from  experiences  in  the  Manchurian  war,  and 
finally  from  the  necessities  imposed  by  their  fighting 
tactics. 


129] 
Some  Technical  Questions. 

PROTECTION    OF    THE    ARTILLERY. 

One  of  the  first  questions  pertaining  to  artillery 
that  it  is  interesting  to  study  in  the  German  documents 
and  books  is  that  of  the  protection  of  the  guns. 

Artillery  is  protected  by  the  shield,  by  entrench- 
ments, and  by  means  of  defilading.  What  use  is  made 
by  the  Germans  of  these  means  of  protection  ? 

We  know  that  the  German  gun  shield  protects  the 
gunner  better  than  the  French  shield ;  it  is  larger.  That 
is  a  slight  advantage. 

The  German  artilleryman  takes  great  care  to  give 
himself  additional  protection  by  means  of  entrench- 
ments. * '  The  batteries  are  protected  by  earth  embank- 
ments on  the  front  and  on  the  flanks."     (A.  R.) 

"Embankments  for  protection  against  the  enemy's 
fire  may  be  employed  everywhere,  even  on  the  offen- 
sive."    (A.  R.  372). 

That  is  a  wise  measure  when  defiladed  from  the 
view  of  the  enemy,  but  it  is  a  question  as  to  whether  it 
may  be  possible  for  batteries  using  direct  laying  when 
facing  a  vigilant  hostile  artillery. 

The  question  of  defilading  has  been  most  widely 
discussed  in  Germany.  After  having  been  greatly  in 
favor,  the  complete  defilade  has  been  vigorously  at- 
tacked; and  the  regulations  while  recognizing  its  ad- 
vantages point  out  its  defects.  They  do  not  recommend 
it  on  the  offensive,  and  formally  forbid  it  to  the  in- 
fantry batteries.*     *'In  order  to  make  the    infantry 


♦Batteries  designated  to  devote  their  entire  attention  to  the 
support  of  infantry  in  action. — Translator, 


[30] 

action  decisive,"  say  the  Artillery  Regulations  (Par. 
367),  "the  field  artillery  should,  renouncing  the  ad- 
vantages of  a  masked  position,  fire  almost  always  from 
a  position  which  is  only  half  masked  or  uncovered." 

Then  (in  Par.  467),  ''The  artillery  should  utilize 
even  in  the  attack  the  advantages  of  the  masked  posi- 
tion, but  it  will  have  to  choose  half  masked  or  uncovered 
positions  when  the  conditions  of  the  action  require 
rapidity  in  the  opening  of  fire  and  the  changing  of  ob- 
jective." 

On  the  defensive,  the  regulations  recommend  the 
defilade  for  the  batteries  to  be  used  against  the  adver- 
sary's artillery  but  not  for  the  infantry  batteries.  In 
Par.  504,  they  say:  *'A  masked  position  will  offer  ad- 
vantages. *  *  *  The  position  will  thus  not  be  disclosed 
prematurely,  maneuvering  can  be  done  under  shelter  of 
the  mask  *  *  *  ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  the  necessity 
of  turning  an  effective  fire  upon  the  live  targets  of  the 
infantry  attack  demands  the  abandonment  at  the  proper 
time  of  the  masked  position." 

The  ideas  at  present  prevailing  in  Germany  seem 
to  be  unfavorable  to  the  defilade.  General  von  Rohne, 
the  principal  exponent  of  the  new  ideas,  wrote  in  1907 : 
"We  reach  this  conclusion,  that  as  a  rule  positions  should 
be  chosen  so  that  a  piece  can  at  least  aim  directly  *  *  *  ; 
let  the  masked  positions  be  left  to  the  howitzers.  My 
deductions  are  directed  merely  against  the  tendency  to 
lay  down  as  a  rule  the  employment  of  masked  positions; 
*  *  *  the  field  guns  possess  in  the  shield  quite  sufficient 
protection;  we  may  ask  of  the  artillery  that  it  raise 
high  that  old  maxim  of  artillerymen,  'Efficiency  before 
protection,'"  (From  Officers'  Manual,  Field  Artillery 
Tactics.) 


[31] 

These  words  from  a  general  officer  who  is  chief  of 
the  German  artillery  fully  show  the  trend  of  present 
German  thought. 

Hence  the  Germans  look  for  protection  to  their 
shields  and  to  earthworks  much  more  than  to  defilading, 
which  appears  to  them  to  have  very  unsatisfactory 
features. 

In  France,  on  the  contrary,  we  strive  after  com- 
plete defilade  (defilading  even  the  gun  flashes,  if  possi- 
ble) for  all  the  artillery  not  intended  for  use  as  infan- 
try batteries. 

The  Germans  recommend  for  most  cases  the  half- 
masked  position,  which  is  a  little  more  than  the  de- 
filading of  the  materiel — ^it  is  placing  the  sights,  ele- 
vated by  means  of  an  extension  leaf,  on  the  line  of  de- 
filade. 

This  half -masked  position  is  intrepid ;  it  is  far  from 
prudent  when  opposed  to  defiladed  artillery  which 
knows  how  to  utilize  its  fire  as  does  the  French  artillery. 

When  it  is  a  question  of  supporting  the  infantry, 
tactical  considerations  come  first. 

The  infantry  batteries  stay  in  the  decisive  phase 
of  an  action  without  respite  or  cessation;  they  must  see 
and  act  in  accordance  with  the  fluctuations  of  the  in- 
fantry combat;  they  must  be  able  to  keep  under  fire 
every  part  of  the  ground  in  front  of  them. 

If  in  order  to  see  what  is  going  on,  the  captain  has 
to  leave  his  battery,  the  transmission  of  orders  will  be 
imperfect ;  the  indirect  fire  which  German  batteries  are 
obliged  to  use  when  defiladed  will  be  delivered  under 
poor  conditions,  and  if  the  captain  should  disappear 
the  fire  will  be  interrupted.  In  the  infantry  batteries 
there  is  not  the  comparative  calmness  that  exists  in  the 


[32] 

counter-batteries ;  it  is  like  being  is  a  furnace,  coolness 
is  partly  lost,  friction  is  more  severe. 

The  French  regulations  wisely  prescribe  that  the 
infantry  batteries  shall  place  themselves  in  such  posi- 
tions as  will  enable  them  to  accomplish  their  mission 
without  considering  defilade,  and  this  prescription  is  still 
more  strictly  imposed  upon  the  German  artillery  which 
has  not  the  same  sighting  facilities. 

FIRING. 

The  questions  of  fire  properly  speaking  are  tech- 
nical questions  which  do  not  have  to  be  treated  here. 
We  may  observe  merely  that  the  German  artillery  has 
been  handling  rapid  fire  guns  for  only  a  short  time;  it 
is  not  yet  thoroughly  accustomed  to  their  use,  and  has 
not  yet  completely  established  firing  methods  for  them. 

The  artilleryman's  instrument  of  the  present  day 
requires  a  delicate  manipulation;  the  workmen  must 
have  real  dexterity  and  much  experience.  The  Ger- 
man cannoneer  is  far  from  having  attained  perfection. 
Despite  great  progress  accomplished  in  the  past  year 
the  battery  commanders  have  not  yet  acquired  the 
mastery  which  must  be  attained.  The  German  reports 
admit  it. 

General  von  Rohne  writes:  "It  will  take  several 
years  for  our  artillery  to  learn  how  to  get  the  best  results 
with  its  perfected  materiel.'' 

France  in  incontestably  more  advanced.  Her  7.5 
cm.  guns  are  well  understood,  the  methods  of  fire  are 
carefully  worked  out,  the  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  have  acquired  a  technical  facility  which  the 
inspectors  general  have  unanimously  recognized. 

By  this  advance  France  acquires  an  undeniable 


[33] 

superiority  which  would  be  strikingly  manifested  on  the 
battlefield. 

How  true,  especially  with  the  present  materiel,  is 
the  reflection  of  General  Francfort:  **It  can  not  be 
too  often  repeated  that  the  quality  of  batteries,  the 
quality  which  is  that  of  their  commanders,  is  of  incom- 
parably greater  importance  than  their  quantity." 

Hence  it  may  be  frankly  proclaimed  that  the  120 
guns  of  7.5  cm.  of  the  French  Army  Corps  could  con- 
tend without  disadvantage  gainst  the  144  or  even  160 
guns  of  the  German  Army  Corps. 

RECONNAISSANCE. 

The  reconnaissance  question  has  assumed  a  pecu- 
liar importance  in  the  German  regulations. 

The  reconnaissance  of  positions  is  to  be  made  with 
the  greatest  care;  the  squad  leaders,  the  battery  com- 
manders have  in  this  respect  the  same  duties  as  in 
France.  The  instructions  relative  to  reconnaissance 
before  opening  fire  should  be  noticed:  *'A  reconnais- 
sance made  in  the  required  time  and  pushed  through," 
say  the  regulations,  "is  the  fundamental  condition  of 
success.  The  time  necessary  to  accomplish  it  must  be 
taken." 

And  here  the  regulations  are  not  speaking  of  recon- 
naissance of  positions  but  of  reconnaissance  of  the 
enemy  in  general,  and  of  the  hostile  artillery  in  particu- 
lar. 

"The  reconnaissance,"  it  is  explained,  "is  com- 
menced by  rapidly  sending  out  officers'  patrols  and 
scouts.  They  may  be  sent  with  the  cavalry.  Their  mis- 
sion is  to  discover  the  strength,  manner  of  deployment  and 
the  position  of  the  hostile  artillery.     The  information 


[34] 

gained  by  the  reconnaissance  of  the  other  arms,  which 
it  is  important  for  the  artillery  to  know,  is  sent  to  it  by 
the  commander  of  the  forces.  "     (A.  R.) 

These  instructions  would  seem  astonishing  if  we 
did  not  know  that  the  Germans  have  a  tactical  concep- 
tion different  from  ours  in  regard  to  the  manner  of 
engaging  combat. 

We  do  not  admit,  in  France,  that  before  an  engage- 
ment we  can  decide  upon  very  much  as  being  certain 
concerning  the  enemy,  other  than  the  apparent  outline  of 
his  position  or  of  his  marching  zones.  It  takes  fighting, 
we  believe,  to  penetrate  the  protecting  curtains  of  the 
enemy  and  read  his  hand.  In  Germany  they  aspire  to 
reading  it,  in  part  at  least,  before  engaging  in  combat; 
they  hope  that  a  well  organized  system  of  secret  service 
and  the  cavalry  will  provide  the  means  for  so  doing. 
In  conformity  with  this  theory  the  regulations  of  the 
German  artillery  prescribe  that  it  shall  not,  as  a  rule, 
become  engaged  until  there  is  sufficient  information  in 
regard  to  the  hostile  artillery. 

This  theory  is  undoubtedly  based  upon  what 
occurred  on  the  Japanese  side  during  the  Manchurian 
war.  Almost  al\^ays  the  Japanese  knew  the  positions 
of  the  Russian  batteries  at  the  time  when  the  engage- 
ment was  commenced.  But  it  must  be  observed  that 
the  Russians  constantly  remained  on  the  defensive; 
their  artillery  was  often  placed  in  advance  in  their  posi- 
tions for  action.  Moreover,  the  Japanese  had  a  marvel- 
ously  organized  system  of  espionnage,  thanks  to  the 
combination  of  exceptional  circumstances. 

Those  conditions  cannot  appear  in  a  European 
war ;  the  examples  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  do  not  in 
any  way  justify  the  German  ''regulation"  requirement. 


[35] 

We  shall  consider  this  subject  again,  but  we  con- 
fess at  once  that  we  do  not  understand  how  artillery 
can  aspire  to  know,  before  engaging,  by  simple  recon- 
naissance, *'the  strength,  the  dispositions  and  the  posi- 
tions of  the  hostile  artillery.  "  ( A.  R. ) .  That  knowledge 
can  be  acquired  before  the  combat  only  in  case  the 
enemy  is  immobile,  fixed  in  an  absolutely  defensive  posi- 
tion, deployed  before  the  beginning  of  any  attack. 

General  von  Rohne  does  not  seem  to  approve  these 
reconnaissances  prescribed  by  the  regulations.  ''The 
sending  by  the  artillery,"  he  says,  "of  officers'  patrols  on 
reconnaissance  is  an  innovation .  I  do  no t  share  the  hope 
that  they  have  induced  any  new  aspects.  In  any  case 
too  many  must  not  be  sent;  for  it  is  problematical 
whether  they  will  bring  in  soon  enough  to  be  useful 
any  information  of  much  importance.  It  is  certain  on 
the  other  hand  that  the  officers  will  be  absent  when  the 
firing  is  going  on,  and  certainly  it  is  to  fire  and  not  to 
give  information  that  artillerymen  have  been  created.'* 

It  is  not  possible  to  speak  more  sensibly. 

LINES    OF    INFORMATION. 

The  regulations  insist  upon  the  importance  of  as- 
suring lines  of  information  between  the  different  eche- 
lons of  the  command.  They  prescribe  the  most  fre- 
quent use  possible  of  the  telephone  and  of  signals. 
"These  two  methods  of  transmission  are  the  most  prac- 
ticable in  combat;  horsemen,  runners  and  relay  posts 
will  be  employed  under  fire  in  exceptional  cases  only." 
(A.  R.) 

One  can  but  approve  these  instructions.  In 
France  we  are  behindhand  with  respect  to  communica- 
tions, we  still  have  a  marked  preference  for  communica- 


[36] 

tions  by  mounted  men.  Telephonic  communication, 
and,  failing  that,  communication  by  signals,  ought  to 
be  the  rule,  and  to  emphasize  it  it  would  be  well  to  use 
them  exclusively  at  the  maneuvers. 

In  Germany  the  communications  of  the  "infantry 
artillery"  with  that  infantry  is  kept  up  by  means  of 
officers.  These  officers  connected  with  the  artillery  by 
telephone  or  by  the  optical  apparatus,  take  positions 
in  rear  of  the  infantry  and  observe  its  movements ;  they 
inform  their  artillery  of  everything  that  takes  place  and 
direct  its  fire  according  to  the  needs  of  the  infantry. 

This  system  has  not  been  adopted  in  France;  it 
offers  several  disadvantages.  In  order  to  perform  sat- 
isfactorily his  mission,  the  officer  of  communications, 
detached  in  the  vicinity  of  the  infantry,  must  be  well 
posted  on  the  tactics  and  on  all  needs  of  that  infantry ; 
he  must  have  very  extended  general  military  informa- 
tion; these  are  conditions  not  to  be  found  among  all 
young  artillery  officers,  and  officers  of  the  higher  grades 
have  more  important  things  to  do  than  to  be  communica- 
tion officers.  Moreover,  whatever  be  the  knowledge  of 
that  officer  he  can  not  divine  the  thoughts  and  the  in- 
tentions of  the  infantry  commander;  he  is,  therefore, 
unable  to  direct  the  artillery  fire  according  to  the  present 
and  future  needs  of  that  infantry. 

It  is  much  better  that  the  officer  or  the  agent  of 
communications  be  with  the  infantry  commander,  as 
has  been  recommended  in  France  by  the  Artillery  Com- 
mittee. This  communication  agent  ought  to  be  always 
connected  with  his  artillery  by  telephone  and  by  signal 
men  and  ought  not  to  return  to  it  except  when  he  is 
unable  to  communicate  with  it  by  other  means. 


[37] 


HOWITZERS. 

MISSION    OF   THE    HOWITZER. 

The  French  military  authorities  assume  that  the 
7.5  cm.  gun  can  do  all  the  work  required  by  combat  in 
fiat  open  country.  France  has  no  howitzers  in  the 
army  corps.  The  15.5  R.  guns  are  theoretically  re- 
served for  armies.  The  Germans  created  after  Plevna 
their  light  howitzers ;  then  finding  that  these  pieces  did 
not  have  sufficient  power,  they  provided  a  battalion  of 
heavy  howitzers  for  each  army  corps. 

We  shall  not  discuss  here  the  value  of  these  how- 
itzers from  the  point  of  view  of  ballistics.  We  shall 
merely  have  a  glance  at  their  tactical  employment, 
which  has  been  presented  in  regulations  according  to 
the  hopes  founded  upon  their  firing. 

The  missions  which  are  incumbent  upon  the  how- 
itzers are  principally : 

1 .  To  reach  and  destroy  artillery  that  is  recogniz- 
able, defiladed  or  behind  earth  works  sheltered  from 
direct  fire. 

2.  To  reach  infantry  hidden  in  the  trenches  or 
behind  obstacles. 

3.  To  crush  the  shelter  of  the  enemy  and,  at  the 
moment  of  assault,  to  render  untenable  his  points  of 
support. 

The  field  gun,  the  Germans  say,  can  not  accomplish 
any  of  these  roles ;  it  is  indispensable  that  the  army 
corps  be  endowed  with  the  means  necessary  to  obtain 
these  objects. 

The  howitzers  can  fire  from  a  greater  distance  than 
the  guns.  They  will  be  placed  back  of  the  latter  and 
often  even  behind,  care  being  taken  to  defilade  them 


[38J 

well  so  long  as  superiority  of  fire  shall  not  have  been 
required.  If  they  are  protected,  the  howitzers  will  be 
able  to  regulate  their  fire  almost  as  if  on  the  maneuver 
terrain ;  if  they  have  a  good  system  of  orientation  they 
can  be  sure  of  having  their  fire  well  regulated  and  of 
obtaining  effects  that  will  assure  to  them  an  incontesta- 
ble superiority  of  fire  over  the  opposing  artillery.  Such 
is,  summed  up,  the  theory  of  the  partisans  of  the  how- 
itzer. 

HEAVY   HOWITZERS. 

With  respect  to  what  concerns  especially  the  heavy 
howitzer,  the  regulations  of  November  18,  1908,  have 
appeared  to  regulate  the  employment  of  them  and  to 
mark  their  place.  It  is  interesting  to  glance  through 
these  regulations  to  find  developed  there  the  theory  of 
the  duties  assigned  to  the  heavy  artillery  just  men- 
tioned. 

In  a  general  way  the  heavy  artillery  must  ''Act  as  a 
first  line  to  put  out  of  action  the  arms  of  the  enemy, 
then  to  destroy  the  enemy's  shelter  and  the  obstacles 
which  hinder  the  advance  of  its  own  troops;  finally  to 
prepare  the  assault."     (H.  H.  R.  387.) 

This  is  its  general  role  in  four  lines. 

"It  is  not  to  be  engaged,"  say  the  regulations, 
*' until  after  a  thorough  reconnaissance  has  been  made 
and  light  has  been  obtained  upon  the  situation."  Here 
is  again  the  same  attention  to  reconnaissance  as  for  the 
field  guns,  but  to  a  higher  degree. 

The  regulations  mention  that  "The  action  of  the 
heavy  artillery  is  decisive  against  artillery  that  is  recog- 
nizable (not  necessarily  visible),  against  infantry  in  or 
behind  shelter  and  especially  against  strongly  con- 
;structed  shelter."     (H.  H.  R.  358). 


[39] 

They  speak  then  of  the  importance  of  lines  of  infor- 
mation and  of  the  system  of  auxiliary  observing  stations. 
They  recommend  in  this  respect  the  widest  possible  use 
of  the  telephone,  of  signal  men  on  bicycles,  and  couriers. 
"The  howitzers  will  be  defiladed;  they  will  often  be 
placed  behind  the  field  artillery."  (363.)  "It  is  de- 
sirable that,  during  an  offensive  action,  all  the  duties 
with  which  the  heavy  field  artillery  may  be  charged  can 
be  affected  by  the  occupation  of  a  single  position;  this 
position  should  therefore  be  as  near  the  enemy  as  ques- 
tions of  fire  efficiency  and  battery  protection  will  per- 
mit. ' '  In  this  way  long  and  difficult  changes  in  position 
will  be  avoided.  The  prescriptions  of  the  regulations 
are  summed  up  in  these  few  lines. 

HOWITZERS    IN    CURVED    FIRE. 

Will  the  curved  fire  of  the  howitzers  produce  any 
considerable  effect?  Can  much  be  expected  of  their 
fire?  It  is  worth  while  to  devote  a  little  attention  to 
the  question.  We  have  shown  above  the  missions  that 
devolve  upon  the  curved  fire  of  the  howitzers;  what  will 
be  the  result  of  it  ? 

Against  a  line  of  intrenched  infantry,  against  an 
objective,  troops  or  artillery  defiladed  from  direct  fire, 
the  howitzer  will  be  able  to  render  some  service.  The 
principal  requisite  in  order  to  reach  these  objectives  will 
be  to  be  perfectly  informed  as  to  their  emplacements; 
it  is  a  primary  difficulty.  Imperfectly  regulated  fire 
will  produce  nothing. 

In  order  to  have  the  hope  of  getting  some  pro- 
jectiles on  the  target  it  will  be  necessary  to  fire  a  great 
deal,  even  with  accurate  firing;  whence  a  great  con- 
sumption of  projectiles,  the  replenishing  of  which  is 
difficult. 


[40] 

If  after  the  reconnaissance  or  during  the  firing  the 
objective  changes  position  the  results  will  be  annulled. 
As  soon  as  this  change  of  position  becomes  known  the 
fire  will  have  to  be  modified ;  that  will  be  long  and  diffi- 
cult. If,  finally,  the  emplacement  is  only  approxi- 
mately known,  it  will  be  necessary,  in  order  to  have  any 
chances  of  striking  it,  to  use  progressive  fire ;  and  what 
expenditure  of  ammunition  will  then  be  entailed! 

We  believe  with  General  von  Halten,  "One  or 
several  happy  shots  will  cause  only  minimum  losses  to 
the  defenders,  and  that  after  a  tremendous  consumption 
of  ammunition." 

In  every  case  where  a  mobile  objective,  even  though 
masked,  can  be  reached  by  direct  fire,  the  fire  of  the 
field  guns  will  produce  a  great  deal  more  effect  than  the 
curved  fire  of  the  howitzer. 

If  the  objectives  are  obstacles,  shelters  or  fortifi- 
cations, these,  being  stable  and  permitting  the  use  of 
auxiliary  points  of  aim  will  be  much  more  easily  struck 
by  curved  fire.  The  shells  that  strike  the  target  will 
produce  thoroughly  destructive  effects,  though  quite 
localized. 

However,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  curved 
fire  alone  will  be  capable  of  handling  fortifications  and 
points  of  support  which  the  enemy  has  had  time  to  pre- 
pare and  to  make  strong  enough  to  afford  protection 
against  direct  fire  from  less  powerful  projectiles. 

Numerous  German  authorities  appear  to  be  scep- 
tical as  to  the  results  to  be  expected  from  curved  fire. 
Firing  of  this  class  seems  to  be  absolutely  necessary  only 
against  semi-permanent  fortifications. 

Major  Ruprecht  who  has  very  thoroughly  studied 
this  question  of  curved  fire  of  howitzers  sums  up  his 


[41] 

discussion  of  the  subject  of  the  fire  against  troops  or 
artillery  by  saying:  ''We  cannot  accord  any  special 
efficiency  to  the  howitzer  against  a  masked  objective 
*  *  *  ;  against  half  masked  batteries  these  pieces  will 
not  give  brilliant  results;  against  mobile  objectives 
they  can  do  nothing.'' 

One  example  among  a  hundred  drawn  from  the 
Manchurian  war  goes  to  prove  the  accuracy  of  ths  as- 
sertion. A  Russian  artillery  officer,  a  participant  in 
the  battle  of  Si-Ho-Ian,  of  June  18,  1904,  writes  in 
speaking  of  the  artillery  duel  >  ' '  However  the  Japanese, 
not  satisfied  with  the  incessant  fire  of  shrapnel  which 
they  were  delivering  with  feverish  intensity,  passed 
shortly  after  the  opening  of  fire  by  one  of  our  newly 
arrived  batteries  to  fire  with  lyddite  shells  directed  par- 
ticularly against  that  battery;  but,  to  our  astonish- 
ment, notwithstanding  the  superiority  of  position  of 
the  Japanese  batteries,  from  which  they  must  have 
clearly  distinguished  the  Russian  batteries,  and  not- 
withstanding the  infernal  intensity  of  their  fire,  the 
Russian  batteries  stiffered  relatively  little  and  continued 
their  fire.'' 

APPRECIATION  OF  THE  GERMAN  HOWITZER. 

The  light  howitzer,  it  must  not  be  forgotten,  uses 
direct  fire  like  the  field  guns;  it  will  therefore  utilize 
curved  fire  only  when  that  is  absolutely  necessary.  It 
is  a  piece  with  a  double  purpose  capable  of  struggling 
everywhere  with  the  field  gun ;  it  fires  less  rapidly,  but 
it  sends  a  projectile  twice  as  powerful.  Its  ratio  of 
efficiency  against  troops  is  certainly  inferior  to  that  of 
the  field  piece;  but  against  shelters  or  obstacles  it  can 
by  its  power  render  service  superior  to  that  of  the  latter. 


[42] 

Finally  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  these  large  caliber 
pieces,  whose  projectiles  are  charged  with  high  power 
explosives  produce  very  considerable  moral  effects. 
This  must  be  borne  in  mind. 

The  best  German  authors  generally  extoU  their 
qualities  and  are  strong  advocates  of  them. 

In  our  opinion  the  light  howitzer  is  a  useful  weapon, 
which  will  be  able  to  render  great  service,  but  its  effi- 
ciency in  the  majority  of  cases  is  not  sufficient. 

As  to  the  heavy  howitzer,  it  has  a  great  many  de- 
tractors. It  has  been  strongly  criticised  in  Germany 
by  a  certain  school  (Generals  von  Halten,  Rohne,  etc.) 
It  appears  to  be  a  piece  adopted  hastily  as  a  result  o 
reports  that  were  primitive  and  without  complete  infor- 
mation upon  the  battles  in  Manchuria. 

(a)  This  howitzer  presents  numerous  disadvant- 
ages. It  makes  considerably  heavier  the  column  of  the 
army  corps  in  which  it  marches.  It  lengthens  the 
column  and  is  not  easily  disengaged  from  it. 

(b)  It  can  move  but  slowly  and  only  over  very 
solid  roads  and  ground;  bad  roads  and,  still  more  so, 
fields  are  not  possible  for  it.  It  has  therefore,  no 
mobility. 

(c)  As  is  indicated  in  article  397  of  the  regulations 
the  heavy  artillery  will  have  to  accomplish  all  its 
firing  missions  from  a  single  position  as  near  as  possible 
to  the  enemy.  A  change  of  position  demands  so  much 
time  and  offers  so  many  difficulties  that  it  is  to  be 
avoided.  One  wonders,  therefore,  how  this  artillery 
will  be  able  to  follow  the  fluctuations  of  a  battle:  if 
the  infantry  advances  appreciably,  it  will  have  to  change 
position,  consequently  losing  a  great  deal  of  time;   if 


[43] 

the  infantry  withdraws,  it  risks  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy  or  at  least  under  his  fire. 

(d)  Not  being  protected  by  a  shield,  the  heavy 
howitzer  can  be  silenced  by  an  ordinary  French  gun  of 
7.5  cm.  which  might  happen  from  flank  or  cross  position 
be  able  to  fire  upon  it. 

(e)  It  has  a  ratio  of  efficiency  sensibly  smaller 
than  the  light  howitzer  against  all  objectives  of  field 
warfare,  for  the  reason  that  having  a  projectile  two 
times  as  heavy  for  an  equal  amount  of  destructive 
matter  it  has  two  times  less  a  chance  of  striking  the 
target,  and  one  of  its  projectiles  does  not  produce  the 
effect  of  two  projectiles  of  the  light  howitzer. 

(/)  Finally,  the  heavy  howitzer  does  not  fire 
shrapnel,  it  depends  for  results  upon  accurately  aimed 
fire. 

MATERIAL   AND   MORAL   EFFECT   OF    ARTILLERY. 

In  order  to  discuss  battle  field  tactics  reckoning 
must  be  made  of  the  material  and  of  the  moral  effects 
of  artillery  fire. 

The  first  news  that  arrived  from  the  war  of  Man- 
churia, where  for  the  first  time  two  nations  armed  with 
modem  artillery  were  engaged  in  combat,  appeared  to 
give  to  the  cannon  a  considerable  preponderance  in 
battles.  The  big  voice  of  the  artillery  made  itself 
heard  afar;  it  dominated  all  other  noises.  The  effects 
of  the  projectiles  with  explosive  powder,  especially 
those  of  the  heavy  artillery,  produced  emotional  effects 
that  impressed  the  witnesses  of  the  struggle.  The 
soldiers  who  had  been  in  the  furnace  of  combat  told  of 
the  profound  impression  made  upon  them  by  those 
projectiles,   and  their  imagination  attributed   terrific 


[44] 

effects  to  them.  People  talked  with  awe  of  the  chimose 
projectiles  of  the  Japanese  howitzers,  which  they  said 
had  obtained  the  victory  by  laying  in  ruins  from  top 
to  bottom  the  defenses  piled  up  by  the  Russians  at  Liao- 
Yan,  Mukden,  etc. 

Under  the  impression  of  these  reports  it  was 
imagined  that  the  importance  of  the  artillery  was  to 
increase  considerably  and  that  it  was  necessary  to  pro- 
vide modern  armies  with  a  considerable  number  of 
guns  largely  composed  of  these  howitzers  with  the 
formidable  projectiles,  which  were  producing  sucl\eff ects 
in  Manchuria. 

Thus  was  formed  the  point  of  departure  for  dis- 
cussions which  led  to  the  creation  of  the  heavy  howitzers 
which  we  have  just  been  discussing. 

Later,  when  everybody  was  calmer  and  the- results 
of  the  battles  in  Manchuria  could  be  verified,  we  had  to 
yield  to  the  evidence.  The  artillery  had  not  produced 
any  greater  effect  in  this  war  than  in  preceding  wars, 
rather  the  contrary.  The  most  reHable  statistics  prove 
that  the  percentage  of  losses  attributable  to  artillery 
often  remained  at  seven  or  eight  per  cent,  and  never 
surpassed  fifteen  per  cent. 

The  many  accounts  of  officers  worthy  of  credit, 
participants  in  these  battles,  generally  agree  as  to  the 
very  variable  effects  of  the  artillery  depending  upon 
circumstances. 

Artillery  struggling  against  artillery  in  its  front 
produced  but  little  material  effect,  and  yet  neither  the 
Russians  nor  the  Japanese  had  shields  on  their  guns; 
they  even  fought  sometimes  without  having  been  able 
to  create  shelter  for  themselves. 


[45] 

We  read  in  a  letter  of  a  Japanese  officer  the  follow- 
ing account  of  an  artillery  combat : 

"The  1st  of  August  in  the  army  of  General  Kuroki 
our  batteries  (two)  had  hardly  had  the  time  to  entrench 
and  to  open  fire  when  they  were  attacked  by  the  hostile 
artillery.  The  Russians  fired  remarkably  well  and  their 
fire  was  perfectly  regulated ;  our  batteries  were  covered 
with  projectiles.  I  took  photographic  proofs  of  the 
bursting  of  ten  or  twelve  shrapnel  falling  one  after 
the  other.     In  a  short  time  gur  batteries  were  silenced. 

' '  I  thought  it  was  for  good ;  but  soon  they  recom- 
menced their  fire  and  developed  it  to  its  maximum  in- 
tensity. That  kept  up  till  8  o'clock  in  the  evening. 
When  I  saw  that  the  fire  of  the  artillery  had  at  last 
ceased,  I  went  to  those  two  batteries  convinced  that  I 
should  find  their  personnel  sorely  afflicted  and  their 
materiel  badly  demolished. 

"The  two  batteries  had  in  all  one  officer  and  four 
men  killed,  one  officer  and  thirteen  men  wounded ;  one 
piece  had  a  broken  wheel." 

General  Hamilton  relates  that  at  the  battle  of 
Liao-Yan,  he  saw  the  artillery  of  the  Japanese  Guard 
concentrate  its  fire  on  an  uncovered  Russian  battery — 
under  that  fire  he  saw  the  Russians  take  the  exposed 
gtms,  by  hand,  in  rear  of  the  crest  behind  the  trenches. 

General  Samsonov  relates  that  on  October  12  th 
at  Peu-Si-Hon,  one  of  his  batteries,  which  was  firing 
from  behind  intrenchments,  stood  the  well  aimed  fire 
from  the  Japanese  artillery  during  a  whole  morning 
without  experiencing  any  loss.  The  men  were  able  to 
withdraw  it  by  hand  under  a  violent  fire. 

Other  very  numerous  examples  prove  that  the  fire 
of  artillery  against  artillery  that  is  only  slightly  visible 


[46] 

and  is  entrenched  is  materially  almost  negligible;  the 
fire  against  artillery  uncovered  and  not  entrenched 
forces  it  rapidly  to  cease  firing  and  causes  it  sometimes 
serious  losses  of  materiel. 

A  battery  in  movement  which  falls  under  the  fire 
of  the  adversary  is  destroyed  or  at  least  very  rapidly 
placed  out  of  action.  These  assertions  are  based  on 
what  took  place  in  Manchuria. 

Among  other  accounts  we  borrow  from  the  official 
account  of  the  engagement  of  Dachi-Ichao  (July  24, 
1904)  by  Lieut.  Col.  Pacht-Cheuko,  the  following  obser- 
vations : 

The  Russian  batteries,  very  inferior  in  number, 
managed  to  struggle  advantageously  against  the  Jap- 
anese batteries.     This  was  because : 

1.  They  were  completely  defiladed  from  view, 
500  meters  in  rear  of  a  crest  which  formed  a  covering 
mass  24  meters  high  and  which  therefore  absolutely 
hid  the  flashes  of  their  guns. 

2.  During  the  day  not  a  movement  of  carriages 
disclosed  their  presence  to  the  hostile  observers. 

3.  The  pieces  were  separated  by  intervals  which 
rendered  them  less  vulnerable. 

While  these  batteries  hardly  suffered  from  the  fire 
of  the  Japanese  artillery,  the  latter  was  sorely  afflicted 
while  seeking  to  move  over  exposed  ground.  "Twice, " 
says  the  Lieutenant  Colonel,  ''the  Japanese  batteries 
tried  to  change  position  to  the  west  of  San-Stsia-Tsi ; 
their  limbers  came  out  from  behind  the  wood  near  the 
village;  but  both  times  they  received  our  fire  whose 
effect  was  terrific ;  the  horses  ran  away  and  the  limbers 
disappeared  far  to  the  rear.     These  two  batteries  were 


[47] 

soon  unable  to  operate;  the  other  Japanese  batteries 
did  not  thereafter  try  to  move  forward." 

In  regard  to  what  concerns  results  of  artillery  fire 
against  infantry,  the  observations  made  in  Manchuria 
confirm  absolutely  the  French  opinions.  Shrapnel 
from  the  field  guns  can  hardly  do  anything  against  in- 
fantry sheltered    in  trenches. 

The  Germans  however  are  seeking  to  obtain  better 
results  with  the  shrapnel  from  their  light  howitzers. 
They  claim  to  be  able,  by  means  of  carefully  planning 
the  bursting  of  their  shells,  to  reach  with  a  portion  of 
the  fragments  the  objectives  placed  in  trenches.  They 
succeed  in  this  on  the  target  range,  but  on  the  field  of 
battle  the  results  would  be  more  than  uncertain;  suc- 
cessful accomplishment  demands  such  exact  ranging 
that  it  would  cost  them  a  prohibitive  number  of  pro- 
jectiles. 

Shrapnel  fire  is  much  superior  to  the  curved  fire  of 
the  howitzers,  even  with  the  big  lyddite  projectiles, 
against  infantry  that  is  not  sheltered  or  that  exposes 
itself  behind  fortifications. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  Manchurian  war  shrapnel 
was  spoken  of  as  having  failed ;  but  a  return  to  the  truth 
has  been  compelled.  Shrapnel  is  the  projectile  par 
excellence  against  infantry.  It  has  produced  terrific 
effects  upon  troops  in  dense  formations,  and  it  is  as 
effective  as  possible  against  lines  of  unprotected  skir- 
mishers. 

Finally,  with  regard  to  the  effects  of  bursting  shells 
small  or  big,we  must  agree  with  the  opinion  of  the  Rus- 
sian officer,  a  witness  of  many  battles,  who  says :  ' '  The 
bursting  shells  produce  a  mighty  spectacle  to  the  eye 
and  a  great  moral  impression;    they  dig  vast  funnels 


[48] 

and  when  they  burst  throw  up  huge  columns  of  dirt 
and  smoke.     But  their  real  effect  is  entirely  insignificant. 

"In  flat  open  country  their  effect  is  especially 
moral ;  their  radius  of  destructive  action  is  very  small : 
25  to  30  meters  for  the  missies  of  the  light  howitzers. 

* '  Within  closed  places  the  effects  are  terrible.  Houses 
are  untenable  and  are  quickly  destroyed.  If  a  shell 
bursts  exactly  in  a  shelter  or  over  a  trench  its  ravaging 
effect  is  complete.  In  timber  the  moral  effect  is  in- 
creased ten  fold;  the  material  effect  is  augmented  by 
that  produced  by  the  branches  being  flung  in  every 
direction." 

MORAL  EFFECT. 

The  moral  effect  of  the  artillery  is  one  of  its  most 
important  factors,  which  it  is  essential  to  know  how  to 
make  use  of;  the  object  of  a  battle  is  not  to  kill  a  vast 
number  of  the  enemy  but  to  produce  fear  in  the  ad- 
versary, to  make  him  believe  in  his  own  inferiority  and 
to  make  him  decide  upon  flight. 

The  artillery  projectile  because  of  the  noise  it  makes 
in  bursting,  the  smoke  it  spreads,  the  dust  it  raises, 
finally  because  of  the  wounds,  frequently  gaping  and  hor- 
rible, which  it  produces,  has  a  considerable  moral  effect. 

When  it  is  recommended  to  use  zone  firing  it  is  not 
merely  to  profit  by  an  advantageous  opportunity  but  also 
to  produce  a  sudden  intense  effect ;  an  effect  often  more 
moral  than  material  from  which  it  is  well  to  know  how 
to  profit,  from  a  tactical  point  of  view. 

The  bursting  shell,  of  which  we  have  shown  the  in- 
feriority in  open  country  from  the  view  point  of  wounds 
produced,  acquires  an  incontestable  superiority  from  the 
moral  point  of  view.      The  shells,  particularly  those 


[49] 

of  large  caliber,  are  absolutely  terrifying  to  those  not 
accustomed  to  them. 

It  was  the  great  moral  effects  that  impressed  the 
witnesses  of  the  Manchurian  war  when,  at  the  beginning, 
they  believed  that  the  explosive  shell  was  to  replace 
shrapnel,  but  the  Russians  became  accustomed  to  the 
theatrical  effect  of  the  explosive  projectile  upon  ascer- 
taining its  slight  material  effect. 

"Action  that  is  solely  moral  is  soon  spent, "  says 
Ardant  du  Picq. 

According  to  their  regulations  the  Germans  must 
use  their  howitzers  from  the  commencement  of  the  battle. 
From  the  moral  point  of  view  that  seems  to  be  a  defect. 
The  nerves  of  the  adversaries  may  become  accustomed 
to  these  bugbears  which  at  the  time  of  the  final  onset 
will  therefore  not  produce  the  desired  effect. 

It  would  seem  wise  not  to  consume  this  moral 
action  too  quickly,  and  therefore  to  use  the  big  howitzers 
only  to  produce  a  great  effect  at  a  given  moment  at  a 
given  point.  That  is  the  French  doctrine  for  the  use  of 
its  15.5  R. ;  we  believe  it  is  the  correct  one. 

But  on  the  other  hand  it  is  certain  that  upon  our 
young  soldiers  with  the  impressionable  French  temper- 
ament the  effects  of  the  German  howitzers  may  be  disas- 
trous in  the  first  large  battle.  Our  young  soldiers  may 
not  have  time  to  get  used  to  them.  Now,  it  is  quite  prob- 
able that  the  first  large  battles  may  decide  the  war. 

The  Manchurian  war  permitted  ascertaining  facts 
worthy  of  notice;  not  only  did  the  loud  noise  and  the 
terrible  visual  effects  of  these  explosive  shells  scare  the 
opponent  and  depress  his  morale,  but  they  had  the  fur- 
ther result  of  stimulating  in  an  astounding  manner  the 
morals  of  the  young  soldiers  whom  they  were  supporting. 


[50] 

When  the  Japanese  perceived  the  Russian  trenches, 
before  which  they  had  been  using  up  their  troops  for  so 
many  hours,  bombarded  in  a  terrifying  manner  by  the 
combination  of  the  field  artillery  and  the  heavy  artillery ; 
when  they  saw  before  them  thick  clouds  of  smoke  and 
dust  interspersed  by  the  flashes  of  the  shells  which  were 
bursting  above  the  trenches;  when  they  heard  the 
thunder  of  these  shells  covering  the  whole  field  of  battle, 
their  enthusiasm  no  longer  knew  any  bounds;  they 
dashed  forward  to  death  or  glory  with  savage  fury. 


[51] 
CHAPTER  III. 


CAVALRY. 

The  regulations  on  field  service  and  those  of  April  3, 
1909,  for  the  German  cavalry  fix  the  province  of  that 
arm  and  its  employment  in  war.  Let  us  rapidly  ex- 
amine the  principal  points  of  the  cavalry  regulations 
with  regard  to  what  especially  concerns  its  operation 
and  action  beyond  its  co-operation  with  the  infantry. 

The  Germans  rely  a  great-  deal  upon  the  cavalry  to 
get  information ;  hence  they  want  it  strong,  well  armed, 
capable  of  piercing  the  protecting  screens. 

We  shall  see  later  on,  upon  studying  the  prelimi- 
naries of  the  battle,  the  method  of  employment  which 
they  lay  down  for  reconnaissance  and  security. 

CAVALRY   ACTION. 

The  cavalry  division  was  formerly  the  strongest 
cavalry  unit  placed  under  a  single  commander.  The 
new  regulations  contemplate  the  formation  of  a  great 
corps  of  cavalry  formed  of  several  divisions.  **The  as- 
sembling of  several  divisions  into  cavalry  corps  may  be 
necessary  as  well  during  the  operations  as  upon  the  field 
of  battle. "  (C.  R.)  We  shall  return  later  to  this  ques- 
tion. 

Each  division  marches  as  a  rule  upon  one  road. 

As  soon  as  the  proximity  of  the  enemy  makes  it 
necessary,  there  is  taken  up  a  formation  in  column  of 
platoons  or  in  double  column  to  reduce  the  depth  of  the 
division ;  this  is  the  Entf altung  (development) ;  then  it 
passes  to  the  deployed  formation  of  line  of  columns: 
this  is  the  Entwikelung ;  finally  it  forms  into  line  before 
the  impact ;  this  is  the  Aufmarsch. 


[52] 

As  soon  as  the  division  commander  wishes  to  take 
a  semi-deployed  formation — Entfaltung  or  Entwike- 
lung — he  gives  his  orders  to  the  brigade  commanders. 
"There  is  no  prescribed  formation  for  the  division;  the 
commanding  general  breaks  up  the  column  into  march 
units  according  to  the  object  to  be  attained."    (C.R.213.) 

This  prescription  marks  a  profound  difference  be- 
tween the  old  and  the  new  regulations.  There  are  no 
normal  formations,  the  general  does  as  he  thinks  best  and 
breaks  up  his  division  in  the  manner  he  deems  expedient. 
Complete  initiative  is  left  to  the  brigade  commanders; 
they  march  abreast  or  in  echelons  according  to  the  orders 
received,  but  they  choose  their  route  and  their  forma- 
tions, keeping  connection  with  the  base  fraction.  They 
look  out  for  their  own  flank  protection.  **As  soon  as  a 
division  commander  has  decided  to  attack,  he  indicates 
their  missions  to  the  artillery  and  the  machine  guns ;  he 
gives  the  order  to  attack  to  the  brigades,  indicating  if 
necessary  the  direction  to  the  base  brigade,  and  desig- 
nates a  reserve."     (C.  R.  223.) 

With  respect  to  everything  that  concerns  the  action 
of  cavalry  against  cavalry,  the  precepts  of  the  new  reg- 
ulations do  not  essentially  differ  from  the  French. 
After  experiments,  our  neighbors  have  adopted  almost 
the  combat  method  of  the  French  cavalry — action  in 
compact  line  of  regiments  with  supports  in  rear  and 
echelons  on  the  side.*  The  regulations  no  longer  pre- 
scribe the  deployment  of  nearly  all  the  forces  on  a 
single  line. 

"It  is  essential  to  engage  at  the  beginning  as  many 


*It  should  be  remembered  that  this  discussion  refers  to  large 
bodies;  the  echelons  may  be  units  of  considerable  size  moving  at  an 
appreciable  distance  to  the  rear  or  to  the  front. — Translator. 


[53] 

troops  as  are  needed,  but  no  more.  No  escadron  must 
fall  opposite  a  gap  in  the  enemy's  line."     (C.  R.  430.) 

The  formation  in  echelons  is  becoming  the  rule  in 
France.  "The  suppleness  of  the  order  in  echelons  per- 
mits, in  proportion  as  the  situation  is  cleared  up,  of 
grouping  the  forces  in  the  most  favorable  manner  for 
passing  to  the  attack."  (C.  R.  425.)  It  is  the  appli- 
cation of  the  precepts  laid  down  by  Moltke  in  1869  and 
lost  sight  of  by  the  Germans:  '*To  deploy  all  one's 
forces  in  the  first  line  is  bad,  eyen  for  small  bodies.  The 
large  units  will  rarely  find  the  necessary  ground.  The 
success  of  cavalry  action  will  often  depend  upon  the 
dispositions  that  will  have  been  taken  to  protect  its  own 
flanks  and  to  surprise  those  of  the  enemy's. " 

The  echeloning  can  be  done  to  the  rear  to  protect 
the  flanks ;  but  when  that  is  possible  it  will  be  preferable 
to  make  it  to  the  front.  Let  us  hear  what  General  von 
Bemhardi,  the  great  cavalry  leader  says  on  the  subject 
of  echelons : 

"There  is  generally  understood  by  the  order  in 
echelons  a  disposition  with  the  wings  refused  to  the 
rear  and  it  is  believed  that  it  is  only  by  such  echeloning 
that  the  protection  of  the  flanks  can  be  assured.  In  my 
opinion,  there  are  other  ways  of  operating.  Against  an 
enveloping  attack  of  cavalry  the  refused  echelons  offer 
indeed  the  best  protection;  but,  against  a  threatened 
hostile  fire  upon  the  wing,  the  result  is  in  no  way  attained. 
Against  an  attack  by  fire  action  or  in  all  cases  if  on 
covered  ground,  it  is  to  the  front  that  the  echelon  should 
be  thrown  to  clear  things  up  in  the  direction  of  danger. 

"The  use  of  defensive  echelons  moreover  does  not 
correspond  in  any  way  to  the  offensive  spirit  that  cav- 
alry ought  to  have.     The  best  protection  of  the  flanks 


[54] 

is  assured  by  attacking  the  hostile  flank,  and  this  attack, 
like  all  enveloping  attacks,  will  be  better  prepared  by- 
echeloning  to  the  front  one  wing  or  both." 

The  regulations  do  not  seem  to  be  so  assertive  as 
General  von  Bemhardi. 

''The  echeloning  will  vary  with  the  end  to  be  at- 
tained and  with  the  situation  *  *  *  ^  An  echelon- 
ing to  the  front  may  result  from  the  situation  of  the 
advance  guard."     (425.) 

This  echeloning  to  the  front,  to  attack  the  hostile 
flank,  is  quite  in  conformity  with  German  tactical  ideas ; 
we  find  it  again  in  the  infantry  action.  It  can  not  be 
successful  in  cavalry  action  except  upon  the  condition 
that  the  enemy  be  deceived  and  does  not  notice  the  move- 
ment ;  otherwise  one  would  be  playing  a  game  that  seems 
very  dangerous. 

It  is  admitted  however  that  one  will  sometimes  be 
able  to  go  to  the  combat  according  to  the  old  principles. 
*'If  the  situation  of  the  enemy  is  sufficiently  clear,  the 
chief  of  the  cavalry  can  at  the  beginning  arrange  his 
forces  abreast  and  direct  them  upon  the  points  upon 
which  he  has  determined  to  make  the  attack ' '     (426. ) 

The  regulations  recommend  always  supporting  the 
flanks  either  upon  an  obstacle,  or  artillery  or  machine 
guns,  or  finally  upon  dismounted  troops.  It  expressly 
recommends  making  use  of  dismounted  action  to  support 
the  cavalry  combat.  "The  fire  of  a  well  sheltered 
fraction  on  foot  may  have  a  decisive  effect." 

These  prescriptions  of  the  new  regulations,  upon 
the  majority  of  points,  accord  remarkably  with  our  cav- 
.alry  regulations.  They  appear  moreover  to  be  abso- 
lutely justified. 

We  shall  not  study  farther  the  question  of  cavalry 


[55] 

combat,  which  is  outside  the  scope  imposed  upon  this 
work.  We  shall  pause  only  over  two  rdles  that  are  new, 
or  at  least  organized  in  a  new  way,  with  which  the  re- 
gulations have  vested  the  cavalry  arm :  the  role  of  the 
defensive  screen,  called  Verchleierung,  a  word  recently 
introduced  into  the  field  service,  and  the  role  of  mounted 
infantry  which  takes  more  and  more  importance  in 
German  tactical  procedure. 

VERCHLEIERUNG.     (Cavalry  Screen.) 

This  new  military  expression,  introduced  into  the 
field  service  regulations,  does  not  indicate  something 
absolutely  new.  The  Verchleierung  is  the  curtain  or 
screen  which  is  to  conceal  a  movement,  an  assembly, 
or  a  position.  The  cavalry  is  to  form  this  screen ;  but 
to  it  is  attached  often  some  detachments  of  infantry, 
cyclists  and  machine  guns.  The  Verchleierung  can  be 
offensive  or  defensive. 

Offensive  to  mask  a  movement :  *  *  On  all  the  roads 
are  pushed  forward  strong  cavalry  patrols  as  well  as 
cyclists  detachments,  having  for  mission  to  attack 
and  to  drive  back  the  hostile  patrols"  (F.  S.  R.  195) : 
and  the  movement  or  position  is  surrounded  on  every 
dangerous  side  by  a  strong  cavalry  screen. 

Defensive :  The  Verchleierung  is  ' '  more  efficacious 
if  there  can  be  utilized  a  natural  obstacle  of  the  terrain 
eaving  available  for  the  hostile  reconnaissance  only  a 
small  number  of  roads."  ''These  roads  are  then  ob- 
structed by  barricades  which  the  cavalry  defends  with 
its  fire;  there  are  attached  to  it  if  possible  some 
machine  guns  sections. 

"In  rear  are  held  cavalry  detachments  of  greater 
strength.     *     *     *     Scouting  detachments  are  pushed 


[56] 

in  advance."  (F.  S.  R.  196.)  The  infantry  aids  in 
forming  this  curtain,  depending  upon  circumstances. 

The  employment  of  the  Verchleierung  will,  in  many 
cases,  offer  many  advantages.  Every  time  that  a  force 
wishes  to  change  position  without  being  seen,  it  will 
employ  a  system  of  Verchleierung,  more  or  less  complete. 
When  it  is  desired  to  create  a  zone  into  which  the 
enemy's  reconnasisance  must  not  penetrate,  there  will 
be  established  a  close  system  of  Verchleierung.  It  is 
prescribed  that  hostile  reconnoitering  parties  that  have 
succeeded  in  penetrating  it  shall  be  pursued  to  the 
uttermost.  It  is  of  course  of  the  greatest  importance 
that  they  do  not  carry  away  any  information  for  which 
there  is  the  greatest  reason  for  secrecy. 

Accurately  speaking,  this  defensive  curtain  which 
the  Germans  designate  by  a  new  term  is  in  no  way  ab- 
solutely new,  but  the  word  expresses  an  ensemble  of 
dispositions  which  it  would  be  useless  to  recall  when 
giving  orders.  The  word  will  be  sufficient;  everybody 
will  understand  it. 

These  screens  may  be  very  useful  before  a  timid 
enemy  and  may  succeed  in  stopping  detachments  or 
advance  guards  which  have  neither  spirit  in  their  move- 
ments nor  notions  of  what  there  may  be  in  front  of 
them. 

As  we  shall  see,  a  German  advance  guard  has  for  its 
duty  to  be  prudent;  a  system  of  Verchleierung  very 
solidly  established  might  be  able  to  intimidate  it  or  per- 
haps to  deceive  it.  As  to  the  French  advance  guards, 
which  are  distinctly  offensive,  they  will  easily  pierce 
the  curtain  and  certainly  will  not  be  stopped. 


[57] 


ACTION  ON  FOOT. 

The  considerable  importance  which  the  regulations 
give  to  dismounted  cavalry  action  is  also  one  of  the  new 
features  of  these  regulations.  The  German  cavalry 
must  be  able  to  transform  itself  into  mounted  infantry 
and  consequently  to  fight  on  foot  absolutely  like  infan- 
try. * '  Mounted  action  is  the  principal  method  of  fight- 
ing for  cavalry,'  say  the  regulations  (Art.  389);  but 
they  add,  * '  The  cavalry  is  also,  thanks  to  its  rifle,  able  to 
fight  on  foot.  It  is  in  a  position,  especially  if  it  is  sup- 
ported by  artillery  and  by  machine  guns,  to  resist  de- 
tachments of  all  arms  or  to  cause  them  to  suffer  con- 
siderable losses  by  surprising  them  with  fire.  It  does 
not  fear  to  attack  wherever  the  situation  requires  it  to 
do  so. 

"The  cavalry  will  often  find  itself  in  the  position  of 
being  forced  to  open  a  road  for  itself  by  attacking  on 
foot  in  order  to  be  able  to  continue  to  fulfill  its  mission. " 

The  German  trooper  must  therefore  know  how  to 
fight  on  foot,  not  only  to  defend  himself  but  also  to 
attack. 

"We  shall  have,"  says  General  von  Bemhardi,  "in 
the  future  to  take  the  offensive  into  consideration  in 
dismounted  action,  and  even  a  decisive  offensive  which 
means  to  attain  its  end,  whatever  happens,  by  engaging 
strong  forces." 

Article  465  of  the  regulations  prescribes  distinctly 
that  this  offensive  shall  be  pushed  through  to  the  end. 
The  paragraph  of  the  Infantry  Regulations  is  repeated : 

"The  attack  has  for  its  object  to  carry  forward  the 
line  of  fire  up  to  the  enemy,  by  advancing,  if  necessary, 
by  very  short  distances.  It  is  completed  by  the  assault^ 
which  seals  the  defeat  of  the  enemy. " 


[58] 

The  regulations  recommend  that  dismounted  action 
be  engaged  in  ''only  after  mature  reflection, "  but  once 
decided  upon  to  engage  in  it  with  all  one's  forces  and  to 
the  limit. 

So  the  Germans  consider  that  their  cavalry  di- 
visions, upon  certain  occasions  of  which  we  shall  speak 
later,  will  be  led  into  fighting  on  foot  with  all  their  forces ; 
into  fighting  which  will  have  to  be  pushed  to  a  decision 
and  include  the  assault. 

In  order  to  give  every  possible  advantage  to  their 
cavalry  and  to  deceive  the  enemy,  the  Germans  have 
just  taken  various  measures.  They  have  given  their 
trooper  a  uniform  quite  similar*  to  that  of  the  infantry 
so  that  the  enemy  in  a  fight  will  not  be  able  to  deter- 
mine whether  he  is  fighting  with  cavalry  or  infantry,  t 
This  is  important  from  the  moral  point  of  view. 

They  have  likewise  just  transformed  the  cavalry 
carbine  so  that  the  range  of  this  weapon,  which  was  1200 
meters,  attains  2000  meters.  The  cavalrymen  use  the 
same  cartridge  as  the  infantrymen  and  have  like  them 
a  bayonet. 

The  cavalry  divisions  have  been  supplied  with  guns 
and  machine  guns.  Being  well  equipped  with  tools 
these  divisions  can  fulfill  all  the  missions  with  which 
they  are  charged  and  are  fitted  for  all  kinds  of  struggles. 

The  rules  for  the  combat  on  foot  of  the  cavalry 


*The  order  from  the  Emperor's  office  of  February  23,  1910,  haa 
also  just  given  the  gray  blouse  to  the  cuirassiers  and  to  the  mounted 
chasseurs,  in  place  of  the  KoUer  (blouse  of  special  form.) 

tThis  measure  would  be  eminently  wise  for  France.  All  our 
uniforms  are  dissimilar.  The  enemy  immediately  recognizes  in  a 
combat  whether  he  has  to  deal  with  cavalry.  How  can  a  hussar 
or|a  dragoon  be  mistaken,  even  at  1,000  meters,  for  an  infantry- 
man? 


[59] 

are  the  same  as  those  for  infantry  combat.  It  is  more 
particularly  recommended  that  the  order  in  depth  be 
used  so  as  to  avoid  mixing  units — something  more  in- 
convenient for  cavalry  than  for  infantry.  The  return 
to  the  horses  can  not  indeed  be  made  in  good  order  unless 
there  has  been  no  mixing  of  units. 

This  offensive  to  the  uttermost  for  cavalry  dis- 
mounted seems  to  us  very  dangerous. 

General  von  Kleist  said:  ''Reflect  once  before 
attacking  when  mounted;  reflect  three  time  before  at- 
tacking on  foot." 

One  will  do  well  to  reflect  a  long  time. 

It  seems  to  me  that  very  rarely  will  there  be  occa- 
sion for  throwing  cavalry  divisions  on  foot  to  launch  them 
into  an  offensive  action  to  be  pushed  to  the  assault. 
Cavalry  divisions  are  precious  instruments  in  any  army. 
How  can  one  conceive  an  occasion  where  the  hopes  of 
success  on  foot  is  worth  the  risk  of  their  loss.  A  di- 
vision of  cavalry  can  hardly  put  more  than  1000  rifles  in 
line,  on  foot  it  is  equal  only  to  a  poor  battalion* ;  while 
mounted  it  is  not  replaceable.  That  cavalry  shall  fight 
on  foot  on  the  defensive,  on  numerous  occasions,  is  be- 
coming more  and  more  necessary,  and  the  opportunities 
for  this  kind  of  action  are  more  and  more  frequent.  But 
it  still  appears  imprudent  to  us,  to  engage  a  whole 
division  of  cavalry,  or  even  a  large  party,  in  a  defensive 
action  on  foot.  As  to  throwing  a  division  of  cavalry 
into  an  attack  on  foot  against  a  position  defended  by 
infantry  in  sufficient  strength — that  appears  to  us  in- 
comparable presumption.  Can  one  imagine  a  German 
cavalry  division,  i.  e.,  equal  in  value  to  a  thousand  com- 

*It  is  to  be  remembered  that  this  refers  to  European  organiza* 
tion. . — Translator. 


[60] 

batants — not  very  expert  be  it  remembered — throwing- 
itself  on  foot  into  an  assault  on  a  position  of  our  frontier 
defended  by  one  of  our  covering  detachments  ?  That  is 
however  what  would  happen  most  certainly  in  case  the 
spirit  of  the  regulations  is  adopted  by  the  spirit  of  the 
responsible  cavalry  leaders. 

To  believe  that  from  cavalrymen  can  be  obtained 
good  foot  soldiers  to  push  an  attack  to  a  decision 
against  real  infantry  is  a  Utopian  dream  that  must  be 
left  to  the  Germans. 

The  cavalryman  will  never  leave  his  horse  other- 
wise than  regretfully;  he  will  be  thinking  only  of  get- 
ting back  to  him.  He  will  never  be  able  to  sustain  a 
very  long  combat ;  he  will  not  have  enough  ammunition, 
his  supply  is  restricted.  If  he  approaches  very  near  the 
enemy  he  will  never  be  able  to  get  back  on  his  horse 
except  after  victory;  a  retreat  would  be  a  defeat. 
Finally,  for  cavalry  dismounted  the  horses  become  the 
danger  point.  A  band  of  hostile  cavalry  or  infantry 
that  could  get  near  them  would  be  sufficient  to  carry 
them  away  or  to  destroy  them;  that  would  mean  dis- 
aster. 

The  old  Gernam  regulations  said:  ''Cavalry  is  not 
in  a  position  to  carry  on  a  dismounted  combat  of  long 
duration;  *  *  *  j^  most  cases  dismounted  action 
will  be  a  defensive  action;  it  will  not  fight  thus  on  the 
offensive  except  when  its  mission  can  not  be  accom- 
plished otherwise."  That  regulation  was  wise.  Why 
have  the  Germans  departed  from  these  reasonable  doc- 
trines to  adopt  in  certain  circumstances  the  offensive 
action  dismoimted  on  the  largest  scale  ? 

We  believe  that  that  has  been  brought  about  in  a 
large  measure,  by  the  examples  which  they  found  in 


[61] 

the  Russo-Japanese  war.  The  tactical  lessons  of  that 
war  seem  to  have  made  a  strong  impression  in  Germany 
(we  shall  verify  it  under  various  circumstances  in  the 
course  of  this  book) ;  but  it  does  not  seem  that  the  Ger- 
mans have  drawn  from  these  lessons  conclusions  that 
are  entirely  exact. 

The  Russian  cavalry  formed  especially  of  Cossacks 
from  the  Transbaikalia,  fought  very  often,  it  is  true,  on 
foot ;  it  rendered  thus  some  great  service  but  it  acted 
very  little  like  cavalry,  why  ? 

General  MischtschenkO  tells  us  why: 

'The  Transbaikalian  Cossacks  are  mostly  himters 
by  profession,  remarkably  good  shots  and  wood  crafts- 
men ;  but  they  are  not  cavalrymen;  the  officer  himself  is  not 
a  true  cavalryman  *  *  *.  Moreover,  their  horses 
are  small,  not  gaited,  though  they  are  robust  and  possess 
good  endurance.  *  *  *  These  horses  march  well 
in  mountains  but  are  heavy  and  untractable." 

With  these  Cossacks  the  Russians  had  an  excellent 
mounted  infantry  but  not  cavalry.  General  Misch- 
tschenko  knew  how  to  use  this  so-called  cavalry  accord- 
ing to  its  capabilities,  i.  e.,  by  making  it  fight  almost 
constantly  on  foot. 

Besides  these  motives  proceeding  from  the  con- 
clusions drawn  from  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  certain 
principles  have  led  the  Germans  to  their  doctrine  of 
the  attack  dismounted;  they  hold  in  effect  as  a  principle 
that  the  cavalry  should  be  in  condition  to  pierce  the 
screens  of  the  infantry  and  be  able  by  its  offensive 
action  to  rend  the  veils  covering  the  collecting  of  troops 
or  hostile  columns. 

The  introduction  into  our  military  organization  of 
bicycle  battalions  has  also  certainly  contributed  to  the 


[62] 

birth  of  the  prescriptions  of  the  German  regulations; 
our  neighbors  did  not  want  their  cavalry  divisions  to  be 
stopped  by  our  bicycle  infantry;  they  are  teaching  it 
to  attack  it  and  to  hammer  it. 

The  new  regulations  of  April  3,  1909,  the  applica- 
tion of  which  was  tried  for  the  first  time  in  the  last 
grand  maneuvers  (1909),  did  not  appear  to  have  had 
a  very  happy  influence. 

The  cavalry  presented  a  poor  appearance.  It  did 
not  succeed  in  getting  information  for,  or  in  enlighten- 
ing properly  its  corps.  Its  service  of  security  was  in- 
sufficient to  such  a  degree  that  on  the  14th  of  Septem- 
ber a  division  of  cavalry  was  surprised  in  its  canton- 
ments by  a  detachment  of  infantry. 

But  it  was  in  action  that  the  German  cavalry 
seems  to  have  been  the  weakest.  It  forgot  that  it  is 
especially  through  motion  that  it  is  redoubtable  and 
that  its  mode  of  action  in  combat  should  be  the  power- 
ful moral  effect  obtained  by  mass,  by  swiftness,  and  by 
the  effect  of  surprise. 

Dismounted  action,  so  much  extolled  by  the  regu- 
lations, had  become  the  rule  of  the  German  cavalry. 

As  soon  as  a  force  of  cavalry  met  the  enemy  its 
first  care  was  to  throw  forward  a  screen  of  dismounted 
cavalrymen,  then  to  maneuver  behind  it,  not  like  cavalry 
but  like  mounted  infantry. 

The  cavalry  in  this  maneuver  forgot  its  role.  It 
never  sought  to  annihilate  the  hostile  cavalry  in  order 
to  assure  itself  the  liberty  of  maneuvering.  The  two 
opposing  cavalry  forces  although  opposite  each  other 
from  the  evening  of  the  15th  of  September  did  not  seek 
out  each  other  with  the  desire  to  fight.  On  September 
15th  the  two  cavalry  forces  mutually  surprised  each 


[63] 

other.  They  were  not  well  informed  as  to  each  other 
and  had  not  prepared  for  battle;  so  the  encounter  was 
nothing  but  a  confused  series  of  surprises  of  regiments 
or  escadrons;*  it  degenerated  into  an  inextricable 
melange  of  dismounted  action. 

The  red  force,  which  was  much  the  weaker  in 
numbers,  was  declared  beaten  and  fell  back.  The 
Blue  cavalry  did  not  profit  by  its  partial  success,  it 
thereafter  avoided  the  Red  cavalry  and  fulfilled  none 
of  the  very  important  roles  with  which  it  might  have 
been  vested.  It  hung  on  thfe  flank  of  the  Blue  army 
without  serving  any  great  purpose. 

Its  superiority  had  offered  it  the  opportunity  to 
play  a  most  important  role  in  the  deHcate  mission  at- 
tributed to  the  general  commanding  the  force. 

Although  no  stable  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from 
a  single  experiment,  it  appears  nevertheless  that  the 
result  of  the  new  regulations  has  been  to  change  com- 
pletely the  cavalry  spirit. 

The  great  anxiety  of  the  German  cavalry  corps 
appears  to  be  at  present  to  protect  itself  by  cavalry- 
men dismounted,  and  to  use  fire  action,  artillery, 
machine  guns,  carbines. 

If  this  result  is  attained  we  can  only  congratulate 
ourselves  over  it. 


*An  escadron  corresponds  somewhat  to  our  troop;   it  is  com- 
manded by  a  captain,  but  has  more  sabers  (150). — Translator. 


PART    II 


THE  BATTLE. 

Preliminary  remarks  on  the  subject  of  the 

prescriptions  relating  to  the  combat 

in  the  new  regulations. 

When  one  studies  the  prescriptions  of  the  new 
German  regulations  he  is  struck  by  a  certain  number 
of  points  upon  which  the  regulations  lay  particular 
stress. 

These  points  mark  the  exact  characteristics  of  the 
spirit  in  which  the  regulations  were  conceived.  They 
are  particularly  conspicuous  in  the  three  regulations 
(Infantry,  Cavalry,  Artillery),  and  they  deserve  special 
mention. 

There  are  four  of  these  characteristics : 

The  spirit  of  the  offensive. 

The  development  of  initiative. 

The  necessity  of  communications. 

The  united  attack. 

1.      THE    SPIRIT    OF   THE    OFFENSIVE. 

The  spirit  of  the  offensive  is  the  first  principle  of 
the  new  regulations.  It  is  foimd  on  every  page.  More 
than  ever  do  the  Germans  want  to  inculcate  it  deeply 
into  all  the  members  of  the  army,  into  the  brains  of  the 
leaders  as  well  as  into  the  temperament  of  the  soldiers. 

No  army,  other  than  the  French  and  the  German 
armies,  has  in  its  regulations  such  clear-cut  principles 
for  the  offensive. 


[65] 

Heading  the  Cavalry  Regulations  is  found  the  old 
Frederickan  precept  relative  to  the  initiative  in  attack- 
ing: "No  escadron  should  wait  till  it  is  attacked;  it 
should  always  attack  first." 

The  Infantry  Regulations,  in  the  instructions  for 
the  combat,  are  just  as  much  for  the  offensive. 

"The  infantry  should  cultivate  its  natural  pro- 
pensity for  the  offensive.  All  its  actions  must  be  domi- 
nated by  this  one  thought:  Forward,  upon  the  enemy 
cost  what  it  may!  This  role  requires  of  the  force  a  high 
moral  standard.  One  of  the  first  duties  of  the  officer 
is  to  develop  this  standard."     (I.  R.  264-265.) 

The  battle  must  be  offensive.  When  at  certain 
points  defensive  combat  must  be  resorted  to,  this  de- 
fensive action  should  always  be  combined  with  another 
offensive  action. 

2.      THE    DEVELOPMENT   OF   INITIATIVE. 

The  new  regulations  prescribe  the  leaving  of  initi- 
ative to  all  grades  of  military  rank.  The  "first  quality 
of  a  leader  should  be  a  hking  for  responsibility,"  say 
the  Artillery  Regulations.  The  Infantry  Regulations 
insist:  "The  maneuvers  in  time  of  peace  should  tend 
to  develop  the  initiative  of  the  leaders  and  of  all  the 
participants,  including  the  rifleman."     (I.  R.  251.) 

"For  the  combat  there  are  required  leaders  who 
are  accustomed  to  thinking  and  who  are  trained  in 
initiative,  and  riflemen  who  know  how  to  act  by  them- 
selves."    (I.  R.) 

* '  In  each  case  the  commander  must  make  decisions 
that  meet  the  situation  and  not  change  them  thereafter 
without  strong  reasons."  It  is  forbidden  to  the  higher 
commanders  to   meddle  with  details,    "the  subordi- 


nate  leaders  should  have  the  choice  of  means."  (I.  R. 
272.) 

"All  leaders  should  always  be  imbued  with  the 
principle  that  inaction  and  negligence  are  more  serious 
faults  than  an  error  in  the  choice  of  means."  (I.  R. 
304.) 

The  Cavalry  Regulations  sound  the  same  note: 
** Initiative  is  the  first  virtue  of  a  leader."  (C.  R.  407.) 
"The  leader,"  adds  this  paragraph,  "must  never  wait 
for  orders  and  should  seize  responsibility  with  joy. 
In  doubtful  cases,  let  him  act  upon  this  principle." — 
"The  boldest  resolution  is  oftenest  the  best."  (C.  R. 
399.) 

As  can  be  seen,  the  regulations  recommend  the 
greatest  initiative,  but  on  the  condition  however,  that 
it  does  not  degenerate  into  license.  "The  initiative 
is  the  source  of  the  great  successes  in  war,"  say  the  In- 
fantry Regulations;  "but  it  will  bear  fruit  only  if  kept 
within  proper  limits." 

In  order  to  leave  to  everyone  his  proper  share  of 
initiative,  to  allow  everyone  the  privilege  of  acting 
according  to  the  circumstances,  according  to  his  judg- 
ment, the  regulations  carefully  avoid  all  ironclad  rules 
and  prescribe  independence  and  responsibility  for  the 
subordinate  in  the  choice  of  means. 

"The  subject  of  combat  does  not  admit  of  exact 
rules.'' 

It  is  very  remarkable  that  in  this  German  army 
which  is  so  given  to  order,  regularity  and  method,  we 
find  it  recommended  that  initiative  and  independence 
be  left  to  all  grades  of  the  military  organization. 


[67] 

3.      THE    NECESSITY    OF    COMMUNICATION. 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to  call  attention  to 
the  care  which  the  Germans  bestow  upon  their  lines  of 
information  not  only  in  the  matter  of  communication 
between  the  different  grades  of  rank  but  also  between 
the  different  arms.  We  shall  see  hereafter,  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  service  of  reconnaissance,  with  what 
care  they  establish  the  Hnes  of  information  of  that 
service. 

In  all  three  arms  the  different  echelons  of  command 
are  formally  enjoined  to  keep  in  close  touch  with  one 
another. 

"All  leaders  must  direct  their  attention  to  *  *  ♦ 
the  lines  of  information."     (I.  R.  283.) 

"The  telephone  is  usefully  employed  to  keep  the 
different  echelons  in  touch  with  one  another."  (I.  R. 
281.) 

Communication  among  the  arms  is  prescribed  in 
the  most  explicit  manner :  '  'the  artillery  especially  must 
keep  in  constant  and  uninterrupted  communication  with 
the  arm  that  it  has  to  support."  "The  artillery  must 
always  keep  in  communication  with  the  portion  of  the 
line  of  battle  that  has  been  assigned  to  it. "     (A.  R.  376.) 

"Infantry  always  fights  in  co-operation  with  the 
other  arms;  its  action  cannot  be  separated  from  that 
of  the  artillery." 

The  new  Artillery  Regulations  no  longer  consider 
the  artillery  duel  as  the  prelude  of  the  battle,  they 
assert  that  the  artillery  owes  all  its  support  to  the  in- 
fantry and  fights  only  to  open  the  road  for  it. 


[68] 

4.      THE    UNITED   ATTACK. 

The  Germans  do  not  concede  that  combat  should 
be  accepted  unless  all  the  means  of  action  have  been 
gathered  together.  When  a  force,  separated  from  its 
main  body,  encounters  the  enemy  it  attacks  only  in 
case  it  is  obviously  superior;  otherwise  it  stops,  en- 
trenches, even  falls  back  if  necessary,  and  awaits  the 
arrival  of  the  main  body.  When,  then,  a  force  having 
an  offensive  mission  finds  itself  facing  the  enemy,  it  is 
first  to  concentrate  then  to  advance  to  the  attack  with 
all  its  forces  acting  in  concert.  It  is  necessary  at  the 
very  start  to  gain  the  superiority  over  the  enemy  and 
crush  him  by  the  weight  of  numbers. 

"Cavalry  must  operate  in  large  masses.''  (C.  R. 
393.) 

"Artillery  should  enter  into  action  almost  like  one 
blow,  in  masses.''     (A.  R.) 

"The  infantry  of  the  main  body  should  simul- 
taneously make  a  united  attack."     (I.  R.  359.) 

Everywhere  we  find  this  idea  of  a  powerful  attack, 
to  be  made  brutally  with  all  available  forces. 


The  German  regulations  lay  down  very  different 
rules  depending  upon  whether  they  are  treating  of  the 
battle  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  offensive  or  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  defensive. 

In  them  are  examined  successively  the  different 
forms  of  the  offensive,  as  it  is  manifested  in  a  meeting 
engagement;  against  an  enemy  in  a  defensive  position; 
against  an  enemy  in  a  fortified  position. 


[69] 

We  shall  study  particularly  the  German  ideas  con- 
cerning meeting  engagements  which  will  be  the  usual 
type  in  future  struggles.  Thereafter  we  shall  study  the 
other  forms  of  combat,  considering  only  the  peculi- 
arities that  they  offer. 


[70] 
CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  OFFENSIVE. 
Reconnaissance  (Information.) 

"The  service  of  reconnaissance  has  for  its  object," 
say  the  Field  Service  Regulations,  ''to  find  the  enemy, 
to  determine  his  position  and  his  strength." 

The  Germans  rely  absolutely  upon  their  secret 
service  and  their  service  of  cavalry  reconnaissance  for 
all  necessary  general  information  concerning  the  enemy. 
They  expect  to  obtain  by  these  two  means  sufficient 
data  to  engage  intelligently  in  combat. 

They  do  not  wait  moreover  to  get  precise  and  de- 
tailed information,  which  can  only  be  obtained  by 
fighting.  As  soon  as  their  two  services  of  information 
have  indicated  the  general  position  of  the  hostile 
centers,  as  soon  as  they  believe  themselves  sufficiently 
oriented  not  to  engage  wrongly,  they  attack  and  aspire, 
by  a  ferocious  offensive,  to  impose  their  will  and  their 
strength  without  needing  to  see  very  thoroughly  into 
the  dispositions  of  the  adversary. 

They  have  therefore  very  carefully  organized  their 
two  means  of  investigation.  Naturally  their  regula- 
tions and  their  military  writings  speak  only  of  the  ser- 
vice of  reconnaissance. 

ATTACKING  THE  ADVERSE  CAVALRY. 

As  a  rule,  the  service  of  reconnaissance  is  per- 
formed only  by  cavalry,  but  to  be  able  to  accomplish 
it  easily  it  must  not  be  hindered  by  the  adverse  cavalry. 
To  perform  its  own  duty  of  exploration  and  to  prevent 


[71] 

the  hostile  cavalry  from  performing  its  duty  are  the 
first  two  missions  of  the  cavalry. 

ATTACKING   THE    HOSTILE    CAVALRY. 

Therefore,  the  regulations  say :  "  It  is  of  the  highest 
importance  to  sweep  away  as  quickly  as  possible  the 
opposing  cavalry  and  to  establish  an  incontestable 
superiority  over  it.  All  detachments  and  patrols 
should  consequently  attack  the  hostile  cavalry  wherever 
it  is  seen.  In  this  way  the  service  of  information  is 
hastened  and  the  service  of  security  considerably  facili- 
tated." 

Hence,  to  put  it  clearly — ^first  attack  the  hostile 
cavalry,  defeat  it,  then  fall  upon  hostile  cavalrymen 
everywhere ! 

The  Germans  do  not  conceal  the  fact  that  they 
rely  absolutely  upon  their  numerical  superiority  in 
cavalry  rapidly  to  defeat  ours  (*). 

Their  principle  of  seeking  from  the  very  outset 
the  main  body  of  hostile  cavalry  in  order  to  defeat  it,  is 
excellent.  The  offensive  from  the  very  beginning  is 
what  they  extol;  we  can  but  approve  it. 

CAVALRY  PATROLS. 

The  service  of  reconnaissance  is  carried  out  prin- 
cipally by  patrols ;  patrols  operating  at  a  distance,  and 
patrols  operating  near  to  their  main  body.  The  Ger- 
man instructions  for  these  patrols  are  similar  to  those 
of  the  French  regulations;  we  shall  not  dwell  upon 
them.     Let  us  observe  only  that  their  regulations  pre- 

*The  Germans  mobilize  twelve  divisions  of  cavalry;  France, 
eight.  The  Germans  have,  therefore,  a  crushing  superiority  in 
numbers;   they  claim  also  to  have  technical  superiority. 


[72] 

scribe  a  substitute  for  the  patrol  leader,  an  extremely 
wise  measure  which  we  would  do  well  to  imitate  in 
France. 

When  the  patrols  are  pushed  out  too  far  to  be  able 
easily  to  communicate  with  the  main  body  of  the  cav- 
alry, supporting  escadrons  are  sent  out,  serving  as 
rallying  centers  and  as  centers  for  transmitting  in- 
formation. These  escadrons  are  separated  by  not  more 
than  15  or  20  kilometers. 

The  important  question  of  the  rapid  transmission 
of  information  has  been  studied.  The  regulations  give 
only  general  instructions ;  but  in  practice  the  Germans 
make  intelligent  use  of  all  means  that  science  has  put 
in  their  hands. 

The  patrols  send  their  reports  to  the  escadrons  by 
courier;  this  is  the  only  possible  means,  but  at  the 
same  time  the  most  uncertain  means  of  transmission. 
Not  only  must  the  courier  escape  the  enemy,  but  he 
must  find  the  escadron.  An  unintelligent  trooper,  alone 
and  without  a  map,  has  a  great  deal  of  trouble  in  find- 
ing his  way  over  unfamiliar  ground. 

The  escadron  can  not  remain  stationary;  it  leaves 
transmitting  stations,  previously  designated,  at  fixed 
points. 

From  these  stations  run  telephone  lines  or,  failing 
these,  lines  of  automobilists  or  cyclists  which  converge 
toward  a  central  point — the  central  information  station 
of  the  independent  cavalry.  At  this  point  there  is  an 
officer  who  gathers  together  all  the  information  and 
co-ordinates  it.  He  communicates  it  by  automobiles 
or  couriers  to  the  general  commanding  the  cavalry, 
who  is  often  some  distance  away. 

As  to  the  communication  with  the  general  com- 


[73] 

manding  the  army,  it  would  take  too  long  if  it  had  to 
be  effected  by  the  same  means.  That  general  is  indeed 
two  or  three  days'  march  in  rear.  The  officer  at  the 
information  center  must  be  provided  with  wireless 
equipment ;  he  communicates  the  information  by  wire- 
less. 

The  system  of  commimication  thus  organized 
seems  perfect  and  is  worth  imitating. 

The  service  of  reconnaissance  is  kept  up  until  the 
two  opposing  armies  come  in  contact;  the  cavalry 
divisions  then  withdraw  to  the  flanks,  and  the  service 
of  information  is  maintained  by  the  divisional  cavalry. 
To  this  end,  ''the  two  bodies  of  divisional  cavalry 
of  an  army  corps  may  be  advantageously  united,  leav- 
ing an  escadron  to  each  division." 

THE  LARGE  INDEPENDENT  CAVALRY  CORPS. 

It  is  thus  that  has  been  organized,  with  it  visual 
antenna,  the  network  of  the  service  of  reconnaissance. 

This  system  will  be  able  in  most  cases  to  give  only 
the  apparent  outline  of  the  positions  or  of  the  Hnes  of 
march  of  the  enemy.  It  will  always  afford  the  possi- 
bility of  indicating  the  location  of  the  hostile  front  and 
wings,  but  rarely  will  it  permit  of  penetrating  far 
enough  to  describe  the  hostile  dispositions.  Its  eyes 
will  be  veiled  by  the  enemy's  screen.  Now  it  is  import- 
ant to  break  that  screen  and  see  behind  it ;  and  this  is 
one  of  the  essential  missions  of  the  cavalry  divisions. 
The  regulations  indicate  that  "in  order  to  accomplish 
this  mission,  divisions  may  be  united  into  a  single  com- 
mand." 

From  everything  that  we  know,  it  is  certain  that 
at  the  beginning  of  war  there  will  be  formed  in  Ger- 


[74] 

many  large  cavalry  corps  composed  of  three  or  four 
divisions,  and  perhaps  more;  each  of  these  divisions 
will  be  armed  with  twelve  machine  guns  and  with 
twelve  field  pieces. 

These  large  corps  will  throw  out  their  network  of 
exploration  and  seek  the  enemy's  cavalry  with  a  view 
to  defeat  it  and  to  put  it  out  of  action.  If  victorious, 
they  will  advance  to  meet  the  hostile  army  with  the 
clearly  defined  mission  of  getting  in  contact  with  it  in 
order  to  reconnoiter  it. 

This  victorious  cavalry  will  then  have  to  drive 
back  the  mixed  corps  that  the  enemy  will  perhaps  have 
thrown  to  the  front,  to  pierce  the  infantry  screens,  to 
bore  through  the  outposts,  defeat  the  flank  guards,  etc. 
It  is  for  these  combats,  before  which  the  German  cav- 
alry is  not  to  hestitate,  that  it  has  been  taught,  as  we 
have  seen,  to  fight  on  foot  on  the  offensive  and  to  push 
the  action  to  a  decision. 

The  Germans  believe  that  their  large  cavalry  corps, 
well  armed  with  machine  guns  and  field  guns,  will  be 
able  to  repulse  all  the  mixed  detachments  with  which  the 
enemy  can  surround  himself,  and  to  push  through  to 
the  infantry  columns  and  reconnoiter  them,  harass 
and  delay  them. 

The  role  of  these  corps  is  to  become  more  and 
more  important ;  it  has  been  foreseen  and  anticipated. 

*'The  larger  the  armies  are,"  writes  General  von 
Bemhardi,  *'the  longer  is  the  time  required  to  execute 
their  movements  and  the  more  is  it  essential  that  the 
command  be  oriented  in  advance  with  respect  to  the 
enemy,  if  it  is  to  co-ordinate  and  execute  its  movements 
to  the  best  advantage.  As  a  necessary  consequence 
the  cavalry  must  be  pushed  a  great  deal  farther  ahead 


[75] 

in  the  direction  of  the  enemy.  It  is  clear  that  its 
movements  can  not  be  made  to  conform  to  those  of  an 
infantry  support  if  one  be  assigned  to  it.  Even  im- 
portant cycHst  detachments,  being  more  or  less  re- 
stricted to  roads,  would  only  imperfectly  procure  for 
the  cavalry  the  independence  that  it  needs. 

"We  shall  have,  then,  in  the  future  to  trust  to 
fighting  on  foot,  even  to  fighting  on  the  defensive  and 
pushing  it  to  a  decision  whatever  happens,  even  by 
engaging  large  forces     *     *     *     . 

''Already  (in  the  war  of  1870-71)  has  defensive 
action  on  foot  been  found  to  be  the  exception  *  *  *  , 
It  is  inconsistent  to  want  to  tie  down  the  cavalry,  the 
offensive  arm  par  excellence,  to  a  defensive  attitude  at 
the  time  when  it  should  make  use  of  its  carbines." 

Before  the  large  corps  of  the  German  cavalry  what 
will  be  done  by  an  adversary,  like  the  French,  very 
inferior  in  cavalry  strength  ? 

The  time  when  each  field  army  was  provided  with 
a  single  division  of  independent  cavalry  acting  for  its 
own  army,  no  longer  exists.  These  isolated  divisions 
would  be  powerless  before  the  most  meager  screen, 
and  opposed  to  a  combination  of  German  divisions 
they  would  get  themselves  successively  destroyed. 

Combinations  must  be  opposed  by  combinations. 
In  cavalry  tactics  we  come  back  to  the  true  principle: 
"Concentrate  to  fight."  There  will  be  formed  in 
France,  as  in  Germany,  large  cavalry  corps.  It  must 
be  observed  that  these  corps  can  not  be  enlarged  indefi- 
nitely; beyond  a  certain  limit  they  would  lose  the 
necessary  mobility  and  suppleness;  the  difficulties  of 
supply  and  subsistence  would  become  insurmountable; 


[761 

one  serious  repulse  might  imperil,  for  the  entire  cam- 
paign one  of  the  most  essential  organs  of  the  army. 

We  claim  that  it  is  Utopian  to  imagine,  as  some 
authors  have  recently  done,  that  in  the  next  war  Ger- 
many will  make  a  lump  of  the  majority  of  her  cavalry 
divisions  by  establishing  a  corps  of  eight  or  ten  divisions. 

How  can  one  believe  that  Germany  would  engage 
at  a  single  point  the  greater  part  of  her  independent 
forces  of  cavalry?  Admitting  even  that  such  a  mass 
could  exist  and  be  satisfactorily  commanded,  what 
consequences  would  ensue  if  it  should  fall  into  a  trap, 
if  an  order,  an  unfortunate  chance  should  bring  about 
its  destruction? 

There  is  certainly  a  limit  to  this  concentration  of 
cavalry;  we  do  not  presume  to  fix  the  limit,  but  three 
or  four  divisions  seem  to  be  a  large  maximum;  and 
further  what  general  is  capable  of  leading  such  an  army 
and  maneuvering  it  properly  on  a  cavalry  battle  field? 

It  can  well  be  presumed  that  these  cavalry  corps 
might  undergo  some  severe  lessons  in  a  war,  when  in 
time  of  peace  they  have  never  been  tested. 

THE  CAVALRY  AND  THE  CYCLIST  CORPS. 

In  any  case  in  France,  though  we  have  a  notorious 
inferiority  in  cavalry,  we  must  remember  that  in  this 
arm  especially  numbers  alone  do  not  give  victory; 
leadership  and  individual  bravery  are  the  arbiters  of 
cavalry  combat. 

In  the  zone  of  operations,  which  we  ought  to  choose, 
we  shall  be  able  to  oppose  any  German  cavalry  corps 
with  an  equivalent  corps  quite  capable  of  stopping  it 
and  of  repulsing  it.  We  can  also  form  a  corps  of  three 
or  even  four  divisions,  armed  like  that  of  our  prospec- 


[77] 

tive  adversaries,  with  field  pieces  and  machine  guns  and 
in  addition,  supported  by  bodies  of  cyclists. 

In  the  ruling  military  spheres,  the  Germans  are 
not  advocates  of  cyclist  corps;  they  claim  that  these 
corps  attached  to  cavalry  are  an  impediment  and  not 
an  auxiliary;  they  are  afraid  that  they  will  injure  its 
mobility  and  its  independence  of  movement.  The  new 
Cavalry  Regulations  say  indeed:  "To  the  supporting 
detachments  (cyclists,  infantry  in  wagons,  etc.),  belongs 
principally  the  duty  of  strengthening  the  resistance  of 
the  cavalry  in  localities  and  of  breaking  a  similar  resist- 
ance on  the  part  of  the  enemy."  But  these  detach- 
ments seem  to  be  meant  for  particular  cases,  as  for  hold- 
ing or  attacking  a  given  point  of  great  importance 
(defile,  bridge,  etc.),  and  not  to  accompany  the  cavalry 
to  support  it  in  time  of  danger. 

In  the  large  maneuvers  of  1907  and  1908,  cyclist 
detachments  were  formed  in  Germany;  little  use  was 
made  of  them;  the  commanding  authority  has  lost 
interest  in  them.  These  detachments  were  formed  of 
elements  from  different  corps.  In  the  maneuvers  of 
1909  no  cyclist  unit  was  formed. 

Our  neighbors  have  no  established  cyclist  units. 
They  well  appreciate  cyclists  as  agents  of  communica- 
tion and  as  messengers;  they  make  extensive  use  of 
them,  but  appear  unwilling  to  use  them,  except  in 
special  cases,  to  form  fighting  units. 

In  France,  in  spite  of  great  opposition,  the  cyclist 
battalions  have  received  appreciation  in  the  large 
maneuvers  and  have  rendered  efficient  service.  In 
the  localities  where  we  may  be  called  upon  to  encoimter 
the  German  army,  there  is  a  compact  network  of  roads; 
the  cyclists  would  be  able  to  get  about  everywhere  and 


[78] 

consequently  to  follow  the  cavalry  divisions  and  to  sup- 
port them  when  necessary.  Two  or  three  cycHst  bat- 
talions operating  with  the  large  corps  of  French  cavalry 
would  permit  it  to  cope  successfully  with  a  German 
cavalry  force  even  superior  in  numbers.  The  practical 
study  of  the  employment  of  these  battalions  in  large 
cavalry  maneuvers  would  be  extremely  interesting. 


[79] 
CHAPTER  V. 


ADVANCE  GUARD;  MARCHING  TO  THE  ATTACK. 
The  Advance  Guard. 

MISSION    OF   THE    ADVANCE    GUARD. 

The  Field  Service  Regulations  define  the  r61e  of  the 
advance  guard  (Par.  164):  "The  advance  guard's 
mission  is  to  ensure  to  the  rnain  body  an  uninterrupted 
march  and  to  protect  the  column  from  unexpected  at- 
tacks. In  case  the  enemy  is  encountered,  it  must  pro- 
vide for  the  main  body  the  time  and  the  space  neces- 
sary to  deploy  for  action,  taking  care  not  to  let  itself 
be  drawn  into  an  engagement  against  the  will  of  the 
commanding  officer."  Hence  the  advance  guard  in 
Germany  is  expected  only  to  protect  the  main  body 
against  surprise  and,  by  its  resistance  in  case  of  attack, 
to  permit  it  to  deploy. 

It  is  a  shield  and  not  an  offensive  weapon. 

The  advance  guard  must  not  engage  in  an  offensive 
action  except  when  it  foresees  certain  success.  From 
the  information  that  will  have  been  gathered  and  from 
what  is  developed  in  the  first  engagements  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  an  approximate  estimate  of  the  situation 
can  be  made. 

''Uncertainty  and  lack  of  information  are  the  rule 
in  war.  In  a  war  of  operations,  the  two  adversaries  will 
often  not  have  their  information  until  after  coming  in 
contact."     (I.  R.  352.) 

This  paragraph  is  exactly  correct.  It  is  the  French 
theory.     It  does  not  seem  to  be  in  accord  with  what 


[80] 

has  been  said  elsewhere  as  to  results  to  be  obtained  by 
the  cavalry. 

If  it  can  be  judged  from  the  first  brushes  of  the 
advance  guard  that  one  has  the  advantage  in  deploy- 
ment and  in  numbers,  one  will  not  hesitate  to  follow  up 
the  first  successes  by  supporting  the  advance  guard 
with  successive  arrivals  of  the  troops  of  the  main  body. 
But  if  one  is  uncertain  it  is  recommended  to  remain 
*'in  expectation,"  to  wait  until  all  the  artillery  has  been 
assembled  and  the  main  body  of  the  infantry  "can 
make  a  united  attack." 

"The  leader  will  then  no  longer  have  to  subordinate 
his  decisions  to  new  and  lengthy  reconnaissances.  He 
must  reflect  that  the  adversary  is  in  exactly  the  same 
predicament  as  himself."     (I.  R.  356.) 

"The  advantage,  in  a  chance  engagement  (meet- 
ing engagement),  lies  with  the  one  who  knows  how  to 
make  the  most  quickly  his  preparations  for  action, 
thus  obtaining  freedom  in  maneuvering."     (A.  R.  476.) 

If,  then,  it  seems  that  one  is  strong  enough  and 
is  as  well  prepared  for  action  as  his  adversary,  "it  is 
the  general  situation  that  determines  whether  the 
offensive  must  be  taken.  If  the  offensive  is  to  be  as- 
sumed, rapid  action  is  necessary."     (I.  R.  355.) 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  enemy  seems  to  be  superior 
or  to  have  the  advantage  as  to  deployment,  "it  is 
necessary  to  act  with  prudence.  *  *  *  The 
leader  will  avoid  becoming  engaged  before  having  as- 
sembled sufficient  forces,  for  fear  of  being  compelled  to 
fight  constantly  with  inferior  forces  against  a  superior 
enemy. 

"It  may  even  be  prudent  to  cause  the  advance 
guard  to  withdraw  in  order  to  save  it  a  bloody  combat 


[81] 

and  to  expedite  the  arrival  and  the  co-operation  of  the 
main  body."     (I.  R.  360.) 

The  Germans  seek  to  hit  hard  at  the  very  begin- 
ning. If  the  advance  guard  has  the  advantage,  it  is 
vigorously  supported;  the  artillery  is  pushed  forward, 
engages  without  hesitation,  then  the  infantry  engages 
as  fast  as  it  comes  up. 

But  if  the  German  advance  guard  is  not  certain  of 
gaining  the  superiority  at  the  outset,  it  halts,  it  keeps 
up  a  delaying  fight  until  the  artillery  has  been  able  to 
come  up  and  the  main  body  of  the  infantry  is  near 
enough  to  support  it.  When  everything  is  ready,  a 
heavy  fire  breaks  out  suddenly  along  the  whole  front 
and  a  powerful  offensive  is  unmasked.  It  is  necessary 
to  hit  hard,  as  hard  as  possible. 

Finally,  if  the  advance  guard  finds  itself  opposed  by 
forces  that  are  superior  or  better  prepared  for  a  fight, 
the  Germans  do  not  hesitate  to  withdraw;  they  will 
even,  if  necessary,  go  so  far  as  to  break  off  the  action, 
notwithstanding  their  violent  prejudices  against  such 
a  procedure.  They  fall  back  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead 
the  enemy  to  run  against  the  line  of  the  main  body, 
deployed  in  rear,  and  ready  to  enfold  him  in  cross  fire 
and  to  crush  him  if  possible,  by  a  vigorous  counter- 
offensive. 

FORMATION  OF  THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 

The  German  advance  guard,  according  to  the  regu- 
lations, should  have  a  strength  equal  to  from  one-third 
to  one-sixth  of  the  total  strength. 

According  to  the  practice  at  the  last  maneuvers, 
there  were  assigned  to  it  in  each  army  corps  the  two 
regiments  of  divisional  cavalry,  leaving  one  escadron 


[82] 

to  each  division.  This  has  become  an  habitual  dis- 
position. This  cavalry  fulfills  the  same  role  as  the 
brigade  of  cavalry  of  the  French  corps;  we  shall  not 
dwell  upon  it. 

In  rear  of  this  cavalry,  the  advance  guard  is  com- 
posed in  Germany  as  it  is  in  France,  and  is  subdivided 
into  the  same  number  of  echelons. 

The  regulations  indicate  two  distances  for  the 
echelons  of  the  advance  guard  proper.  The  advance 
party  marches  at  400  or  500  meters  in  front  of  the  sup- 
port, and  the  support  at  from  1,000  to  1,500  meters  in 
front  of  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard. 

The  distance  of  the  main  body  from  the  reserve  o^ 
the  advance  guard  is  not  indicated,  but  this  distance 
is  generally  conceded  to  be  about  3,000  meters. 

The  sum  of  the  distances  gives  a  space  of  about 
five  kilometers  from  the  point  to  the  head  of  the  main 
body.  The  latter  is  therefore  practically  insured 
against  surprise  from  the  artillery  of  the  enemy. 

In  our  opinion,  there  should  be  no  fear  about  taking 
very  great  distances  between  the  different  echelons 
of  the  advance  guard;  the  resisting  power  of  the  units 
has  been  considerably  increased  by  the  modern  arma- 
ment in  use,  the  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  now  takes 
a  longer  time  and  is  more  difficult. 

THE  ADVANCE  TO  AN  ENGAGEMENT.   DEPLOYMENT 
OF  COLUMNS. 

Paragraph  315  of  the  German  Infantry  Regula- 
tions says:  "When  the  enemy  is  approached,  disposi- 
tions for  action  are  made.  They  consist  in  the  doubling 
of  the  colimm  (forming  double  column  or  coltimn  of 
platoons),  the  Aufmarsch;    the  deployed  formation  of 


[83] 

line  of  columns  (the  Entfaltung),  and  the  forming  into 
line  before  the  impact  (Entwikelung) . 

We  find  thus  three  phases : 

(a)  Passing  from  route  formation  to  a  compact 
formation  of  less  depth  and  greater  width,  or  an  assem- 
bling if  a  halt  is  made ; 

(6)  Passing  from  the  compact  marching  forma- 
tion or  the  assembled  formation  to  an  open  formation. 
The  march  is  continued  or  taken  up  in  small  separated 
columns  across  country;  it  is  the  French  "march  to  an 
engagement;" 

(c)     Deployment  as  skirmishers  of  the  first  lines. 

"When  it  can  be  foreseen  that  it  is  necessary  to 
enter  immediately  into  action,  the  formation  into 
double  column  (the  Aufmarsch)  is  omitted,  because  it 
most  often  involves  a  loss  of  time  and  useless  fatigue; 
one  passes  directly  to  the  formation  of  the  Entfaltung, 
the  march  to  the  engagement."     (I.  R.) 

This  last  restriction  is  a  wise  one ;  it  is  indeed  uot 
easy  to  understand  what  a  colimm  on  the  march  can 
gain  by  forming  itself  into  a  double  column,  in  a  wide 
formation,  or  by  assembling  once  it  is  on  the  march  in 
any  column  whatever.  It  always  means  loss  of  time 
and  useless  fatigue.  To  begin  the  march  in  a  dense 
formation  when  it  is  known  that  the  road  to  he  traversed 
permits  of  retaining  that  formation  everywhere,  may  be 
exceedingly  useful;  thus  can  be  diminished  the  depth 
of  the  column  and,  consequently,  the  time  necessary 
for  deployment,  but  to  take  this  formation  while  on 
the  march  or  to  stop  to  assemble  is  almost  always  a 
mistake. 

The  assembling  of  a  column  previous  to  any  en- 


[84] 

gagement  whatever  was  for  a  long  time  an  established 
principle.  Instead  of  going  directly  to  their  places  on 
the  battle  field,  the  troops  would  go  and  collect  in 
masses.  In  addition  to  the  disadvantages  already- 
pointed  out,  these  assemblies  would  in  these  days,  in 
front  of  modern  artillery,  be  exposed  to  serious  danger. 
A  battery  of  German  howitzers  can,  at  a  distance  of 
five  or  six  kilometers,  produce  very  marked  material 
effects  and  still  greater  moral  effects  by  unexpected  fire 
upon  an  assembly  that  has  been  observed. 

These  assemblies  are  no  longer  made  except  in 
very  open  formation. 

There  is  no  reason  for  them  except  when  the  com- 
mander does  not  know  just  when  he  will  have  to  engage 
his  forces  nor  in  what  direction. 

THE    IMPORTANCE    OF   TAKING   THE    RIGHT   DIRECTION. 

The  Germans  consider  as  highly  important  the 
attention  devoted  to  assigning  proper  directions  to  the 
different  columns.  It  is  essential,  they  say  indeed,  that 
these  colimms  be  started  in  the  right  directions.  If  there 
are  errors  in  direction  considerable  delays  are  caused; 
there  is  a  risk  of  throwing  some  of  the  troops  against 
empty  air,  of  getting  some  wedged  in,  or  having  gaps 
produced. 

The  German  method  of  making  an  united  attack 
without  having  collected  all  needed  information,  can 
indeed  bring  about  serious  errors  as  to  directions; 
certain  units  may  strike  empty  air,  others  be  led  away 
by  screening  troops  in  divergent  directions. 

The  role  frequently  assigned  in  France  to  an  ad- 
vance guard,  to  a  contact  detachment  or  to  a  rear  guard 
is  precisely  that  of  drawing  the  enemy  in  a  false  dire 


[85] 

tion.  The  German  regulations  particularly  recommend 
to  the  commanders  of  large  units  that  they  start  their 
forces  exactly  toward  the  objective  selected  or  desig- 
nated; but  before  hand  it  is  essential  that  the  objective 
shall  have  been  carefully  reconnoitered  and  the  direc- 
tion thoroughly  studied. 

Indeed,  the  German  Infantry  Regulations  (Par. 
286)  say:  "The  difficulty  of  getting  units  engaged  in 
the  first  line  to  change  direction  increases  with  their 
size.  The  direction  in  which  a  force  is  to  fight  is  de- 
termined before  engaging  it.  Tf  during  the  advance  it  is 
observed  that  the  direction  is  faulty,  it  is  rare  that  more 
can  be  done  in  the  case  of  large  bodies  than  to  send 
new  troops  forward  in  the  proper  direction." 


[86] 
CHAPTER  VI. 


MEETING  ENGAGEMENTS. 

The  Germans  recognize  only  one  form  of  offensive 
action;  they  do  not  differentiate,  like  the  French,  be- 
tween the  preliminary  or  demonstrative  attack  and  the 
decisive  attack.  For  them  there  is  but  one  method  of 
fighting  offensively. 

PREPARATORY  COMBAT. 

1.     ARTILLERY    DEPLOYMENT. 

The  advance  guard  deployed  over  a  wide  front  has 
for  its  principal  duty  the  protection  of  the  deployment 
of  the  artillery ;  while  fighting,  it  must  occupy  as  needed 
the  important  points  of  the  terrain.     (I.  R.) 

The  artillery  is  pushed  forward  so  as  to  establish 
as  rapidly  as  possible  "an  impenetrable  wall     *     *     *". 

As  soon  as  it  has  been  decided  to  give  battle,  the 
general  commanding  the  army  corps  must  call  up  all 
his  artillery,  i.  e.,  that  of  his  two  divisions.  This  artil- 
lery, during  the  march  to  the  engagement  (the  Ent- 
faltung),  is  to  be  pushed  forward  over  the  main  roads 
while  the  infantry  is  coming  up  over  smaller  roads  or 
across  country.  Its  arrival  at  the  positions  indicated 
by  the  corps  commander  must  not  be  delayed. 

If  the  advance  guard  has  been  able  to  gain  the 
advantage  and  is  found  to  be  acting  on  the  offensive, 
■**the  commander  of  the  troops  will  unhesitatingly 
throw  into  action  the  fractions  of  the  artillery  as  fast 
as  they  come  up  in  order  to  keep  or  to  make  the  most 


[87] 

of  an  advantage  won  by  the  advance  guard."     (A.  R. 

481.) 

But  if  the  advance  guard  is  obliged  to  observe 
prudence,  believing  itself  before  an  opposing  force  that 
is  larger  and  better  prepared  for  battle,  it  is  advised  to 
wait;  "The  commander  will  then  avoid  undertaking 
any  serious  combat  until  he  has  at  his  disposition 
enough  artillery. ' '     (A.  R.  482.) 

These  sentences  from  the  regulations  show  that 
battle  may  be  entered  into  in  different  ways.  "There 
is  no  reason  for  formulating*a  fixed  rule,"  says  General 
von  Rohne.  "It  is  important  to  have  the  advance 
guard  strong  in  artillery  because  beyond  doubt  it  is 
called  upon  to  play  a  very  important  role;  it  enables 
the  commander-in-chief  to  overcome  many  difficulties. 
It  is  desirable  to  maintain  under  all  circumstances  the 
possibility  of  giving  prompt  support  to  the  advance 
guard  by  the  artillery  of  the  main  body,  and  one  should 
not  fear  to  separate  from  his  infantry  the  artillery  of 
the  last  division  and  push  it  forward  in  the  column." 
These  passages  from  the  work  of  General  von  Rohne, 
the  great  chief  of  artillery,  thoroughly  indicate  the 
German  opinion  on  the  rapid  deployment  of  the  mass 
of  artillery  in  rear  of  the  advance  guard. 

OPENING  FIRE. 

"One  should  try  to  have  the  artillery  of  the  main 
body  open  fire  simultaneously."     (A.  R.  481.) 

"It  is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  put  out  of 
action  the  opposing  artillery  before  passing  to  the  at- 
tack    *     *     * 

"The  artillery  should  endeavor  to  open  fire  by 
surprise,  within  effective  range.     For  that  purpose  it 


[88] 

approaches  as  near  as  circumstances  permit  to  the 
hostile  position."     (A.  R.  466.) 

The  Germans  consider  that  one  cannot  think  of 
an  assault  before  having,  if  not  destroyed,  at  least  put 
out  of  action  the  hostile  artillery,  and  for  that  reason  it 
is  necessary  to  get  the  superiority  of  fire  as  soon  as 
possible.  The  best  way  is  to  open  fire  by  surprise  at 
close  range. 

General  von  Rohne  wisely  says : 

"The  farther  away  the  first  position  is  from  the 
enemy,  the  sooner  will  be  felt  the  necessity  for  changing 
position.  Outside  of  the  loss  of  time  that  that  will 
entail,  it  is  likely  that  there  will  be  much  less  chance  to 
act  by  surprise  in  the  new  position." 

Contrary  to  the  principles  taught  by  the  regula- 
tions of  1899,  the  new  Infantry  Regulations  recommend 
that  the  batteries  wait  to  open  fire  until  the  infantry 
shall  have  commenced  its  movement.  ''In  order  to 
leave  the  adversary  in  uncertainty,  it  is  important  not 
to  engage  the  artillery  until  the  infantry  is  advancing." 
(A.  R.  361.) 

The'  preliminary  duel  before  the  infantry  combat 
is  no  longer  recognized  in  Germany. 

* '  The  artillery  duel  and  the  infantry  attack  are  not 
two  separate  acts  of  a  battle,"  says  further  General 
von  Rohne,  "it  will  be  necessary  henceforth  to  engage 
with  the  hostile  artillery  during  the  advance  of  the  in- 
fantry. Only  the  closest  co-operation  of  the  two  arms 
permits  getting  results." 

The  regulations  finally  lay  down  this  principle: 
"As  soon  as  the  friendly  infantry  approaches  the  zone 
beaten  by  the  fire  of  the  hostile  infantry,  the  artillery 
while  continuing  to  fire  upon  the  opposing  artillery 


[89] 

must  direct  the  greater  part  of  its  fire  upon  the  enemy*s 
infantry  in  order  to  facilitate  the  advance  of  its  own." 
(A.  R.  369.) 

That  paragraph  is  very  important,  for  it  points  out 
to  the  German  artillery  a  method  of  operation  different 
from  that  to  which  it  has  been  accustomed.  There- 
fore according  to  the  new  regulations,  whatever  be  the 
condition  of  the  artillery  combat  the  infantry  combat 
takes  the  first  place  in  importance  and  the  artillery 
must  support  its  infantry  with  the  major  part  of  its 
strength.  ''Notwithstanding  that  necessity,"  says 
General  von  Rohne,  '*no  fraction  of  the  enmey's 
artillery  must  be  left  unoccupied.  The  batteries  which 
keep  up  the  artillery  duel  will  have  to  divide  up  among 
themselves  the  hostile  batteries. 

' 'The  fire  must  be  so  apportioned  that  no  fraction  of 
the  opposing  line  can  keep  up  the  action  with  impunity 
*  *  *  .  The  best  results  may  be  expected  from 
combined  front  and  flank  firing.  Even  when  you 
haven't  numerical  superiority,  you  must  try  to  obtain 
it  temporarily  upon  certain  points,  by  concentrating  the 
fire."     (A.  R.  437.) 

The  Germans  expect  that  from  the  beginning  of 
the  artillery  struggle  the  howitzers  will  render  the  most 
useful  service.  The  light  howitzers  enter  into  action 
at  the  same  time  as  the  field  guns,  but  the  heavy  artil- 
lery will  often  be  late  getting  into  operation;  we  have 
seen  that  there  are  various  precautions  to  be  taken 
before  it  engages. 

In  any  case  "these  howitzers  will  have  to  silence 
all  hostile  artillery  whose  position  can  be  determined 
and  then  facilitate  by  the  greater  part  of  their  fire  the 
advance  of  their  infantry."     (H.  A.  R.  409-10.) 


[90] 

Placed  in  carefully  defiladed  positions,  the  how- 
itzers will  be  able,  as  we  have  already  seen,  to  damage 
the  opposing  artillery,  provided  it  be  recognizable. 

It  is  nevertheless  certain  that  they  will  never  be 
able  to  destroy  the  adversary's  artillery.  "It  can 
hardly  be  expected  that  the  visible  artillery  can  be 
completely  destroyed.  Formerly  it  needed  only  a  few 
salvos  to  silence  a  battery.  That  can  no  longer  be  ex- 
pected. It  is  only  by  fire  with  percussion  shells  that 
such  a  result  can  be  obtained;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
fire  of  the  artillery  can  greatly  decrease  the  battery's 
efficiency ,  interrupt  its  operation  *  *  *  ."  (General 
von  Rohne.) 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  USE  OF  ARTILLERY. 

On  the  whole,  as  soon  as  a  battle  is  seen  to  be  im- 
minent, the  artillery  is  pushed  forward  so  as  to  get  into 
action  as  quickly  as  possible.  This  is  an  excellent 
principle;  it  is  likewise  recommended  in  the  French 
regulations.  Our  neighbors  apply  it  with  remarkable 
regularity. 

As  has  been  stated,  very  rare  will  be  the  cases  when 
the  German  advance  guard  will  boldly  take  the  offen- 
sive, and,  consequently,  when  the  fractions  of  artillery 
will  be  engaged  successively  according  to  the  order  of 
their  arrival  or  the  hazard  of  circumstances. 

Our  neighbors,  being  prudent  and  methodical, 
make  use  of  their  advance  guard  as  a  protecting  curtain, 
behind  which  they  deploy  as  much  artillery  as  possible. 
When  they  believe  themselves  to  be  ready  to  engage 
all  their  forces  they  let  loose  suddenly  and  by  surprise 
the  whole  mechanism  of  a  powerful  offensive. 


[91] 

The  artillery  thus  enters  into  action — "as  a 
bunch."     Upon  whom?     Upon  what? 

In  case  of  a  fight  between  the  Germans  and  the 
French,  it  can  be  foreseen  that  the  German  artillery 
will  have  been  able  to  perceive  at  that  time  only  a  few 
French  batteries  of  the  advance  guard  which  will  have 
been  on  the  offensive.  These  batteries  which,  it  is  to 
be  hoped,  will  have  deployed  as  quickly  as  the  German 
artillery,  will  be  in  positions  of  observation  along  the 
whole  front. 

If  the  Germans  open  fire  with  all  their  artillery 
'4n  a  bunch,"  the  French  artillery  will  immediately 
have  precise  information  as  to  the  emplacement  and  as 
to  the  strength  of  the  German  artillery ;  all  the  more  so 
since,  as  we  have  stated,  the  latter  will  be  for  the  most 
part  masked  but  not  defiladed.  We  shall  then  be  able 
to  reply  to  it  very  advantageously.  The  batteries  of 
the  French  advance  guard  will  obviously  have  to  suffer; 
but  if  they  have  been  prudent,  if  they  know  what  to 
expect,  the}^  can  be  presumed  to  have  taken  precautions. 
Well  spaced  and  defiladed,  they  will  be  undoubtedly 
forced  to  suspend  their  fire  for  some  time,  making  up 
for  it  by  resuming  fire  when  they  shall  have  the  op- 
portunity. 

The  German  method  of  starting  the  artillery  fight 
appears  to  be  rather  crude;  it  rests  upon  mere  brute 
force.  It  conforms  to  the  German  ideas,  but  the  pro- 
cedure seems  somewhat  barbarous  compared  to  the 
French  methods  which  are  so  perfected  and  rational. 

It  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  sudden  unloosening 
of  the  fire  of  the  combined  artillery  will  produce  a 
profound  impression  upon  the  young  French  troops; 


[92] 

therefore  they  should  be  warned  beforehand  so  as  not 
to  be  surprised. 

The  Germans  have  thoroughly  grasped  the  fact 
that  the  infantry  combat  will  become  the  predominent 
factor  of  the  struggle;  their  regulations  prescribe  de- 
voting the  major  part  of  the  artillery  to  the  infantry 
fight.  Until  the  moment  for  the  asssault,  the  remainder 
of  the  available  guns,  with  the  support  of  the  greater 
part  of  the  howitzers,  is  to  keep  up  the  artillery  duel. 

This  prescription  of  the  regulations  can  but  be 
approved. 

The  importance  of  the  infantry  combat  is  appreci- 
ated in  the  same  manner  by  the  French  Chiefs  of  Artil- 
lery. General  Percin,  the  Inspector  General  of  Artil- 
lery says:  "On  the  offensive,  it  is  the  battery  sup- 
porting the  infantry  that  plays  the  principal  role,  the 
batteries  that  oppose  the  hostile  artillery  (the  counter 
batteries)  are  there  solely  to  give  the  infantry  batteries 
freedom  of  action.  The  efficiency  of  the  artillery  can 
therefore  be  measured  by  the  proportion  of  the  bat- 
teries susceptible  of  giving  effective  support  to  the  at- 
tacks of  the  infantry.  Of  what  importance  is  the  result 
of  the  artillery  duel?  When  the  infantry  goes,  every- 
thing goes!" 

The  Germans  recommend  (I.  R.  331)  that  some 
batteries  accompany  the  infantry  up  to  the  very  shortest 
ranges.  They  hardly  sanction  defiladed  positions  for 
the  light  artillery  batteries;  they  do  not  authorize, 
under  any  circumstances,  defilading  for  the  batteries 
designated  to  support  the  infantry;  these  must  fight 
without  cover  from  half  masked  positions  in  order  to 
take  advantage  of  favorable  opportunities. 

Since  it  is^practically  impossible  for  artillery  that  is 


[93] 

visible  to  change  its  position  under  fire  of  the  enemy, 
the  result  will  be  that  the  German  artillery  designated 
to  support  the  infantry — and  this  will  mean  the  greater 
part  of  their  field  artillery — will  have  to  go  in  battery 
at  the  beginning  in  a  definite  position  from  which  it  will 
not  be  able  to  budge. 

This  uncovered  condition  of  the  artillery,  before 
the  enemy's  batteries  are  dominated  or  at  least  partly 
put  out  of  action,  appears  to  us  to  be  terribly  dangerous, 
especially  facing  a  well  defiladed  artillery  that  is  vigilant 
and  active  like  that  of  the  French. 

At  the  large  maneuvers  of  1909  the  French  wit- 
nesses were  particularly  struck  by  the  imprudence  of 
the  German  batteries. 

2.     INFANTRY   DEPLOYMENT. 

The  deployment  of  troops  is  made  by  our  neigh- 
bors almost  as  in  France ;  there  is  the  same  preoccupa- 
tion about  getting  under  cover,  the  same  care  in  pre- 
serving the  proper  direction. 

There  is,  however,  a  characteristic  difference. 
Whereas  the  French  regulations  accord  a  preponderant 
influence  to  the  utilization  of  the  ground,  the  Germans 
pitilessly  subordinate  the  question  of  the  utilization  of 
the  ground  to  that  of  maintaining  the  direction. 

It  is  the  duty  of  each  unit  to  utilize  to  the  best  ad- 
vantage accidents  of  the  ground,  but  it  is  not  allowed  to 
encroach  upon  the  neighboring  zone ;  it  will  have  to, 
without  hesitation,  if  it  has  at  its  disposition  only  open 
ground,  engage  boldly  thereupon  and  keep  up  the  fight 
on  it  to  the  end. 


[94] 

Whereas  in  France  an  objective  is  indicated  to  the 
leader  of  a  unit,  and  he  is  left  free  to  use  the  ground  to 
the  best  possible  advantage,  by  inclining  more  or  less 
to  one  direction  or  the  other;  by  sharing  passages 
through  which  will  slip  several  units  having  contiguous 
but  different  objectives;  by  closing  up  behind  certain 
shelters  which  may  serve  as  protection  to  various  units, — 
in  Germany  there  is  assigned  to  each  unit  a  zone  from 
which  it  has  not  the  right  to  stray.  The  Germans  fear 
the  crowding  and  mixing  of  units  in  sheltered  passages. 
Their  well  ordered  and  methodical  minds  dread  dis- 
order and  confusion  above  everything  else;  they  trace 
out  absolute  lines  of  demarcation  between  the  zones  for 
the  advance  of  the  different  units.  They  remember 
the  extraordinary  obstruction  that  took  place  in  the 
ravine  de  la  Mance  on  August  18th,  1870;  the  memory 
of  this  famous  episode,  which  might  have  been  so  dis- 
astrous for  them,  has  certainly  had  an  influence  upon 
the  prescriptions  of  the  regulations.  Many  able  Ger- 
man minds  do  not  agree  as  to  this  point  with  the  regu- 
lations. In  1898  General  von  Schlichting  wrote:  '*It 
must  be  laid  down  as  a  fact  that  open  level  surfaces, 
beaten  by  the  enemy's  fire,  are  henceforth  impossible 
to  skirmish  lines  and  to  their  supports,  whatever  may 
be  the  formations  adopted." 

As  a  result  of  the  prescriptions  of  the  regulations, 
the  German  lines  are  perfectly  seen  during  their  advance 
even  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  That  could  be  ob- 
served at  their  last  large  maneuvers. 

The  gaps  in  the  battle  field,  which  sometimes  struck 
the  observers  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  can  not 
occur  with  the  Germans.  In  France  we  claim,  that 
by  seeking  cover,   an  effort  should  be  made  in  the 


[95] 

maneuvers,  as  in  actual  war,  to  give  to  the  enemy  so  far 
as  possible  the  impression  of  these  gaps,  which  are  so 
troublesome  for  the  adversary.  We  believe  this  to  be 
approximating  a  condition  which  will  be  a  reality  im- 
posed in  war. 

On  the  German  battle  field  such  a  gap  can  not 
exist,  since  the  exposed  positions  of  the  zones  of  attack 
are  occupied.  Moreover,  the  reserves  follow  exactly 
the  first  lines. 

One  will  then  be  certain^  over  any  zone  whatever, 
to  see,  if  the  terrain  permits,  the  first  line  advancing, 
followed  successively  by  the  different  lines  of  reserve. 
Instead  of  marching  as  in  France,  generally  grouped  in 
small  columns  utilizing  the  passage  ways  of  the  terrain, 
these  reserves  are  obliged  to  advance  over  the  zones  as- 
signed to  them,  whether  these  zones  be  favorable  or  not 
for  defilading  them.  Over  the  exposed  zones  they  march 
like  the  first  line,  in  large  deployed  chains. 

It  was  of  importance  to  show  up  these  methods  of 
marching  of  the  German  infantry.  They  seem  to  us 
subject  to  criticism,  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  they  are 
not  in  conformity  with  the  spirit  of  regularity  and  order 
that  prevails  in  Germany. 

FRONTS. 

The  German  regulations  abstain  from  giving  any 
data  as  to  the  extent  of  the  fronts;  they  leave  complete 
initiative  as  to  this  matter. 

''The  initial  development  of  the  front  will  depend 
upon  the  strength  and  intentions  of  the  force  and  upon 
the  development  of  the  hostile  front."  (I.  R.  288.) 
In  the  case  of  a  definite  offensive  against  an  enemy 
deployed  in  a  defensive  position,  the  regulations  fix  as 


[96] 

the  front  not  to  be  exceeded  500  meters  for  a  company 
and  1,500  meters  for  a  brigade. 

These  are  the  only  figures  found  in  the  regulations 
pertaining  to  the  subject  of  fronts. 

It  is  evident  that  the  fronts  can  not  be  fixed :  they 
are  preeminently  variable  depending  upon  the  circum- 
stances and  the  terrain.  The  perfecting  of  the  arma- 
ment, the  increase  in  the  range  of  the  weapons  allow 
their  width  to  be  considerably  augmented.  A  line, 
even  though  thoroughly  defended,  will  surely  have 
empty  sections  in  it. 

The  supporting  points  of  the  position  will  be  oc- 
cupied; exposed  passages  that  can  be  swept  by  cross 
fire  will  be  left  without  troops.  The  assailants  will 
move  upon  these  supporting  points  avoiding  the  de- 
nuded passages. 

The  line  of  battle  will  no  longer  form  a  continuous 
line  of  defenders  or  of  assailants,  but  a  succession  of 
positions  over  which  the  combats  will  take  place. 

It  will  often  be  very  advantageous  to  use  forces 
economically  over  one  part  of  the  line  in  order  to  be 
able  to  use  more  of  them  elsewhere. 

In  Germany,  as  in  France,  the  distribution  of  the 
forces  will  be  essentially  variable.  There  will  be 
sectors  very  feebly  occupied,  while  others  will  be  very 
strongly  occupied.  It  rests  with  the  supreme  com- 
mander to  make  the  distribution  according  to  his  inten- 
tions. 

The  gaps  were  numerous  on  the  Russo-Japanese 
battle  fields.  These  gaps,  when  left  so  intentionally 
with  their  defense  provided  for,  offer  no  danger;  we 
have  already  spoken  of  them. 


[97] 

One  of  the  most  conclusive  examples  of  the  im- 
possibility of  the  enemy's  penetrating  them,  when  they 
are  swept  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery  and  the  machine 
guns,  was  seen  at  the  battle  of  Liao-Yan.  Colonel 
Danilow  relates  that  in  this  battle,  in  one  of  the  sectors 
of  the  right  of  their  position  the  Russians  left  an  interval 
of  three  versts  (3,200  meters)  protected  by  artillery 
fire.  The  Japanese  conceived  a  desire  to  cross  it,  but 
their  attempt  did  not  succeed,  and  the  cross  fire  re- 
pulsed them  with  such  losses^ that  they  did  not  dare  to 
renew  the  attempt. 

The  combat  fronts  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war 
were  extremely  variable  and  it  can  be  observed  that 
they  were  very  extended. 

On  the  Japanese  side,  a  division,  acting  with  others, 
had  a  front  varying  from  five  to  ten  kilometers;  in  an 
exceptional  case  it  occupied  only  2.6  kilometers  for  the 
center  and  left  in  the  battle  of  Liao-Yan,  where  the 
Japanese  moreover  suffered  great  losses  in  their  at- 
tacks. The  average  front  for  the  division,  during  the 
entire  war  was  6  kilometers. 

On  the  Russian  side,  the  width  of  the  combat  front 
of  the  division  was  much  less;  the  general  average 
was  three  kilometers,  that  is,  half  of  the  Japanese 
fighting  front.  But  it  must  be  added  that  the  Russians 
by  their  passivity  permitted  every  imprudence. 

The  Japanese  fronts  were  often  wide  beyond 
bounds.  Moreover  in  extending  their  front  indefinitely, 
they  were  often,  in  various  battles  led  into  creating 
veritable  breaks,  unforeseen,  not  commanded  by  the 
fire  of  an3rthing,  openings  through  which  the  Russians 
could  have  broken  up  their  line  of  battle.  Their  ex- 
ample is  not  to  be  followed. 


[98] 

However  that  may  be,  the  Russo-Japanese  war 
demonstrated  that  the  fronts  in  future  battles  will  con- 
siderably exceed  what  could  be  considered  reasonable 
a  short  time  ago. 

In  their  last  large  maneuvers,  the  Germans  used 
some  very  wide  fronts.     They  imitated  the  Japanese. 

On  September  15th,  the  Third  Division  of  the  Red 
force  took  the  defensive  and  covered  a  front  of  seven- 
teen kilometers. 

On  September  16th,  the  three  Red  Army  Corps 
(the  Third,  the  Twentieth  and  the  Fourteenth),  accord- 
ing to  the  orders  for  operation,  engaged  in  action  over 
a  front  forming  a  concave  line  with  a  development  of 
twenty-seven  kilometers. 

On  September  17th,  the  two  Blue  Army  Corps 
occupied  a  defensive  position  behind  the  Tauber  with 
an  extent  of  seventeen  kilometers;  there  were  but 
three  divisions  on  the  front,  twelve  battalions  having 
been  massed  as  a  reserve  in  rear  of  the  left  wing. 

During  these  three  days  the  two  forces,  when  they 
engaged,  did  so  in  long  lines  with  insignificant  reserves. 

On  the  15th,  the  Red  force  had  no  reserve  at  all; 
it  hastily  constituted  one  during  the  course  of  the  opera- 
tion. 

On  the  16th,  the  battle  anticipated  by  the  Red 
force  did  not  take  place ;  the  enemy  sHpped  away,  but 
the  order  of  battle  showed  no  provisions  for  any 
general  reserve. 

On  the  17th,  the  reserve  of  the  Blue  force,  consist- 
ing of  twelve  battalions,  was  placed  behind  the  left 
flank. 

These  methods  of  the  Germans,  imitations  of  the 


[99] 

Japanese  warfare,  are  to  be  understood  and  remembered 
by  us  Frenchmen. 

FIRING. 

The  German  regulations,  like  those  of  France  pre- 
scribe marching  toward  the  enemy  the  longest  time 
possible  without  opening  fire. 

"Distances  at  which  fire  should  be  opened  cannot 
be  fixed  in  advance;  but,  over  flat  and  open  ground, 
good  infantry  ought  not  to^open  fire  before  having 
reached  medium  ranges  ( 1 , 200  to  800  meters ) . "     (I.  R. ) 

''Beginning  at  two  kilometers,"  says  Captain 
Soloview,  "The  losses  caused  by  infantry  fire  com- 
mence to  be  sensibly  felt;  at  a  distance  of  one  kilo- 
meter this  fire  becomes  very  effective." 

Colonel  Neznamow  confirms  this  statement: 

"The  present  rifle,"  he  writes,  "Permits,  by  ex- 
pending a  great  many  cartridges,  the  infliction  upon  an 
adversary  of  serious  harm  beginning  at  two  kilometers, 
provided  the  objective  offers  considerable  dimensions. 

"Between  1,800  and  1,400  meters,  fire  gives  good 
results  especially  from  the  moral  point  of  view.  At 
1,100  meters  the  fire  by  the  deployed  firing  line  is 
generally  begun. " 

It  can  then  be  admitted  that  firing  will  commence, 
on  an  average,  over  flat  and  open  ground,  at  from  1,000 
to  1,200  meters.  This  necessity  for  an  early  opening  of 
the  fire  is  imposed  more  and  more  by  the  improvement 
of  the  weapons.  A  force  cannot  be  led  very  long  under 
the  effective  fire  of  the  enemy  without  being  permitted 
to  return  the  fire. 

The  Germans  seek  to  gain  the  superiority  of  fire 


[100] 

at  the  beginning :  hence,  as  we  have  shown,  they  deploy 
at  the  beginning  a  dense  firing  line. 

As  soon  as  it  is  believed,  say  the  German  Regula- 
tions, that  the  superiority  of  fire  has  been  obtained,  it 
is  the  duty  of  every  fraction  to  profit  by  it  to  gain 
ground.  The  march  is  made  by  rushes,  the  fraction 
which  is  advancing  being  supported  by  the  fire  of  the 
neighboring  units.  Progress  is  thus  made  from  position 
to  position. 

When  at  one  of  these  positions  the  fire  of  the  ad- 
versary stops  the  movement,  the  firing  line  is  rein- 
forced in  order  to  try  to  regain  the  superiority  of  fire, 
which  will  permit  a  new  rush  to  the  front. 

The  local  reserves,  therefore,  melt  little  by  little 
into  the  firing  line  as  that  becomes  necessary. 

"In  order  that  the  attack  shall  be  well  conducted 
the  firing  line  ought  to  be  kept  as  strong  as  possible  by 
successive  reinforcements.  The  question  of  reinforce- 
ment must  be  the  constant  care  of  the  leader."  (I.  R. 
341.) 

The  arrival  of  the  reinforcements  is  not  in  Germany 
the  signal  for  the  rush  forward,  but  for  the  resumption 
of  an  intense  fire  in  which  the  new  arrivals  take  part. 

The  regulations  indicate  that  the  Germans  do  not 
think  that  a  permanent  superiority  of  fire  can  be  easily 
obtained.  This  superiority  being  acquired  at  a  par- 
ticular moment,  a  more  advanced  position  will  be  gained 
from  which  the  struggle  will  have  to  be  recommenced. 

"From  the  moment  when  fire  is  opened,  up  to  the 
point  from  which  the  assault  is  to  be  made,  the  combat 
will  be  developed  with  alternating  success  or  lack  of 
success,  with  a  stubbornness  and  nevertheless  a  slow- 


[101]    ■■".--.::    :■■■'.•  ■^■.■■- 

ness  that  will  sooner  or  later  wear  out  one  of  the  con- 
tending parties."     (M.  G.  R.) 

Infantry  regulations  in  Germany,  as  in  France, 
recommend  that  the  platoon  leaders  keep  control  of 
the  fire  as  long  as  possible;  but  they  admit  that  at  some 
particular  moment  this  control  will  be  completely  lost. 

In  the  combat  of  the  present,  control  of  fire  is  very 
difficult.  From  each  position  the  infantrymen  have  a 
tendency  to  open  the  fire  as  soon  as  they  are  prone, 
without  awaiting  orders.  A  man  in  face  of  danger  has 
an  instinctive  need  of  distracting  his  mind  and  of  stifling 
the  feeling  of  fear  by  keeping  up  his  activity. 

"  It  is  impossible  to  regulate  the  fire  when  the  men 
have  not  received  solid  instructions  and  when  they  are 
not  controlled  by  the  severest  discipline,"  wrote  Captain 
Solo  view. 

At  the  short  ranges,  starting  with  about  400  meters 
it  is  no  longer  a  question  of  regulating  the  fire;  the  men 
lose  all  their  calmness. 

"The  distance  once  reduced  to  400  meters,"  writes 
Colonel  Neznamow,  "it  becomes  difficult  to  aim;  the 
bullets  fly  over  the  heads  and  fall  far  to  the  rear." 

It  is  a  phenomenon  that  has  been  known  for  a 
long  time.  At  these  short  ranges  the  farther  one  ad- 
vances the  fewer  losses  he  has. 

"At  these  distances,"  said  Colonel  Ardant  du  Picq, 
as  far  back  as  1869,  "the  men  no  longer  take  aim;  it 
cannot  even  be  said  that  they  fire :  they  make  a  noise  to 
distract  their  minds." 

By  their  very  careful  instruction  in  firing,  by  their 
very  severe  discipline,  and  by  the  aid  of  the  squad 
leaders  who  second  the  section  leaders,  as  we  have 
shown,  the  Germans  hope  to  preserve  for  the  greatest 


'■■ «'  --'s  [102] 

possible  time  the  fire  discipline  and  to  acquire  thus  the 
superiority  over  an  enemy  '*of  a  more  nervous  disposi- 
tion, less  disciplined  and  less  densely  supported  in  line." 

THE  ASSAULT. 

"To  attack,"  say  the  regulations,  "is  to  carry  a 
line  of  fire  as  near  as  possible  to  the  enemy.  The  assault 
with  the  arme  blanche  definitely  seals  his  defeat." 

Before  the  Russo-Japanese  war  the  Germans  used 
to  believe  that  fire  action  would  be  sufiicient  to  over- 
come the  resistance  of  the  enemy;  the  assault  was  to 
take  place  only  to  crown  a  victory  already  acquired. 
War  has  shown  that  if  fire  action  is  necessary  in  prepara- 
tion, the  attack  can  nevertheless  be  made  successful 
only  by  a  hand  to  hand  combat.  The  bayonet  has  re- 
taken the  very  important  place  which  had  been  refused 
to  it. 

The  Germans  have  taken  this  into  consideration; 
we  have  said  that  the  French  should  rejoice  because  of 
it. 

"When  the  first  line  gets  the  impression  that  the 
moment  for  the  decisive  attack  has  arrived,  it  should 
not  hesitate  to  deliver  the  assault.  It  warns  the  frac- 
tions in  rear  by  means  of  signals.  These  fractions 
immediately  assemble  and  dash  forward  without  heed- 
ing the  losses  they  suffer."     (I.  R.  345.) 

The  signal  for  the  assault  may  be  given  by  the 
subaltern  leaders  further  in  rear.  "This  signal  is  that 
of  the  rattling  of  the  bayonets  on  the  gun  barrels." 
{L  R.  147.) 

The  assault  is  deHvered  when  one  has  reached  a 
distance  of  about  100  meters  and  when  one  feels  the 
enemy  to  be  sufficiently  shaken.     Note  that  the  dis- 


[103] 

tance  for  the  assault,  fixed  in  the  regulations  as  about 
150  meters,  has  just  been  reduced  to  about  100  meters 
by  instructions  from  headquarters.  (Amendments  to 
the  Infantry  Regulations  in  October,  1909.) 

It  must  be  observed  indeed  that  the  assaults  started 
too  far  back  in  the  war  in  Manchuria  nearly  all  failed. 
It  often  happened  that  the  adversaries  could  not  or 
dared  not  hurl  themselves  upon  a  position  until  they  had 
arrived  within  distances  much  below  100  meters. 

The  artillery  has  the  duty  of  preparing  the  assault. 

"As  soon  as  the  commander  of  the  force  has  indi- 
cated to  the  artillery  commander  the  point  upon  which 
he  will  make  the  decisive  attack,  the  artillery  must 
concentrate  upon  that  point  an  overwhelming  fire  by 
occupying  enveloping  positions  so  far  as  possible.  It 
is  at  this  moment  at  the  latest  that  the  artillery  frac- 
tions which  have  been  held  in  reserve  are  thrown  into 
action."     (A.R.470.) 

"The  infantry  batteries  must  accompany  that  in- 
fantry to  support  it  at  short  ranges. 

"The  howitzers  and  principally  the  heavy  artillery, 
must  crush  by  their  plunging  fire  the  supporting  points 
of  the  defense,  and  destroy  all  the  obstacles."  (H.  A. 
R.) 

Such  are  in  effect,  the  prescriptions  relative  to  the 
assault.  They  are  the  paragraphs  which  appear  to  us 
to  be  the  least  clear ;  they  are  even  conflicting. 

It  is  possible  that  the  regulations  were  intentionally 
left  very  vague  on  the  subject  of  the  assatdt. 

The  regulations  appear  to  lay  down  as  a  general 
rule  that  the  signal  for  the  assault  is  given  by  the  firing 
line.  In  certain  cases,  however,  they  admit  that  this 
signal  may  be  given  by  the  commander. 


[104] 

The  Germans  claim  that  the  cases  will  be  very  rare 
when  the  commander  will  have  exact  knowledge  of  the 
situation  of  the  firing  line,  and  of  its  possibilities  to 
deliver  the  assault.  It  is,  therefore,  they  say,  for  the 
subaltern  leaders  who  direct  the  firing  line  to  under- 
stand when  the  time  is  propitious  and  to  give  at  the 
proper  moment  a  signal  which  is  to  determine  the  dash 
to  the  front. 

THE  PREPARATION  OF  THE    ASSAULT   BY   THE  ARTILLERY. 

If  generally  the  troops  of  the  first  line  are  to  give 
the  signal  for  the  assault  on  the  point  which  they  be- 
lieve they  are  able  to  carry,  it  may  be  wondered  how 
the  artillery  can  prepare  in  advance  the  road  for  the 
infantry.  It  would  seem  by  simply  reading  the  regu- 
lations that,  except  in  the  particular  cases  where  the 
commander  gives  the  signal  for  the  assault,  it  can  never 
be  foreseen  at  what  point  the  efforts  of  the  first  line 
will  be  crowned  by  success.  Consequently  the  prescrip- 
tions of  the  artillery  regulations  relative  to  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  assault  appear  to  be  an  artifice. 

In  order  thoroughly  to  understand  the  regulations 
it  is  necessary  to  be  well  posted  in  the  general  tactics 
of  the  Germans. 

They  do  not  understand  the  decisive  attack  as  we 
comprehend  it  in  France;  they  attack  along  the  whole 
front  with  the  fewest  men  possible  and  bring  about  the 
decisive  event  on  one  of  the  adversary's  flanks.  This 
attack  which  must  be  decisive  is  conducted  with  the 
same  methods  as  a  frontal  combat,  but  with  more 
violence  and  a  greater  concentration  of  means. 

When  the  regulations  prescribe  that  the  general-in- 
chief  shall  indicate  to  the  artillery  commander  the  points 


[105] 

upon  which  the  decisive  attack  will  be  made,  they  mean 
that  the  former  will  have  to  indicate  the  points  of  the 
enemy's  flank  which  must  be  enveloped  if  possible.  On 
the  attacking  wing  the  Germans  will  concentrate  a  great 
mass  of  artillery;  they  will  use  there  all  the  artillery 
kept  in  reserve  and  still  available. 

THE   ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES. 

The  regulations  prescribe  that  certain  batteries  will 
accompany  the  troops  making  the  assault.  This  seems 
to  us  still  more  difficult  in  tlie  German  army  than  in  the 
French  army.  How  can  it  be  conceived  that  batteries 
uncovered,  or  barely  masked,  as  the  German  batteries 
are,  can  at  the  most  decisive  moment  of  the  battle, 
bring  up  their  limbers,  expose  their  teams  and  follow 
their  infantry? 

In  France,  General  Percin  recommends  taking  for 
this  work  of  accompanying  the  infantry,  batteries  that 
are  to  be  kept  out  of  the  duel,  and  which  are  to  follow 
sheltered  routes.  It  will  not  always  be  easy  to  find 
these  routes.  These  batteries  appear  to  us  to  be  terribly 
exposed  if  they  advance  too  far  or  if  they  uncover 
themselves ;  but  after  all  it  will  be  admitted  that  bat- 
teries that  are  well  defiladed,  as  will  be  a  great  many 
such  batteries,  can  get  in  motion  without  being  seen 
and  without  being  obliterated;  but  how  can  this  be 
claimed  for  German  batteries?  And  yet  by  consulting 
the  most  serious  works  of  our  neighbors  on  this  subject 
it  is  seen  that  they  speak  glibly  of  changes  of  position 
for  the  artillery  engaged  in  action.  In  regard  to  the 
accompanying  batteries  here  is  what  General  von  Rohne 
says: 


[106] 

"There  is  no  doubt  that  it  will  hereafter  be  difficult 
for  the  artillery  to  accompany  the  infantry  attack 
*  *  *.  If  the  new  position  is  situated  in  the  zone  of 
action  of  the  enemy's  infantry  fire,  and  if  the  position 
cannot  be  occupied  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  the  dash 
to  the  front  may  be  terminated  by  the  complete  de- 
struction of  the  battery,  and  the  object  aimed  at  will 
be  completely  missed." 

General  von  Rohne  concerns  himself  very  justly 
with  the  danger  incident  to  the  occupation  of  the  position, 
but  he  says  nothing  of  the  danger,  which  is  just  as  great, 
of  the  starting  of  and  of  the  march  in  accompanying  the 
attack. 

If  these  batteries  were  able  sometimes  to  accomplish 
their  mission  in  certain  battles  of  1870,  in  the  present 
day  with  the  perfected  artillery  they  appear  to  us  to  be 
consecrated  to  a  very  rapid  destruction  if  they  are  not 
very  prudent  and  if  peculiar  circumstances  do  not  pro- 
tect them. 

"In  the  Far  East,"  says  Major  Meunier  in  his  work 
on  the  Russo-Japanese  war',  "no  accompanying  of  the 
attack  took  place  either  on  the  Russian  or  on  the  Jap- 
anese side,  because  it  was  thought  that  it  meant  expos- 
ing the  artillery  to  certain  destruction.  Many  authors 
share  this  idea  and  recommend  charging  the  machine 
guns  with  this  duty  because  they  have  no  need  of  teams 
in  carrying  it  out." 

THE  MARCH  OF  THE  RESERVES. 

The  regulations  say  that  at  the  signal  for  the  assault 
"the  troops  in  rear  of  the  firing  line  assemble  immedi- 
ately and  dash  forward  by  the  shortest  road  without 
heeding  the  losses  they  suffer." 


[107] 

The  regulations  do  not  say  how  this  assembly  will 
be  made.  If  the  assembling  is  done  in  small  columns, 
that  will  be  perfect ;  but  if  this  assembly  is  executed  by 
rather  considerable  masses,  battalions  or  even  com- 
panies, they  are  marching  to  destruction. 

If  the  scattered  troops  assemble,  those  which  are 
assembled  must  a  fortiori  move  forward  "as  quickly  as 
possible  without  heeding  losses."  If  then,  for  example, 
a  reserve  battalion  is  massed  behind  a  shelter,  it  will 
have  to  move  en  masse  to  the  front. 

All  this  part  of  the  regulations  pertaining  to  the 
assault  appears  to  have  a  general  lack  of  preciseness 
which  makes  it  obscure. 

The  few  precise  sentences  pertaining  to  the  accom- 
panying batteries  and  to  the  march  of  the  reserve 
seem  to  us  to  be  susceptible  of  a  terribly  dangerous 
interpretation. 

Finally,  it  is  remarkable  that  the  German  Regula- 
tions should  be  silent  concerning  the  counter  attack 
which  menaces  the  assailant,  and  concerning  the  means 
for  parrying  it. 

'  THE  PURSUIT  AND  THE  RETREAT. 

All  the  German  regulations  insist  most  particu- 
larly that  the  pursuit  shall  be  pushed  to  the  limit. 
Very  wisely  they  give  the  clearest  and  most  vigorous 
instructions  that  no  halt  shall  be  made  under  any 
considerations. 

"If  one  is  contented  with  defeating  the  enemy, 
one  wins  only  half  a  victory.  The  victory  becomes 
complete  only  through  the  pursuit,  which  has  for  its 
object  the  wiping  out  of  the  enemy."     (I.  R.  421.) 


[108] 

Every  effort  must  tend  toward  the  complete  de- 
struction of  the  hostile  forces. 

The  heavy  artillery  profits  by  its  long  range  to 
fire  upon  the  columns  in  retreat  as  long  as  possible. 

The  field  artillery  batteries  in  position  continue 
to  fire  as  long  as  they  possibly  can;  the  infantry  bat- 
teries quickly  occupy  the  position  and  execute  in  bat- 
tery, no  matter  how;  it's  a  question  of  firing  as  quickly 
and  as  rapidly  as  it  can  be  done. 

The  batteries  that  have  retained  their  mobility 
and  that  have  been  able  to  get  a  fresh  supply  of  am- 
munition pursue  the  enemy  with  the  co-operation  of 
the  infantry  troops  that  are  the  least  exhausted.  (A. 
R.) 

The  pursuit  must  be  kept  up  to  the  limit  by  every 
possible  means.  It  is  essential  to  push  the  enemy  hard, 
to  get  him  at  your  mercy  by  means  of  shrapnel,  shell 
and  rifle  bullets,  by  running  him  through  with  bayonets 
if  necessary. 

''The  cavalry  must  all  have  moved  forward  as  soon 
as  it  perceived  that  the  fight  was  nearing  a  decision." 
(C.  R.  514.) 

''The  cavalry  and  the  infantry  on  the  wings 
endeavor  to  outfiank  the  enemy  in  order  to  fall  upon 
his  flanks  or  to  cut  off  his  retreat."     (I.  R.  423.) 

The  cavalry,  by  covering  great  distances  must 
keep  harassing  the  enemy's  flanks  and  not  leave  him  a 
moment's  respite. 

The  regulations  of  the  three  arms  agree  in  speci- 
fying that  to  obtain  the  result  sought  after,  the  leaders 
must  keep  up  their  energy  to  the  last  extremity  and 
must  demand,  with  severity  if  necessary,  more  than  is 
possible  of  their  men.     ' '  Those  who  fall  will  stay  down. ' ' 


[109] 

(A  saying  that  has  become  a  proverb.)  "There  is  no 
consideration  whatever  that  should  stop  the  pursuit 
by  day  or  by  night,  without  relaxation,  until  the  enemy 
is  completely  annihilated."     (I.  R.  424;    C.  R.  515.) 

These  prescriptions  conform  thoroughly  to  sane 
reasoning.  The  Germans  have  realized  how  fruitless 
would  be  a  dearly  bought  victory  if  it  did  not  result  in 
the  annihilation  of  the  hostile  army. 

The  Japanese  triumphed  painfully  over  the  Rus- 
sians; they  never  knew  how  to,  and  were  never  able  to 
exploit  their  success. 

The  exhaustion  of  their  troops,  the  lack  of  reserves, 
and  especially  their  great  inferiority  in  cavalry  were  the 
causes  of  that.  The  few  batteries  which  made  an  at- 
tempt at  the  pursuit  with  fire  action  were  obliged  to 
stop  almost  immediately  from  lack  of  ammunition. 
The  Russians  withdrew  without  being  pursued,  and  they 
were  always  able  to  reorganize  their  forces. 

The  Japanese  Army  won  some  brilliant  victories 
over  the  Russian  Army,  but  never  conquered  it. 

THE   RETREAT.      * 

If  the  fight  turns  out  unfavorably,  a  retreat  must 
be  made  to  a  position  that  is  easily  defendable.  (I.  R. 
426.)  It  is  absolutely  prohibited  to  keep  a  reserve  to 
protect  the  retreat;  the  intervention  of  the  reserve 
might  assure  the  victory.  The  movement  to  the  rear 
should  be  made  in  several  columns  perpendicularly  to 
the  front.  The  infantry  gets  away  as  soon  as  possible, 
protected  by  the  artillery  and  the  cavalry.      (I.  R.  428.) 

The  artillery  sacrifices  itself  so  far  as  that  is  neces- 
sary for  the  escape  of  the  infantry.     It  fires  solely  on 


[110] 

the  hostile  infantry  in  order  to  try  to  stop  it.  (A.  R. 
474;   I.  R.  428.) 

"The  cavalry  should  sacrifice  itself  to  permit  the 
infantry  to  get  disengaged;  it  charges  the  adversary, 
especially  upon  the  flanks."     (C.  R.) 

As  soon  as  the  position  selected  in  the  rear  has 
been  reached  it  is  occupied  mainly  by  the  artillery, 
the  machine  guns  and  the  cavalry. 

All  these  prescriptions  are  natural.  The  infantry 
is  the  arm  that  must  be  got  free  at  any  cost.  The  artil- 
lery and  the  cavalry  can  withdraw  rapidly  and  conse- 
quently gain  in  speed  over  the  pursuer. 

It  is  astonishing  that  the  Germans,  who  have  very 
carefully  studied  the  subject  of  combat  by  night  and 
admit  so  frequently  its  usefullness,  have  not  spoken 
of  the  facilities  for  retreat  offered  by  the  darkness. 
To  fall  back  in  broad  daylight  when  closely  engaged, 
or  after  an  unsuccessful  assault,  is  to  deliver  one's  self 
up  to  great  losses. 

BREAKING  OFF  THE  COMBAT. 

When  a  retreat  is  compelled,  the  best  means  to 
effect  it  without  too  many  losses  is  to  cling  tight  to  the 
earth  and  wait  for  night  in  order  to  get  away.  The  Jap- 
anese when  obliged  to  recoil  followed  this  method  every 
time  they  could.  A  retreat  in  broad  daylight  is  easily 
changed  into  a  rout ;  the  enemy  regains  self  control,  his 
firing  gets  to  be  well  directed  and  produces  terrible 
effects.  The  morale  of  the  soldier  that  is  falling  back 
is  depressed.  The  least  incident  may  produce  a  brain- 
storm. 

Breaking  off  an  action,  the  regulations  say,  is 
more  easily  done  after  success.     They  might  well  have 


[Ill] 

added,  as  do  the  French  regulations,  that  this  breaking 
off  should  always  be  preceded  by  violent  action  on  the 
offensive.  "The  farther  the  combat  has  advanced,  the 
more  difficult,  it  will  be  to  break  it  off,"  add  the  German 
regulations.     (I.  R.  433.) 

The  evidence  bears  out  this  statement;  but  it  is 
under  such  circumstances  that  one  should  wait  for  night 
to  get  disengaged  and  to  break  off  the  combat. 

Colonel  Madridow,  in  April,  1904,  was  in  command 
of  a  detachment ;  he  threw  his  advance  guard  against 
the  city  of  Andjou ;  the  fight  having  been  commenced,  he 
re-inforced  the  advance  guard.  He  found  himself  com- 
pletely involved  when  he  realized  that  his  attempt  had 
failed.  He  preferred,  notwithstanding  the  danger  of 
the  sudden  arrival  of  a  Japanese  detachment,  to 
remain  the  whole  day  before  Andjou  rather  than  risk 
a  difficult  withdrawal.  He  sustained  his  line  of  fire, 
kept  up  a  delaying  action  and  waited  for  night.  He  was 
then  able  to  withdraw  without  losses. 

This  is  a  good  example  to  follow.  Breaking  off  the 
combat  is  always  difficult  in  daylight;  if  one  is  deeply 
involved  disaster  is  risked. 

**A  voluntary  breaking  off  of  combat  in  broad  day- 
light, "  says  Major  Dickhut,  "can  be  conceived  of  only 
in  the  case  where  for  some  motive  or  other  the  adversary 
also  wishes  to  break  it  off  (the  fight  at  Nouart,  August 
29,  1870),  or  if  by  reason  of  the  lack  of  valor  of  his 
leaders  one  can  act  without  taking  them  into  considera- 
tion. In  all  other  circumstances  the  enemy  will  very 
quickly  transform  a  voluntary  departure  at  the  begin- 
ning into  a  retreat  engendering  all  the  horrors  of  defeat." 


[112] 


ATTACKING  THE  ENEMY  WHEN  HE  IS  ON  THE  DEFENSIVE 
OR  IN  A  FORTIFIED  POSITION. 

For  the  attack  of  a  defensive  position,  even  if  it  is 
fortified,  the  regulations  give  the  same  general  rules  as 
for  a  meeting  engagement.  The  prescriptions  pertain- 
ing to  these  attacks  offer  material  for  only  a  few  re- 
marks. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  regulations  speak  only  of  a 
frontal  attack  against  these  defensive  positions.  They 
do  not  even  point  out  that  the  simplest  means  of  mak- 
ing them  fall  is  to  turn  them  and  to  proceed  to  cut  their 
line  of  communications. 

The  regulations  remain  always  within  the  narrow 
limits  of  the  subject  studied,  without  showing  any 
tendency,  purposely  no  doubt,  to  discuss  tactics  in 
general. 

1st.     Enemy  on  the  defensive: 

If  the  enemy  remains  upon  the  defensive,  he  re- 
nounces all  liberty  of  action  and  gives  it  to  his  adversary. 

As  soon  as  information  has  been  obtained  that  the 
enemy  is  established  in  a  defensive  position,  and  the 
advance  guard  has  verified  the  fact,  the  German  regu- 
lations prescribe  that  the  advance  guard  shall  halt  and 
shall  not  engage  in  action.  The  detailed  reconnaiss- 
ance of  the  position  must  first  be  executed  with  minute 
care  by  officers  of  all  arms  and  by  strong  patrols.  The 
reconnaissance  permits  the  commander  to  determine 
how  the  attack  shall  be  advanced  and  what  will  be  the 
direction  of  the  attack.  If  the  approach  to  the  position 
is  too  difficult  to  be  done  by  day  it  will  be  done  during 
the  night. 


[113] 

Troops  are  distributed  in  sectors.  They  start 
from  perfectly  sheltered  positions  situated  at  least 
three  kilometers  from  the  enemy.     (I.  R.  367.) 

One  unit  is  chosen  as  the  base  unit  for  direction 
The  march  is  made  by  rushes  from  zone  to  zone,  from 
one  break  or  one  obstacle  to  another. 

Having  reached  the  zone  of  attack,  infantry 
should  open  fire  along  the  whole  line,  so  far  as  possible 
at  the  same  time. 

The  artillery,  utilizing  tfee  information  gained  by 
reconnaissance,  will  occupy  defiladed  positions  and 
commence  the  struggle  as  soon  as  it  is  ready,  without 
waiting  for  the  infantry.     (A.  R.  485-487.) 

The  prudence  of  the  Germans  should  be  noted; 
they  do  not  enter  into  action  against  a  defensive  posi- 
tion till  after  the  most  minute  reconnaissance,  which 
they  believe  will  give  them  sufficiently  exact  informa- 
tion concerning  the  situation  and  strength  of  the  enemy. 
Now  we  shall  repeat  what  we  have  already  said  several 
times:  reconnaissance  before  a  defensive  position 
and  consequently  before  an  enemy  that  is  hidden  and 
motionless  will  hardly  give  any  certain  results;  it  can 
only  indicate  the  outline  of  the  position  occupied  by 
the  enemy.  In  war  when  you  want  to  see  and  to  know, 
you  attack. 

In  applying  the  prescriptions  of  their  regulations 
the  Germans  always  run  the  risk  of  striking  empty 
space.  An  advanced  line  or,  better,  some  advanced 
posts  of  the  defenders,  will  succeed  in  throwing  them 
off  the  scent. 

The  regulations  make  no  provision  for  the  case  of 
an  advanced  line  of  defense  formed  by  a  mere  screen 
and  nevertheless  capable  of  resisting  patrols  and  at- 


[114] 

tacks  by  cavalry  on  foot.  One  must  seek  in  the  cotirses 
on  general  tactics  of  the  German  schools  for  prescrip- 
tions supplementing  those  of  the  regulations. 

Gen  V.  Rohne  sums  up  these  prescriptions: 

''The  reconnaissance  of  the  hostile  position  is  very 
difficult  and  often  will  give  no  results,  even  from  an 
elevated  point,  because  the  large  mass  of  the  batteries 
will  be  defiladed  in  waiting  positions. 

''There  will  often  be  left  nothing  to  do  but  to 
follow  the  advice  of  Napoleon :  You  attack  everywhere; 
then  you  see. 

"The  infantry  moves  forward  into  the  zone  of 
action  of  the  hostile  guns  in  order  to  force  the  artillery 
of  the  enemy  to  show  its  hand  and  to  occupy  its  combat 
positions. 

"There  must  be  likewise  engaged,  with  a  similar 
object,  a  few  isolated  batteries  which  the  French  call 
' ' primer  batteries*"  (decoy  batteries) . 

"It  is  moreover  very  important  to  knovu  what  is  in 
front  of  one,  and  whether  one  is  before  the  principal 
position  of  the  enemy,  or  whether  the  latter  has  con- 
tented himself  with  occupying  a  few  advanced  posts 
situated  in  front  of  the  principal  positions.  The  French 
have  a  great  predilection  for  these  positions  and  hope 
thus  to  induce  the  enemy  to  disclose  his  strength  pre- 
maturely. 

"But  if  the  assailant  perceive  the  subterfuge,  he 
can  in  certain  cases  win  a  great  success  by  an  envelop- 
ing attack  either  by  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  the  troops 


♦Batteries  placed  with  guns  a  considerable  distance  apart  with 
no  special  effort  to  conceal  them;  they  seek  to  lead  the  enemy's 
artillery  to  fire  upon  them  thereby  disclosing  its  positions. — Trans- 
lator. 


[115] 

which  occupy  these  advanced  points  or  by  hurling 
them  back  in  disorder  on  the  principal  position  and 
penetrating  with  them  into  the  position." 

These  prescriptions  in  the  book  which  is  in  every- 
body's hands  show  that  outside  of  the  regulations 
there  is  a  current  of  ideas  which  complete  them.  Gen- 
eral V.  Rohne  reproduces  almost  exactly  the  principles 
of  French  tactics. 

We  have  seen  (p.  113)  that  the  German  Regulations 
prescribe,  in  a  case  of  attack^ on  an  enemy  on  the  de- 
fensive, to  open  fire  with  all  the  artillery  as  soon  as  the 
latter  is  ready,  before  the  engagement  of  the  infantry. 
Let  us  note  in  regard  to  this  point  the  difference  from 
the  prescriptions  studied  under  meeting  engagements. 

If-  the  defenders  have  not  unmasked  their  position, 
and  that  will  be  very  probable  since  they  will  not  have 
been  attacked,  upon  what  then  will  the  German  artil- 
lery fire?  It  seems  to  us  that  there  is  here  a  gross 
error  which  did  not  escape  General  v.  Rohne. 

The  measures  of  precaution  laid  down  by  the  regu- 
lations for  the  prudent  and  well  ordered  march  of  the 
infantry  appear  natural.  It  is  wise  to  regulate  very 
minutely  the  dispositions  for  the  attack  of  a  position 
that  has  been  prepared  for  defense. 

2.  The  attack  of  fortified  field  position: 

In  considering  the  case  of  this  kind  of  attack,  the 
regulations  recognize  that  the  defenders  will  occupy  an 
advanced  position ;  they  recommend  pushing  them  back 
on  the  principal  position  before  executing  the  indis- 
pensable minute  reconnaissance.     (I.  R.  376.) 

The  attack  will  be  advanced  usually  at  night. 

**A  position  can  not  usually  be  reconnoitered  until 
the  enemy  has  been  forced  to  occupy  it.     For  that 


[116] 

reason  it  is  necessary  even  during  the  day  for  infantry 
detachments  to  feel  the  enemy's  position  along  differ- 
ent points  and  to  try  to  entrench  in  the  vicinity  thereof. 
They  are  reinforced  little  by  little."  (I.  R.  376.) 
(Amendment  of  October,  1909  to  Infantry  Regulations.) 

The  artillery  will  get  into  defiladed  positions;  all 
possible  protective  works  will  have  to  be  constructed 
and  fire  will  not  be  opened  until  one  is  well  acquainted 
with  the  necessary  data. 

"In  the  most  usual  case  one  will  not  be  able  to 
shake  the  enemy  until  after  the  artillery  of  the  defense 
has  been  weakened;  it  will  be  necessary  to  concentrate 
a  violent  fire  upon  the  parts  of  the  positions  which  ap- 
pear to  be  most  important  with  reference  to  the  form 
of  the  terrain  and  the  intentions  of  the  commander. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  enemy  will  probably 
not  yet  have  occupied  the  position,  or  that  he  has  caused 
it  to  be  occupied  only  with  unimportant  forces,  so  long 
as  the  attack  has  not  been  fully  undertaken ;  the  bom- 
bardment of  a  position  will  be  justified  only  when  it  has 
been  learned  that  it  is  occupied."     (A.  R.  493.) 

"The  supporting  points  are  hammered  by  the 
howitzers  *  *  *  .  As  soon  as  the  defenders  show 
themselves  they  are  overwhelmed  by  the  fire  of  shrapnel 
*  *  *  .  It  is  important  to  put  out  of  operation  the 
adversary's  machine  guns.     (A.  R.  495.) 

"The  combat  will  usually  last  several  days.  In- 
fantry will  keep  under  cover  during  the  day  and  will 
be  able  to  make  progress  only  at  night. 

"At  the  break  of  day  the  fire  of  the  infantry  and 
the  machine  guns  in  concert  with  that  of  the  artillery 
will  oblige  the  enemy  to  burrow  in  his  trenches.     One 


[117] 

will  thus  be  able  to  proceed  with  the  destruction  of  the 
obstacles  and  to  deliver  the  assault."     (I.  R.  383.) 

Such  are  the  principal  prescriptions  of  this  very 
special  form  of  combat,  which  resembles  much  more  a 
siege  operation  than  a  field  operation. 

The  German  prescriptions  seem  to  be  normal  and 
well  arranged.     We  have  no  observation  to  present. 

In  a  war  between  France  and  Germany  we  do  not 
anticipate  a  battle  of  such  nature.  The  fortified  places 
are  already  quite  numerous,  and  an  army  that  would 
shut  itself  up  in  a  permanent  defensive  position  would 
be  inviting  destruction. 

The  defense  will  always  be  only  temporary  and 
consequently  will  be  made  on  a  position  hastily  estab- 
lished, which  the  enemy  will  have  to  take  quickly 
otherwise  the  motives  which  imposed  a  temporary  de- 
fense will  have  soon  ceased  and  the  force  on  the  defen- 
sive will  pass  to  the  offensive. 

Battles  in  entrenched  camps  as  occured  at  Plevna 
or  Mukden  will  never  take  place  in  a  war  with  the 
French  army. 


[118] 
CHAPTER  VII. 


TACTICS  IN  GENERAL. 

The  German  ideas  on  general  tactics  differ  on 
certain  points  from  the  French  tactics.  They  are  only 
the  more  interesting  to  study;  if  they  do  not  appear 
very  clear  in  a  study  of  the  regulations,  they  are  to  be 
found  formally  exposed  in  the  courses  in  tactics  and  in 
the  military  works  of  their  most  renowned  authors. 
Moreover,  at  their  large  maneuvers  it  is  easy  to  observe 
the  application  of  them. 

GENERAL    DISCUSSION    OF    THE    GERMAN    OFFENSIVE. 

After  the  rapid  examination  that  we  have  just 
made  of  the  prescriptions  of  the  German  Regulations 
relative  to  the  offensive,  let  us  pass  to  the  discussion 
of  the  ideas  of  general  tactics  which  have  served  as  a 
basis  for  the  elaboration  of  those  regulations. 

The  general  synthesis  of  the  battle,  as  it  is  conceived 
by  the  Germans  can  be  summed  up  thus : 

As  soon  as  you  meet  the  enemy,  attack  him  if  you 
are  the  stronger;  but  attack  him  immediately,  without 
delay  and  without  hesitation;  don't  give  him  a  chance 
to  get  his  bearings  or  to  prepare  for  defense. 

If  you  are  not  the  stronger  at  the  time,  temporize, 
delay  getting  into  contact  with  him,  wait  until  you  have 
assembled  all  your  forces ;  then  when  the  proper  moment 
has  come  take  the  offensive,  suddenly,  by  surprise,  with 
.all  available  means,  by  engaging  your  whole  strength. 

Make  the  principal  effort  against  the  wing  of  the 
adversary,  which  you  should  overlap,  turn,  and  crush 
under  an  irresistible  concentric  attack. 


[119] 

Such  is  in  its  simplest  form  the  conception  our 
neighbors  have  of  the  battle. 

Let  us  study  with  impartial  criticism  the  principal 
elements  of  this  conception. 

1.      THE   ADVANCE   GUARD. 

(a)     Generalities. 

The  question  of  the  advance  guard  is  one  that  has 
been  considerably  discussed  in  recent  times. 

A  great  evolution  is  being  effected  in  France  in 
regard  to  this  subject.  We-  would  not  speak  of  it  if  the 
Germans  were  not  the  direct  cause  of  this  evolution. 
The  teachings  of  the  ^cole  sup&ieurede  guerre,  which  have 
furnished  the  strategical  and  tactical  doctrine  of  the 
French,  were  based  upon  the  principles  of  the  advance 
guard  in  vogue  in  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Up  to  the  pres- 
ent  times  these  principles  have  been  regarded  as  impera- 
tive and  absolute. 

General  Bonnal  has  written:  **The  conception 
of  an  advance  guard  which  is  applicable  to  a  detach- 
ment, to  an  army,  yes,  to  a  group  of  armies,  dominates 
all  other  questions  relative  to  the  conduct  of  war.  It 
is  so  true  that  an  officer  facing  a  strategical  or  a  tactical 
situation  will  avoid  any  grave  faults  of  procedure  if  he 
thinks  first  of  all  of  the  advance  guard." 

Such  was  in  effect  the  French  doctrine;  from  the 
strategical  point  of  view  this  doctrine  has  been  modified. 
Since  Napoleon's  time  conditions  of  war  have  changed 
absolutely  and  are  changing  slowly  every  day;  it  is 
natural  that  there  should  be  an  evolution  of  ideas,  as  a 
consequence.  The  Germans  have  always  been  hostile 
to  the  idea  of  the  strategic  advance  guard;    this  idea 


[120] 

has  likewise  been  abandoned  in  the  new  military  centers 
of  the  French. 

The  reciprocal  situations  of  the  armies  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  being  given,  a  strategic  advance 
guard  would  have  no  raison  d'etre;  it  would  be  the  same 
in  most  wars  between  European  powers  of  the  present 
day,  at  least  at  the  beginning  of  the  operations. 

An  absolute  condemnation  of  the  strategic  advance 
guard  would  seem  to  us  to  be  an  error.  Such  an  ad- 
vance guard  might  be  necessary  when  one  does  not 
exactly  know  the  zones  of  mobilization  of  the  enemy, 
when  one  is  separated  from  the  adversary  by  a  con- 
siderable distance,  etc. 

Everything  in  warfare  is  a  matter  of  common 
sense ;  nothing  is  absolute. 

We  shall  not  dwell  upon  the  question  of  strategy, 
which  would  lead  us  outside  the  limits  of  our  program, 
and  we  shall  return  to  the  German  tactics. 

{h)     The  Offensive  Advance  Guard. 

In  France  the  advance  guard  has,  as  in  Germany, 
the  duty  of  affording  protection ;  but  it  must  in  addition 
serve  to  gather  information  concerning  the  strength 
and  the  disposition  of  the  adversary.  Except  in  par- 
ticular cases  the  advance  guard  has  a  distinctly  offensive 
mission:  '*It  must  engage  vigorously  to  oblige  the 
enemy  to  disclose  his  strength. ' '     (French  Regulations.) 

What  are  the  objections  that  the  Germans  make 
to  an  offensive  role  for  the  advance  guard  ? 

They  fear,  as  happened  several  times  in  1870,  that 
the  advance  guard  will  drag  the  main  body  into  battle 
against  the  will  of  the  commander-in-chief.  Now,  in 
the  regulations,  they  prescribe  very  justly  that  the 


[121] 

general-in-chief  shall  be  with  his  advance  guard. 
The  latter  has,  therefore,  this  advance  guard  under  his 
immediate  authority  and  can  regulate  its  movements 
at  will;  if  he  doesn't  want  it  to  engage,  he  halts  it. 
We  do  not  thoroughly  understand  the  fear  shown  by 
the  German  authors. 

Our  neighbors  do  not  wish  to  engage  completely 
their  advance  guard  because,  they  say,  if  it  strikes  an 
enemy  that  is  deployed,  it  will  be  repulsed,  turned, 
enveloped  before  the  main  body  has  been  able  to  inter- 
vene. 

This  seems  to  be  a  very  chimerical  fear.  An  ad- 
vance guard  does  not  march  with  its  eyes  shut;  the 
cavalry,  the  contact  detachments,  will  have  already 
reconnoitered  the  enemy;  one  will  know  at  least  his 
apparent  contour,  that  is  to  say  his  front  and  his  flank 
as  they  appear ;  one  will  know  almost  where  and  how  he 
is  going  to  be  met.  The  offensive  advance  guard  has 
for  its  mission  to  tear  away  the  curtains  which  have  not 
yet  been  pierced  and  to  force  the  enemy  to  a  premature 
deployment,  which  appears  to  be  such  a  cherished  idea 
with  the  Germans. 

When  this  advance  guard  will  have  reconnoitered 
the  general  position  of  the  adversary,  when  it  will 
have  led  the  latter  to  deploy  and  by  that  fact  to  expose 
his  strength  and  his  resources,  it  will  have  fulfilled  its 
role.  If  it  runs  against  an  enemy  that  is  already  de- 
ployed it  will  reconnoiter  him  more  easily,  for  it  will 
have  quickly  arrived  on  the  principal  line  where  it  will 
be  halted.     Will  it  then  risk  being  annihilated  ? 

The  French  advance  guard  is  composed  of  a  force 
equal  to  about  one-fourth  of  the  total  strength  of  the 
troops;    it  must  be  admitted  that  the  adversary  will 


[122] 

not  have  a  force  greatly  superior.  Now  in  the  present 
day  conditions  of  combat,  when  you  are  one  against 
four  or  five  you  can  resist  long  enough  before  being 
obliged  to  retreat  for  the  arrival  of  not  far  distant 
succor.  When  everybody  is  recognizing  that  combats 
are  becoming  longer  and  longer,  how  would  an  advance 
guard  be  overwhelmed  so  quickly  that  the  main  body 
would  not  have  time  to  interfere? 

To  recall  the  combat  at  Wissenbourg,  the  Douai 
Division  struggled  for  six  hours  against  the  whole  Army 
of  the  German  Crown  Prince.  If,  instead  of  being 
isolated,  this  division  had  been  the  advance  guard  of 
MacMahon's  Army,  that  army  even  eight  or  ten  kilo- 
meters away  from  its  advance  guard  would  have  con- 
siderably intervened  in  time  to  support  General  Douai 
and  to  maneuver  to  good  advantage  against  the  army 
of  the  Crown  Prince  which  was  entirely  engaged  against 
that  unfortunate  division.    . 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Douai  Division,  having 
been  attacked  at  8 :  00  o'clock  in  the  morning  was  still 
in  perfect  order  and  holding  Wissenbourg  at  11 :  30. 
What  would  have  happened  if  MacMahon's  Army 
could  have  debouched  about  11 :  30  into  the  theater  of 
the  struggle? 

The  Germans  claim  that  by  occupying  a  much 
wider  front  than  the  hostile  advance  guard,  they  will 
be  able  if  they  have  a  sufficiently  open  formation  to  get 
that  advance  guard  under  a  covering  fire,  with  which 
they  expect  to  annihilate  it  quickly.  This  hope  could 
evidently  have  a  serious  base  if  the  advance  guard  would 
present  itself  as  a  package,  or  in  column,  or  in  close  for- 
mation;  but  that  would  be  admitting  a  complete  sur- 


[123] 

prise  of  that  advance  guard  and  a  denial  of  any  tactical 
knowledge  on  the  part  of  its  leader. 

We  have  just  said  that  the  advance  guard  should 
be  kept  informed  and  enlightened  by  the  cavalry 
which  precedes  it;  it  ought  to  know  in  a  general  way 
whether  it  is  going  to  meet  the  enemy  in  motion  or 
established  on  a  defensive  Hne.  It  ought  then,  in  time, 
to  spread  out,  to  distribute  its  artillery  and  to  protect 
carefully  its  flanks.  If  this  advance  guard  is  important, 
it  will  be  marching  in  several  columns  composed  of 
different  arms;  it  will  be  protected  on  its  flanks  by 
more  or  less  powerful  contact  detachments  which  it  will 
not  be  afraid  to  space  properly. 

When  this  advance  guard  meets  the  enemy  it  will 
present  itself  to  him  under  the  form  of  numerous  points 
occupying  a  very  considerable  front. 

How  will  the  Germans  be  able  to  get  a  converging 
fire  on  all  that  front?  All  the  little  columns  will  be 
advancing  moreover  under  cover  so  far  as  possible; 
they  will  vigorously  assault  all  the  screens  that  they 
encounter  and  will  arrive  at  the  line  of  resistance  with- 
out offering  a  good  target  either  to  the  fire  of  the  artillery 
or  to  that  of  the  infantry.  The  artillery  of  that  advance 
guard,  distributed  in  widely  spaced  groups,  will  vig- 
orously support  the  march  of  its  infantry.  It  will 
probably  be  at  first  out  of  artillery  range  of  the  main 
hostile  position;  then,  if  the  adversary  has  not  ad- 
vanced, it  will  get  into  co-operation,  remain  at  a  great 
distance  on  well  defiladed  emplacements,  seeking  either 
to  support  the  progressive  march  of  its  infantry,  or, 
by  firing  upon  the  hostile  artillery  that  can  be  recog- 
nized, to  provoke  in  the  latter  what  we  call  in  French 
the  "igniting  current."     In  this  latter  case,  the  bat- 


[124] 

teries  of  the  advance  guard  will  play  the  role  of  fuses 
to  primers.  If  the  hostile  artillery  wants  to  try  to 
crush  these  batteries  by  taking  advantage  of  its  super- 
iority and  of  its  deployment,  it  will  commit  according 
to  our  opinion  a  grave  mistake.  It  will  disclose  its 
positions,  permit  them  to  be  marked  out,  and  will  not 
produce  a  great  effect  by  its  fire.  We  have  previously 
seen  what  slight  effect  artillery  fire  had  against  covered 
and  protected  batteries.  The  fire  of  the  hostile  artillery 
at  long  range  against  the  French  advance  guard  bat- 
teries will  undoubtedly  force  these  into  temporary 
silence,  but  will  not  disable  them. 

We  do  not  believe  there  is  any  danger  of  being  anni- 
hilated for  an  advance  guard  that  is  actively  offensive, 
provided  it  be  well  maneuvered  and  properly  com- 
manded. The  German  ideas  on  the  subject  of  the 
advance  guard  do  not  to  us  seem  accurate. 

(c)     Security  and  Information. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Germans  are  fundamentally 
opposed  to  offensive  action  on  the  part  of  the  advance 
guard.  They  expect  to  get  their  information  solely 
through  their  cavalry,  and  the  role  of  their  advance 
guard  is  merely  one  of  protection. 

We  have  seen  how  the  Germans  have  entire  con- 
fidence that  their  cavalry  corps  can  pierce  the  screens 
and  get  information  right  up  to  the  very  columns  or 
cantonments  of  the  enemy.  They  expect  that  their 
cavalry  will  be  able  to  carry  through  all  the  combats  on 
foot  that  become  necessary,  and  they  consider  it  useless 
and  even  dangerous  to  reinforce  it  with  cyclist  battalions. 

They  do  not  recognize  the  mixed  contact  detach- 
ments which  appear  to  us  capable  of  rendering  such 
great  service  outside  the  columns  of  the  advance  guard. 


[125] 

"The  idea  of  throwing  in  front  of  the  army  strong 
mixed  detachments,"  writes  General  von  SchHchting, 
"is  far  from  being  justified  in  every  case;  on  the  other 
hand,  we  must  unreservedly  accept  that  of  distributing 
in  front  of  the  march  powerful  cavalry  masses  which 
will  clear  things  up  a  great  distance  ahead  and  whose 
mission  will  be  to  furnish  the  foundations  for  the  deci- 
sion to  be  taken." 

We  repeat  what  we  have  already  said — the  masses 
of  cavalry  will  be  able  to  penetrate  the  screens ;  but  as 
soon  as  they  find  themselves  in  contact  with  the  ad- 
vance guard,  and  with  the  covering  detachments,  they 
will  be  completely  unable  to  pierce  or  even  to  drive 
back  these  first  bodies  of  infantry.  They  can  hope, 
upon  entering  into  a  strongly  constituted  protective 
net,  to  break  a  few  meshes,  but  they  run  great  risks  of 
finding  themselves  entangled  in  meshes  of  infantry 
bodies  from  which  they  will  be  able  to  escape  only  by 
leaving  behind  a  part  of  their  strength. 

General  Langlois  said  several  years  ago:  "The 
cavalry  can  not  perform  the  duty  of  reconnaissance 
reserved  for  the  advance  guard;  if  it  is  scattered,  a 
feeble  infantry  screen  will  stop  it;  if  it  is  massed  into 
divisions  it  will  perhaps  pierce  that  screen,  but  in  a 
single  point ;  it  will  soon  collide  with  an  advance  guard. 
In  short  it  will  have  seen  very  little  at  the  price  of  very 
great  sacrifices. 

"For  serious  reconnaissance,  cavalry  needs  the 
co-operation  of  forces  capable  of  piercing  the  screen  and 
of  seeing  what  they  hide ;  in  a  word,  of  mixed  detach- 
ments." 

For  the  large  units,  it  appears  that  these  detach- 


[126] 

merits  are  to  be  the  rule  in  France;  but  in  Germany 
they  have  only,  up  to  the  present,  been  the  exception. 

We  can  only  disapprove  the  German  tactics, 
which  risks  compromising  in  hazardous  dismounted 
combats  organs  so  important  as  the  cavalry  division. 

On  the  whole,  notwithstanding  their  secret  service 
system,  notwithstanding  the  audacity  and  the  temerity 
of  a  well  equipped  and  powerfiil  cavalry,  the  Germans 
before  an  adversary  forewarned  and  well  covered,  will 
be  able  to  know  exactly  only  the  apparent  outline  of  the 
troops  which  are  opposed  to  them.  They  will  go  into 
battle  with  an  inaccurate  idea  of  the  forces  and  of  the 
position  of  the  enemy. 

As  to  the  role  of  security,  the  German  advance 
guard  ought  to  be  able  to  accomplish  it  thoroughly. 
The  measures  prescribed  by  the  regulations,  the  customs 
which  have  been  so  long  followed  in  the  German  Army 
prove  how  well  the  troops  will  know  how  to  take  care  of 
themselves  and  to  protect  themselves  against  surprise 
in  the  field. 

(d)     Tactical  RSles  of  the  German  Advance  Guard, 

We  have  said  that  the  German  advance  guard  will 
not  seriously  undertake  the  offensive  unless  it  has  an 
incontestable  superiority  or  in  case  it  becomes  necessary 
to  acquire  some  important  point  at  any  price. 

The  quick  and  immediate  attack  by  a  force  that 
knows  itself  to  be  superior  is  excellent  tactics.  An  ad- 
vance guard  should  never  trifle  with  detachments  which 
it  can  destroy  or  at  least  repulse. 

It  will  often  happen  that  the  German  advance 
guard  upon  meeting  with  resistance  will  not  know  that 
it  has  an  assured  superiority;  in  that  case  it  will  stop. 


[127] 

If  this  German  advance  guard  should  encounter  a 
contact  detachment,  like  those  recommended  in  France, 
its  role  would  be  to  struggle  with  it ;  but  can  it  be  certain 
that  the  detachment  is  weak  or  that  it  is  isolated  ?  If 
that  detachment  knows  how  to  spread  itself  out,  to 
give  the  appearance  of  having  a  long  line  of  artillery, 
having  really  only  a  few  guns ;  to  amplify  its  forces  by 
its  skill  and  its  maneuvering,  it  will  be  able  to  deceive 
the  adversary  completely  and  to  induce  him  to  under- 
take faulty  maneuvers. 

As  a  general  rule  the  German  advance  guard  will 
be  very  prudent.  Prudent,  because  the  regulations 
prescribe  it  when  superiority  is  not  assured;  prudent, 
because  the  German  character  does  not  take  to  adven- 
tures and  to  hazardous  risks ;  prudent,  finally,  because 
the  mind  of  the  leader  will  be  given  to  order  and  method, 
and  the  German  method  is  to  attack  only  when  one  has 
all  his  forces  under  his  hand. 

The  Germans  will  gain  contact  slowly.  While 
their  advance  guard  is  feeling  the  enemy  or  resisting 
from  a  defensive  position  the  attacks  of  an  aggressive 
enemy,  the  main  body  of  the  forces,  preceded  by  the  artil- 
lery, will  be  massing  in  rear.  The  advance  guard  will 
be  carrying  on  a  delaying  action  by  every  means  and 
if  necessary,  will  fall  back  step  by  step  so  as  to  avoid 
getting  too  thoroughly  engaged  before  the  arrival  of  the 
principal  mass. 

During  all  this  period  of  feeling  the  enemy  and 
of  preparation,  the  Germans  will  disclose  only  as  much 
as  is  absolutely  necessary  of  their  artillery,  they  will 
remain  prudently  on  the  defensive,  will  appear  timid  and 
irresolute.     Then  we  have  seen,  suddenly,  when  they  be- 


[128] 

lieve  themselves  to  be  ready,  they  will  launch  their 
offensive  by  a  sudden,  violent  and  general  action. 

The  battle  will  be  begun,  but  the  battle  will  have 
been  engaged  with  a  premature  deployment  and  before 
positive  information  shall  have  been  obtained  as  to  the 
strength,  the  position  and  the  intentions  of  the  enemy. 

There  is  in  these  methods  of  engaging  a  real 
danger,  to  the  consideration  of  which  we  will  return. 

2.      THE  GENERAL  RESERVE. 

Properly  speaking,  there  is  no  general  reserve  in 
the  German  battles. 

The  forces  of  an  army  are  divided  into  two  frac- 
tions; one  is  assigned  to  the  frontal  combat,  for  a  cov- 
ering or  a  holding  action  (called  by  the  French,  "the 
wear  and  tear  action");  the  other  improperly  called 
the  general  reserve,  is  massed  toward  one  wing.  It  is 
intended  either,  on  the  offensive,  to  deliver  the  decisive 
blow  by  envelopment,  or,  on  the  defensive,  to  parry 
any  turning  movement  on  the  flank.  The  troops  of 
this  last  fraction  are  maneuvering  troops  following  a 
preconceived  plan,  but  are  in  no  way  what  is  called  a 
general  reserve  at  the  disposition  of  the  commander- 
in-chief  and  susceptible  of  intervening  at  such  or  such 
a  point  where  it  might  be  conveniently  used,  depending 
upon  the  incidents  of  the  battle. 

In  rear  of  the  front,  in  each  sector,  are  found  partial 
reserves,  very  carefully  graduated.  These  reserves  are 
intended  solely  to  feed  the  firing  line  on  the  front  and  to 
hold  the  enemy  while,  upon  one  of  the  wings,  is  exe- 
cuted the  movement  prepared  from  the  beginning,  the 
movement  which  is  to  bring  about  a  decision.     These 


[129] 

sector  reserves  are  then  only  reserves  for  tactical  support 
and  not  maneuvering  reserves. 

One  hardly  finds  in  the  various  German  regulations, 
any  ideas  concerning  a  general  reserve  properly  so 
called.  The  infantry  regulations  do  not  speak  of  it; 
only  the  artillery  and  the  machine  gun  regulations 
speak  of  a  contingent  general  reserve  composed  of  guns 
and  machine  guns. 

"In  the  large  units,  the  commander  may  reserve  at 
the  first  a  portion  of  his  artillery. "     (A.  R.  365.) 

**The  machine  guns  after  the  first  engagement,  are 
to  be  withdrawn.  They  form  at  the  disposition  of  the 
commander-in-chief  a  reserve  which  may  be  employed 
to  support  quickly  points  that  are  threatened,  to  op- 
erate on  the  flanks  of  the  adversary,  to  support  the 
decisive  attack."     (M.  G.  R.  242-243.) 

Therefore  as  a  matter  of  general  reserve,  the  regu- 
lations anticipate  only  a  reserve  of  artillery  and  of 
machine  guns  which  will  serve  in  case  of  need.  In 
practice,  it  is  not,  however,  seen  that  the  Germans 
abstain  completely  from  using  general  infantry  reserves. 

In  the  great  maneuvers  of  the  last  few  years,  it 
has  been  seen  that  the  commanders-in-chief  preserved 
as  a  general  reserve  a  few  troops  under  their  immediate 
authority.  The  strength  of  these  troops  has  been,  in 
certain  cases,  one  eighth  of  the  total  effectives;  but 
usually  one- tenth.  Under  these  conditions,  that  re- 
serve, being  incapable  of  producing  a  decisive  effect  by 
itself,  can  be  used  only  to  fill  up  a  gap  which  might  have 
occurred  in  the  front  or  to  bind  the  frontal  attack  to 
the  attack  on  the  flank,  or  for  another  useful  purpose 
that  can  be  considered  as  secondary. 


[130] 

3.      THE  ENVELOPING  MOVEMENT. 
THE  DECISIVE  ATTACK. 

The  general  principle  of  German  maneuvers  in 
combat  is  the  following: 

Hold  the  enemy  on  his  front,  turn  him,  and  crush 
him  on  the  wing. 

This  very  simple  maneuver  is  the  one  with  which 
the  Germans  constantly  succeeded  in  1870;  it  is  the  one 
which  they  taught  to  the  Japanese  and  which  the  latter 
have  employed  with  so  much  success.  Hence,  now, 
the  Germans  accept  no  different  maneuver  either  in 
strategy  or  in  tactics. 

It  is  felt  that  the  strategy  used  at  Sadowa  is  the  one 
that  they  admire  the  most :  March  upon  the  enemy  with 
an  army  intended  for  the  attack  on  the  front,  while 
another  army,  assembled  at  the  proper  time  as  an  offen- 
sive hook,  falls  upon  his  flank  to  determine  the  victory- 

When,  their  preparations  for  concentration  are 
studied  it  can  be  understood  that  it  is  a  maneuver  of 
the  same  kind  that  they  have  the  intention  of  renewing 
against  us  upon  the  next  occasion.  The  railroads  per- 
mit them  to  carry  out  their  plan  more  easily  and  on 
a  different  scale  than  in  1870. 

But  let  us  leave  strategy  and  remain  in  the  limits 
of  general  tactics. 

All  the  German  authors  extol  the  same  method  of 
combat :  As  soon  as  he  approaches  the  enemy  to  within 
a  distance  varying  according  to  the  importance  of  the 
force  (twenty-four  hours  at  least  for  an  army),  the  com- 
mander-in-chief "designates  that  part  of  his  troops 
which  will  perform  the  demonstration  or  remain  upon 
the  defensive,  and  that  which  will  take  the  offensive." 
(General  von  Scherff.) 


[131] 

"He  will  divide  his  forces  into  a  principal  attack 
and  a  secondary  attack,  assigning  to  the  secondary  the 
smallest  possible  number  of  troops."     (Griepenkerl.) 

The  frontal  attack,  which  is  the  secondary  attack, 
is  however,  made  with  all  possible  energy.  "To  make 
the  envelopment  successful,"  say  the  infantry  regula- 
tions, (Par.  392),  "the  enemy  must  as  a  preliminary 
have  been  held  on  his  front.  The  best  means  for  that 
is  to  attack  him  vigorously." 

"If  the  forces  are  insufficient  to  make  a  vigorous 
frontal  attack,  or  if,  for  som^  reason  or  other,  this  at- 
tack must  be  given  up,  a  skillful  leader  will  be  able  to 
make  the  envelopment  possible  by  means  of  a  delaying 
action  or  by  simply  threatening  an  attack." 

Let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  the  attack  on  the  flank 
is  worked  out  according  to  the  information  collected  be- 
fore the  engagement  has  cleared  up  the  situation, 

"The  simplest  envelopment,"  say  the  infantry 
regulations,  (Par.  394),  "  consists  in  bringing  the  troops 
that  are  farthest  away  upon  a  wing  of  the  enemy  by 
simply  giving  them  the  proper  direction  on  the  march. 

"The  envelopment  becomes  more  difficult  if  it  is 
not  begun  until  the  moment  of  deployment  or  if  it  is 
done  by  reserves  held  in  rear." 

The  fraction  of  the  forces  charged  with  the  frontal 
attack  advances  in  shallow  columns  widely  spaced  and 
enters  vigorously  into  action.  The  cavalry  leaves  the 
column  toward  the  side  where  the  principal  attack  is  to 
be  made.  Along  the  whole  front  there  is  only  a  rather 
deep  line,  quite  solidly  organized  but,  as  we  have  seen, 
without  a  general  reserve,  without  a  maneuvering 
force  at  the  disposition  of  the  general-in-chief . 

"The  massed  enveloping  force  is  advancing  at  a 


[132] 

certain  distance  on  the  flank  so  that  its  interior  wing  will 
not  get  wedged  with  the  neighboring  wing  of  the  forces 
engaged."     (I.  R.) 

When  the  proper  moment  appears  to  have  arrived, 
the  general-in-chief  sends  it  an  order  to  attack. 

Such  is,  on  the  whole,  according  to  the  official 
documents,  the  attack  which  our  neighbors  consider  as 
decisive.  This  attack,  for  the  force  that  executes  it, 
seems  to  be  a  frontal  attack,  and  the  procedure  in 
matters  of  combat  are  identical  with  those  which  we 
have  studied. 

4.       INVIOLABILITY    OF   THE    FRONT. 

The  Germans  do  not  believe  in  the  possibility  of 
piercing  the  front  of  a  line  of  battle,  nor  in  winning  a 
victory  by  breaking  through  the  hostile  lines. 

Their  theory  on  this  subject  is  as  follows : 

Any  force  which  would  advance  in  the  form  of  a 
wedge  into  the  hostile  front  would  be  immediately 
crushed  by  the  converging  fire  and  repulsed  by  the  inter- 
vention of  the  adjacent  sector  reserves. 

Napoleon  was  able  to  win  brilliant  victories  by 
breaking  the  enemy's  front;  but  in  his  time  firearms 
had  little  effectiveness  and  were  of  very  short  range. 
Troops  located  on  the  flanks  of  a  break  made  in  the 
line  were  unable  to  interfere  to  a  sufficient  degree. 

Nowadays  not  only  would  the  infantry  fire  from 
the  neighboring  sectors  enfilade  the  whole  invading  lines, 
but  the  cannons  placed  upon  the  flanks,  in  positions  de- 
filaded from  the  fire  from  the  adverse  front,  would 
shower  a  crossed  fire  upon  the  venturesome  invaders. 
One  can  indeed  carry  a  point  along  the  line  of  the  front 


[133] 

and  hold  it,  that  will  be  a  partial  success  such  as  will 
often  occur  for  one  side  or  the  other,  but  it  will  be  ex- 
plicitly forbidden  to  throw  upon  a  given  sector  a  mass 
intended  to  break  through  and  gain  a  victory.  This 
mass,  whatever  formation  may  have  been  given  it, 
would  always  form  an  objective  or  a  series  of  very 
vulnerable  objectives;  it  would  be  rapidly  crushed  by 
the  covering  fire  to  which  it  would  be  subjected  as  soon 
as  it  had  passed  the  first  line  of  the  hostile  front. 

The  convictions  of  the  Germans  on  this  point  are 
explicit.  (See  in  regard  to  this  the  fourth  ntimber  of 
the  1906  Quarterly  Militaiy  Review  of  the  German 
Vierteljahrshefte  fiir  Truppenfiihrung.) 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  no  where  do  the  German 
Regulations  speak  of  the  inviolability  of  the  fronts; 
they  let  it  be  thought  that  one  can  attack  everywhere 
with  success.     This  is  prudent  and  wise. 

But  the  German  conviction  on  this  point  appears 
in  the  writings  of  their  best  authors  and  especially  in 
their  actions.  In  1870  they  never  won  a  victory  by  a 
decisive  frontal  attack.  The  Russo-Japanese  War  has 
still  more  confirmed  them  in  their  belief.  And  indeed 
for  ten  years,  in  their  great  maneuvers,  the  German  gen- 
erals have  never  attempted  a  decisive  frontal  attack ;  the 
decisive  attack  is  always  made  on  a  wing  or  upon  the 
two  wings  at  once. 

The  Germans  consider  that  the  troops  on  the  front 
will  always  be  able  to  keep  up  a  holding  action  until  the 
decisive  wing  attack  can  be  delivered  to  decide  the 
battle.  We  know  that  along  the  front,  in  rear  of  their 
infantry,  they  claim  that  they  have  placed  an  impassable 
wall,  represented  by  their  formidable  artillery. 

The  theory  of  the  inviolability  of  the  front,  as  it  is 


[134] 

upheld  by  our  neighbors,  appears  seductive,  but  it  does 
not  correspond  to  what  is  demonstrated  by  the  practice 
of  war.  We  have  shown,  by  relating  on  page  98  the 
German  method  of  operating  at  their  last  great  maneu- 
vers, that  they  had  no  fear  for  their  very  extended  fronts 
and  did  not  preserve  any  general  reserves  in  rear  to 
parry  a  victorious  attack  on  their  front.  Thus  on  the 
16th  of  September,  three  army  corps  were  to  engage 
simultaneously  on  a  front  of  twenty-seven  kilometers 
with  no  force  at  the  disposition  of  the  General  com- 
manding the  army. 

It  was  almost  the  same  on  the  other  days.  Thie 
commanders  of  the  armies  were,  however,  two  of  the 
best  generals  of  the  German  Army. 

The  principle  of  the  inviolability  is  then  perfectly 
accepted  and  applied  by  our  neighbors.  We  should 
know  this  and  remember  it. 

5.       GENERAL    CRITICISMS. 

Hence  the  general  idea  of  the  battle  is  based 
among  the  Germans  on  four  elementary  principles: 

Prudence  of  the  Advance  Guard; 

Inutility  of  a  General  Reserve ; 

Inviolability  of  the  Front; 

Decisive  Attack  by  Envelopment. 

We  cannot  choose  as  a  defender  of  these  ideas  any 
one  better  than  Colonel  Kuhl  of  the  great  General  Staff. 
In  1904  he  wrote  in  the  German  Quarterly  Review: 

"To  hold  the  enemy  everywhere  and  to  seek  the 
(decision  by  massed  reserves  acting  under  the  orders  of 
the  General-in-chief  in  the  zones  selected  by  him — such 
jxiethods  have  become  impracticable." 


[135] 

It  is  the  Napoleonic  method,  it  is  the  French  tactics 
which  is  condemned. 

And  further  on  he  adds:  "The  question  arises 
even  of  knowing  whether  in  the  great  battles  of  to- 
morrow it  will  be  possible  to  seek  the  decision  by  the 
action  of  a  reserve.  The  reserve  could  intervene  only 
where  the  conditions  were  ripe  for  it;  but,  from  the 
point  where  the  general-in-chief  will  be,  will  he  be  able 
to  discern  the  favorable  point  ?  If  so,  will  the  reserve 
have  time  to  get  there  with  the  enormous  extension  of 
the  present  front  ?" 

The  author  seems  to  confound  the  general  strategic 
reserves  with  the  tactical  reserves.  It  is  certain  that 
the  reserves  of  a  large  army  or  of  a  group  of  armies  can- 
not be  led  unexpectedly  against  a  given  point.  No- 
body argues  it.  In  strategy  a  plan  must  be  foreseen 
and  fixed  upon  in  advance,  depending  upon  the  condi- 
tions. 

The  contingencies  of  a  battle  cannot  completely 
alter  a  strategic  plan,  at  the  most  they  can  bring  to  it 
certain  modifications.  Here  we  are  speaking  only  of 
tactics,  hence  of  a  tactical  general  reserve.  Now,  if  the 
combat  fronts  have  been  considerably  increased,  the 
capacity  for  resistance  of  a  force  has  grown  enormously. 
A  battle  will  last  several  days.  A  general  reserve  may 
be  ten,  twenty  or  thirty  kilometers  from  the  point 
where  it  is  to  make  its  attack  and  get  there  on  time. 
The  General-in-chief,  when  he  has  engaged  everywhere 
and  has  seen  does  not  wait  until  the  conditions  are  en- 
tirely right  to  cause  his  reserves  to  approach  the  point 
where  he  wants  to  deliver  his  effort. 

Colonel  Kuhl  adds:  ''Even  if  the  moment  was 
propitious  there  would  be  reason  for  wondering  whether 


[136] 

the  intervention  of  a  general  reserve  would  be  useful. 
It  would  not  be  if  the  preparation  by  fire  action  had  been 
completely  accomplished;  for  then  the  intervention  of 
the  partial  reserves  in  echelons  in  rear,  assigned  to  the 
same  sector  of  the  field  of  battle  would  be  quite  sufficient 
to  give  to  the  first  line  the  moral  support  it  would  need 
to  throw  itself  into  the  assault.  And  if,  on  the  contrary, 
conditions  are  not  right,  the  reserves  by  reason  of  piling 
up  so  would  be  running  into  certain  catastrophe." 

We  will  not  dwell  on  this  reasoning  which,  carried 
out  to  the  extreme,  would  seem  to  say  that  the  more 
reserves  there  are  to  support  an  assault  the  more 
chances  there  are  of  failure ;  let  us  remember  only  that 
affirmation  that  large  reserves  that  pile  up  run  into  a 
certain  catastrophe.     Nobody  disputes  it. 

But  if  the  enemy  is  spent,  if  the  attack  by  fresh 
troops  is  made  by  surprise,  as  it  is  understood  in  France, 
one  can  not  seriously  say  that  the  partial  reserves  of 
the  enemy  will  be  sufficient.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
on  both  sides  the  wear  and  tear  will  have  occurred  on 
the  troops  of  the  first  line ;  the  partial  reserves  will  have 
been  engaged,  the  greater  part  of  them  at  least.  To 
suppose  that  the  reserves  of  a  sector  will  be  sufficient 
not  only  to  carry  a  given  point,  but  to  break  completely 
a  hostile  line  and  to  assure  victory,  is  to  suppose  that  the 
adversary  is  incapable  of  struggling  seriously  or  that 
he  has  engaged  without  partial  reserves;  in  that  case 
tactics  has  nothing  more  to  do  with  it,  nothing  remains 
to  be  done  but  to  march  to  the  front. 

To  suppose  that  sector  reserves  will  be  sufficient  to 
carry  a  position  defended  by  forces  approximately 
equal  seems  inadmissible.  One  cannot  argue  on  such 
hypotheses. 


[137] 

No,  in  a  struggle  between  two  adversaries  approxi- 
mately equivalent,  it  must  be  admitted  that  if  one  of 
them  has  engaged  all  his  forces  in  a  given  sector  he  has 
forced  his  adversary  to  employ  almost  all  of  his.  At 
the  end  of  a  certain  time  in  a  holding  engagement,  the 
exhaustion  is  general;  one  can  do  no  more,  one  doesn't 
want  anymore.  Only  a  few  reserves  can  be  considered 
as  still  available. 

But,  if  at  this  moment  there  appears  a  fresh  force, 
strong  and  supported  by  a  formidable  artillery,  how  can 
it  be  claimed  that  this  attack  will  not  succeed  and  that 
the  feeble  reserves  will  be  siitecient  to  repel  it?  The 
adjacent  artillery  will  be  held  fast  by  the  superior  at- 
tacking artillery  and  will  be  incapable  of  producing  the 
effects  of  convergence  that  the  Germans  talk  about. 
However,  the  attack  by  these  troops  of  general  reserve 
should  be  made  in  wide  formations  and  with  the  neces- 
sary precautions  for  the  flanks. 

General  Kuhl,  as  well  as  the  other  German  authors, 
always  argues  on  the  question  as  if  a  decisive  French 
attack  would  be  made  against  fresh  troops  supported 
by  artillery  in  possession  of  all  its  capabilities. 

There  lies  the  error. 

The  method  of  always  hunting  the  hostile  flank  to 
win  the  decision  by  envelopment  does  not  present 
merely  those  advantages  which  are  so  vaunted  by  the 
Germans;  it  has  also  some  very  great  disadvantages 
which  it  is  well  to  point  out. 

It  is  of  course  understood  that,  according  to  the 
German  method,  there  is  assigned  to  the  combat  along 
the  front  as  few  troops  as  possible  in  order  that  the  at- 
tack which  is  to  produce  the  decision  may  be  well  rein- 
forced;  now  in  looking  for  the  enemy's  flanks,  by  ex- 


[138] 

tending  one's  front  with  that  object  in  view,  one  may 
succeed  in  extending  his  Hnes  to  an  inordinate  degree. 

If  the  troops  for  the  combat  on  the  front  are  not 
strongly  organized,  if  they  are  not  carefully  connected 
one  with  another,  if  unusual  gaps  happen  to  occur  due 
to  errors  or  to  weakness,  what  will  become  then  of  all 
that  German  theory  concerning  the  so-called  inviola- 
bility of  the  front?  It  is  almost  impossible  to  affirm, 
in  view  of  the  preconceived  plan  accepted  by  the  Ger- 
mans that  the  troops  that  will  be  assigned  to  the  combats 
along  the  front  will  be  sufficient  and  that  they  will  not 
have  to  be  extended  more  than  they  should.  Let  it  be 
remembered  what  was  on  August  18,  1870,  the  surprise 
of  the  Germans  upon  learning  that  the  French  front 
extended  as  far  as  St.  Privat. 

In  the  recent  war  in  Manchuria,  in  the  battle  of 
Mukden,  to  cite  only  that  one,  the  Russians  would  have 
had  a  safe  opportunity  to  pierce  the  Japanese  front. 
That  front  which  was  immoderately  extended  presented 
many  weak  points.  The  counter  attacks  failed  because 
they  were  not  strong  enough,  not  properly  prepared, 
not  accompanied  by  artillery.  The  adjacent  forces 
seemed  to  be  disinterested  in  the  counter  attacks,  in- 
stead of  supporting  them  by  redoubling  their  activity. 

If  General  Kuropatkin,  being  posted  as  to  the 
enemy's  deployment,  had  thrown  the  First  Siberian 
Corps  or  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  which  he  had  as  a  general 
reserve,  upon  one  of  those  numerous  weak  points  in 
the  enemy's  front,  it  is  quite  probable  that  the  issue  of 
the  struggle  would  have  been  totally  modified.  If,  for 
example,  he  had  thrown  his  counter-attack  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Goutoulin,  where  there  was  a  complete  opening 
in  the  Japanese  line,  he  would  have  completely  sepa- 


[1B9] 

rated  Kuroki's  army  from  that  of  Nodzu  and  could 
have,  without  meeting  other  than  a  few  battahons, 
fallen  upon  the  rear  of  General  Nodzu. 

Who  would  dare  to  say  that  the  Japanese  front  was 
inviolable. 

The  moment  the  Germans  accept  the  impossibility 
of  a  decisive  attack  against  the  front  of  the  enemy 
and  consider  that  the  sector  reserves  are  sufficient  to 
insure  the  inviolability  of  the  front,  they  are  quite 
naturally  led  to  place  their  general  reserve  on  a  wing. 
Here  is  what  Colonel  Kuhl  says :  * '  In  the  middle  of  the 
front,  this  reserve  would  be  used  only  for  an  offensive 
attack.  Now,  that  form  of  attack  has  become  much 
more  difficult  and  unpromising  since  the  great  range  of 
the  arms  permit  concentrating  strong  fire  upon  the  as- 
sailant who  forms  a  wedge. 

''If  one  has  decided,  on  the  contrary,  to  employ 
that  reserve  upon  a  wing  it  will  be  difficult  to  engage  it 
at  the  desired  time  and  place  by  causing  it  to  make 
changes  of  position  toward  the  side  in  rear  of  the  front ; 
the  employment  of  the  reserve  appearing  to  be  more 
convenient  upon  a  wing,  it  is  there  that  it  will  preferably 
be  placed.  But,  why  not  put  it  there  before  hand, 
especially  since  it  will  then  be  already  there  to  envelop 
the  enemy?  One  can  make  as  many  objections  as  one 
may  wish  to  the  mania  for  envelopment;  nobody  will 
dispute,  however,  that  the  envelopment  is  the  most 
effective  form  of  attack,  because  it  offers  the  only  sure 
means  of  deploying  a  superior  number  of  guns  and 
rifles  for  concentric  fire ;  from  the  point  of  view  of  pro- 
cedure it  is  the  one  which  promises  the  best  results  by 
permitting  action  upon  the  flank  and  the  rear  of  the 
enemy." 


[140J 

Thus  it  is  that  in  the  German  Army  the  general 
reserve  is  no  longer  a  reserve  properly  so-called,  because, 
being  placed  beforehand  upon  a  wing  for  a  definite 
mission,  it  is  no  longer  at  the  disposal  of  the  general-in- 
chief. 

Is  the  attack  of  a  wing  more  advantageous  than 
the  attack  of  the  front  ? 

Yes,  certainly,  if  one  is  dealing  with  an  enemy 
who  has  not  anticipated  it,  or  who  has  not  taken  the 
measures  necessary  to  prevent  its  success.  But  when 
one  finds  oneself  in  front  of  a  prudent  enemy  who  is 
skilled  in  maneuvering,  the  wing  attack  will  not  be 
found  to  offer  a  priori  any  better  conditions  than  the 
frontal  attack. 

If  the  enemy  has  supported  his  two  wings,  either  on 
a  fortified  position  or  upon  an  impassable  obstacle, 
how  would  the  flank  attack  be  possible?  Now,  a  sup- 
porting point  will  be  sought  more  and  more,  if  not  for 
both  wings  at  least  for  one  of  them.  In  case  one  or 
both  flanks  cannot  be  sheltered,  artificial  supporting 
points  will  be  created,  which  will  of  course  not  be  impas- 
sable but  which  will  strongly  support  the  threatened 
flank. 

The  great  disadvantage  of  the  flank  attack  is  that 
it  can  almost  always  be  anticipated.  A  frontal  attack, 
on  the  contrary,  cannot  be  divined  beforehand,  or  at 
least  it  can  be  foreseen  only  a  few  moments  before  its 
execution,  that  is  to  say  often  too  late  to  be  able  to 
parry  it. 

For  a  flank  attack  to  succeed  one  of  the  essential 
conditions  is  that  this  attack  be  made  against  what  is 
really  the  wing  of  the  adversary.     Can  one  be  certain 


[141] 

in  making  an  attack  that  he  has  found  the  real  wing  of 
the  principal  line  of  the  enemy  ? 

If  one  makes  a  mistake  one  risks  disaster.  The 
active  protection  of  the  threatened  flank  will  be  made, 
in  reality,  by  a  force  echeloned  in  rear  which  it  will  be 
very  difficult  to  reconnoiter.  These  echelons  will  have 
in  front  of  them  mixed  detachments,  and  occasionally 
cavalry  supports,  which  will  be  able  to  deceive  abso- 
lutely the  adversary  as  to  the  extent  of  the  front  really 
occupied.  When  the  assailant  seeks  the  wing  which  he 
has  in  advance  resolved  to  attack,  he  will  be  obliged 
to  extend,  undoubtedly  beyond  all  his  expectations  in 
order  to  find  the  last  detachment  and  the  last  echelon. 

If  the  flank  attack  is  launched  before  the  disposi- 
tion and  the  forces  of  the  enemy  have  been  thoroughly 
reconnoitered,  there  is  a  risk,  when  dealing  with  an 
enemy  skilled  in  maneuvers,  of  finding  oneself  taken  in 
the  flank  at  a  critical  moment  by  a  reserve  of  the  ad- 
versary which  will  have  been  previously  placed  in  over- 
lapping echelons  far  to  the  rear. 

The  Germans  are  mistaken  when  they  claim  that 
the  wing  attack  is  always  preferable  to  a  frontal  attack. 

The  decisive  attack  will  be  profitable  only  if  it  is 
made  by  surprise;  the  flank  attack  can  hardly  be  by 
surprise. 

If  the  frontal  attack  appears  to  offer  a  disadvantage 
through  taking  the  form  of  a  wedge  into  the  hostile  line 
and  through  seeming  to  permit  the  concentration  of  the 
converging  fire  of  the  adversary,  the  flank  attacks 
will  almost  always  offer  just  as  great  a  difficulty  because 
of  the  impossibility  of  attacking  the  forces  at  the  ex- 
treme limit  of  the  enemy's  disposition. 

The  frontal  attack,  or  at  least  an  attack  not  pre- 


[142] 

viously  designated,  presents  moreover  the  opportunity 
of  using  the  facihties  that  the  ground  will  offer  for  its 
preparation. 

This  attack  has  the  advantage  of  not  being  thrown 
against  a  position  that  will  be  strongly  defended  by 
fortifications  constructed  to  resist  it.  The  adversary 
not  being  able  to  foresee  it  will  not  be  able  to  establish 
beforehand,  as  he  would  be  in  the  case  of  the  exposed 
flank,  important  defenses  at  the  point  where  it  will  take 
place. 

And  what  can  be  said  of  the  initial  disposition  for 
battle  to  which  the  preconceived  plan  of  the  Germans 
will  lead?  The  force  intended  to  make  the  envelop- 
ment is  placed  in  advance  on  a  wing  in  overlapping 
echelons  even  before  the  enemy's  front  has  been  attacked 
and  before  the  disposition  of  his  troops  have  been  de- 
termined. But  what  will  happen  if  one  makes  a  mis- 
take ?     We  will  let  Colonel  Kuhl  answer : 

"That  this  manner  of  giving  battle  presents  certain 
inconveniences"  confesses  the  Colonel,  "nobody  dis- 
putes; as  the  battle  has  been  prepared,  so  it  will  have 
to  be  developed ;  for  thereafter  the  commander  will  not 
be  able  to  make  any  further  essential  changes  in  the 
distribution  of  the  forces  *  *  *  .  If  the  effort  does 
not  succeed  at  once,  it  will  fail." 

The  German  colonel  is  certainly  right;  he  might 
have  added :  "If  the  enemy  is  not  very  inferior  and  is 
not  willing  to  allow  himself  to  be  done  up,  the  effort  will 
very  often  fail." 

How  can  any  leader  dare  to  take  fixed  and  im- 
changeable  dispositions  for  a  fight  on  the  mere  informa- 
tion obtained  by  cavalry  and  spies?  A  front  will  be 
pointed  out  to  him,  but  has  no  mistake  been  made? 


[143] 

As  we  have  already  said,  the  cavalry,  for  many  reasons, 
is  unable  to  tear  away  the  veil  from  the  real  front  of  a 
disposition. 

Without  going  back  to  the  examples  of  the  wars  of 
1870  or  1878,  which  show  the  errors  which  can  be  com- 
mitted by  cavalry,  we  will  point  out  merely  what  took 
place  in  the  great  German  maneuvers  in  1895.  General 
von  Eichhom  commanding  the  Eighteenth  Corps  made 
his  plans  on  September  the  8th  to  envelop  the  left  wing 
of  the  Eighth  Corps.  Misled  by  erroneous  information 
his  maneuvers  failed  completely. 

If  one  is  deceived  at  the  maneuvers,  what  will  one 
be  in  a  war  ? 

In  an  organism  like  an  army,  the  general-in-chief 
must  make  his  plans  at  least  tweny-four  hours  in  ad- 
vance. 

What  is  there  to  prove  that  the  front  tomorrow  will 
be  the  one  that  was  reconnoitered  today?  That  some 
important  force  echeloned  in  rear  will  not  stop  short  the 
enveloping  movement  at  a  time  and  place  which  will 
not  have  been  anticipated?  That  fortuitous  circum- 
stances will  not  modify  the  data  concerning  the  enemy 
and  all  the  expectations  of  the  commander-in-chief? 
For  an  attack  that  has  been  prepared  in  advance  to 
succeed,  it  must  be  carried  on  with  unfailing  exactness 
with  reference  both  to  time  and  to  space. 


[144] 
CHAPTER  VIII. 


THE  DEFENSIVE. 

THE  GERMAN   DEFENSIVE   COMBAT — CRITICISM  THEREOF. 

The  general  discussion  we  have  just  made  of  the 
German  offensive  combat  is  applicable  in  part  to  their 
defensive  combat.  We  shall  not  make  a  separate  dis- 
cussion of  the  defensive  combat,  which  would  bring 
about  repetitions ;  we  shall  examine  the  regulation  pre- 
scriptions and  the  German  doctrine  for  the  defensive 
combat  as  the  opportunity  arises  in  the  general  dis- 
cussion of  the  defensive. 

1.      OCCUPATION   OF   A   DEFENSIVE   POSITION. 

Preparation  of  the  Position. 

' '  The  principal  conditions  that  should  be  fulfilled 
in  a  defensive  position  are:  to  present  a  clear  field  of 
fire,  to  permit  of  free  movements,  under  cover,  within 
and  to  the  rear  of  the  position ;  to  have  at  least  one  of 
its  flanks  solidly  supported."     (I.  R.  392.) 

"The  works  are  usually  not  arranged  in  a  continu- 
ous line,  but  in  groups.  The  intervals  between  the 
groups  offer  no  danger  if  they  are  commanded  by  the 
fire  from  the  trenches."     (I.  R.  408.) 

We  have  nothing  special  to  point  out  in  the  regula- 
tions relative  to  the  establishment  of  the  defensive  posi- 
tion ;  these  prescriptions  appear  to  be  excellent,  and  they 
conform  to  those  of  the  French  regulations. 

The  Germans  are  particularly  careful  in  regard  to 
their  lines  of  information,  especially  upon  the  defensive. 
They  recommend  that   communication  by  telegraph 


1145] 

and  by  telephone  be  established  with  the  greatest  care. 
One  remark  in  passing.  It  is  stated  (I.  R.  406) 
that  field  works  lose  much  of  their  value  when  they 
facilitate  the  enemy's  reconnaissance.  That  is  abso- 
lutely correct.  To  dig  a  trench  which  is  visible  to  the 
enemy  is  to  give  him  a  reference  point  to  show  him 
where  to  strike.  Not  enough  care  is  taken,  as  a  rule,  in 
concealing  the  defensive  works. 

INFANTRY   AND   ARTILLERY. 

The  position,  the  regulations  wisely  say,  should  be 
divided  into  sectors  among  which  are  distributed  the 
troops  assigned  to  the  defense  of  the  front ;  each  sector 
is  provided  with  its  own  special  reserve,  the  reserve 
being  smaller  as  the  ground  is  more  covered. 

"The  first  thing  to  think  of  is  the  use  to  be  made  of 
the  artillery."     (A.  R.  502.) 

The  employment  of  the  infantry  is  just  as  important 
as  that  of  the  artillery ;  but  the  Germans  have  a  marked 
predilection  for  the  artillery  on  the  defensive;  they 
seem  to  expect  the  most  protection  from  it. 

' '  The  infantry  should  be  about  600  meters  in  front 
of  the  artillery."     (I.  R.  401,  A.  R.  502.) 

This  prescription  seems  astonishing.  The  regu- 
lations (Par.  144)  do  say  why  this  distance  should  not 
be  less,  but  not  why  it  should  not  be  greater. 

When  they  have  no  cover,  the  infantry  supports 
should  be  at  least  300  meters  from  the  firing  line,  say 
the  Germans;  in  France,  we  say  at  least  400  meters. 
In  rear  the  reserves  are  placed  at  a  distance  varying 
from  300  to  500  meters.  For  the  artillery  to  be  able 
on  level  ground,  to  fire  with  safety  over  the  infantry, 
it  must  be  at  least  300  meters  in  rear  of  it. 


[146j 

According  to  these  figures,  it  may  be  wondered 
where  the  Germans  will  place  their  sector  reserves. 
Furthermore,  if  the  infantry  line  of  fire  is  only  600  meters 
from  the  batteries,  the  artillery  will  find  itself  compro- 
mised in  case  the  said  line  wavers  in  any  pronounced 
degree  toward  the  rear. 

The  indicated  distance  of  600  meters  seems  to  us 
to  be  remarkably  insufficient,  it  could  only  be  given  as 
a  minimum  to  be  allowed  only  in  certain  especially 
favorable  conditions. 

"Careful  attention  must  be  given  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  artillery  on  the  position  in  echeloned 
groups,  assuring  the  possibility  of  concentrating  the 
fire  of  these  groups;  provision  will  also  be  made  for 
firing  toward  the  flanks  and  for  the  use  of  crossed  fire." 
(A.  R.  504.) 

The  formation  of  the  artillery  into  groups,  the 
echeloning  of  these  groups  and  of  the  batteries  in  the 
groups  are  wise  and  prudent  measures. 

The  flanking  or  enfilading  fire  of  batteries  masked 
in  the  passageways  of  the  position  can  produce  extra- 
ordinary effects  at  a  decisive  moment.  The  German 
regulations  therefore,  very  wisely  prescribe  that  such  a 
use  of  the  batteries  shall  be  provided  for  at  the  begin- 
ning. It  seems  absolutely  necessary  that  artillery 
established  in  position,  for  this  purpose,  in  advance  be 
used  to  avoid  having  to  execute  possibly  disastrous 
movements  at  a  critical  moment.  The  German  regula- 
tions are  silent  concerning  the  distribution  of  these 
batteries  and  the  emplacements  to  be  aSvSigned  to  them. 
Their  very  special  purpose  permits  departure  from  the 
principles  accepted  for  the  offensive.  The  fixed  posi- 
tions for  the  defensive  permit  determining  the  ground 


[147] 

over  which  the  struggle  will  take  place  and  permit  fore- 
seeing the  probable  needs  of  the  infantry.  Common 
sense  will  have  to  be  exercised  in  accordance  with  the 
circumstances.  General  Percin  says,  with  the  high 
authority  due  him:  ''There  is  reason  for  inquiring 
whether  the  local  defense  should  not  be  provided  for 
with  a  small  number  of  batteries,  of  sections  and  even 
of  pieces,  sheltered  so  far  as  possible,  intended  to  act 
only  at  the  last  moment." 

With  regard  to  the  positions  to  be  taken  by  the 
artillery,  the  regulations  prescribe:  ''It  will  be  ad- 
vantageous to  occupy  defiladed  positions.  From  such 
positions  the  artillery  can  fire  upon  the  enemy  while  he 
is  advancing  his  attack  and  during  his  deployment, 
without  betraying  before  the  proper  time  its  positions 
and  its  strength.  These  positions  will  permit  carrying 
on  the  duel  with  a  superior  artillery  strength,  and  will 
favor  lateral  changes  of  position.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  artillery  must  be  able  to  leave  them  when  necessary 
in  order  to  fight  when  it  can  effectively  do  so,  from  the 
very  beginning,  the  mobile  infantry  targets.  If  provi- 
sions can  not  be  made  for  changing  position  with  safety 
during  the  action,  a  certain  number  of  batteries  should 
be  designated  to  fire  upon  the  infantry."     (A.  R.  504.) 

As  we  have  seen  in  the  study  of  their  offensive 
combat,  the  Germans  recognize  the  use  of  defiladed 
positions  for  batteries  that  are  to  fire  upon  fixed  targets, 
such  as  the  hostile  artillery,  but  never  for  firing  upon 
mobile  targets.  On  the  defensive  they  recommend  de- 
filading the  counter-batteries.  The  counter-batteries 
have  greater  need  for  defilade  when  on  the  defensive 
than  when  on  the  offensive;  for  they  should  be  able  to 
change  their  objectives,   to  fire  in  all  directions,  and 


[148] 

even  to  change  position,  things  they  could  not  do  if 
they  were  without  cover  under  fire. 

General  von  Rohne  says  that  the  batteries  that 
are  to  be  used  to  support  the  infantry  fire  do  not  need 
to  be  in  their  position  beforehand,  that  they  can  remain 
waiting  limbered  up.  He  believes  that  these  batteries 
will  be  able  to  move  under  fire  to  their  positions?  If 
these  positions  can  be  taken  by  a  simple  movement  by 
hand  in  front  of  a  crest,  that  is  possible;  but  if  they 
have  to  cross  exposed  ground  with  their  teams  under 
the  adversary's  fire,  it  seems  to  us  to  be  absolutely  im- 
possible. 

Let  us  remember  that  when  the  reconnaissance 
shows  that  the  attack  is  imminent,  and  indicates  the 
direction  from  which  it  will  come,  the  artillery  intended 
to  support  the  infantry  is  put  in  position  on  uncovered 
or  half  masked  emplacements,  which  are  strengthened 
by  embankments  of  earth. 

A  SINGLE  POSITION  FOR  THE  DEFENSE. 

The  defense  must  occupy  only  one  position  accord- 
ing to  the  regulations. 

The  Germans  condemn  the  theory  of  advanced 
lines.  They  authorize  them  only  upon  the  condition 
that  these  advanced  lines  shall  fall  back  as  soon  as  the 
enemy  deploys  to  attack  them.  Thus  on  September 
11,  1905,  at  their  great  army  maneuvers,  the  Fifth 
German  Corps  pushed  an  advanced  line  to  within  a 
few  kilometers  of  the  enemy's  advanced  posts ;  the  ad- 
vanced line  did  not  even  make  an  attempt  at  resistance, 
if  fell  back  as  soon  as  it  saw  that  the  enemy  was  com- 
mencing his  deployment. 

"No  advanced  positions,"  said  the  regulations  for 


.    [149] 

the  infantry  maneuvers  of  May  29,  1906;  "they  inter- 
fere with  the  fire  of  the  defenders  of  the  main  position 
and  one  gets  himself  beaten  in  detail.  If  it  is  necessary 
to  gain  time,  trenches  can  be  constructed  in  advance  of 
the  true  position  to  lead  the  enemy  into  error;  but  they 
will  be  very  weakly  held  and  will  be  evacuated  as  soon 
as  the  enemy  has  deployed." 

It  is  certain  that  advanced  lines  are  often  dangerous. 
As  has  been  said  by  General  Langlois,  who  has  made  a 
thorough  study  of  them,  "they  should  be  used  only 
under  exceptional  conditions." 

The  same  is  not  true  of  what  we  call  covering  de- 
tachments, which  consist  of  very  mobile  troops  occupy- 
ing only  certain  selected  points  in  front  of  a  line  of 
defense. 

These  detachments  seem  to  us  to  be  indispensable. 
They  ascertain  the  direction  of  the  lines  of  march  of  the 
hostile  columns,  the  strength  of  the  hostile  advance 
guard,  etc.  They  serve  as  contingent  supports  for  the 
cavalry  and  enable  it  to  complete  its  information; 
finally,  they  very  often  succeed  in  deceiving  the  enemy, 
in  making  him  deploy  prematurely,  in  any  case  in 
making  him  lose  time. 

We  can  see  what  happens  at  the  large  maneuvers, 
where  the  march  is  made  moreover  very  quickly  with- 
out considering  the  blows  received;  we  note  the  diffi- 
culty experienced  by  an  advance  guard  that  has  been 
halted  by  a  hostile  detachment  in  making  an  accurate 
and  prompt  estimation  of  the  situation  and  of  the 
strength  of  the  troops  opposed  to  it. 

In  1870,  General  von  Werder  sent  out  from  the 
Lisaine  several  detachments  in  front  of  his  line  of  de- 
fense;  von  Debschitz  to  Delle,  von  Bredow  to  Ar9ay, 


[150] 

von  Willisen  to  Lure.  Everybody  knows  how  success- 
ful their  mission  was. 

General  von  Rohne  admits  that  "the  adoption  of 
smokeless  powder  and  the  increased  range  of  modern 
weapons  considerably  augment  the  importance  of  these 
advanced  posts.  These  two  improvements  make  re- 
connaissance more  difficult  and  diminish  the  danger 
for  these  advanced  troops  of  getting  cut  off  from  the 
principal  position. 

"On  the  other  hand,"  adds  the  general,  "the  fact 
must  not  be  concealed  that  the  conduct  of  these  detach- 
ments still  remains  a  very  delicate  matter.  The  diffi- 
culty lies  in  seizing  the  proper  moment  to  break  off  the 
action  and  to  fall  back  in  good  order." 

The  Boers,  however,  without  any  study  of  the 
subject,  frequently  used  detachments  of  this  sort  with 
the  greatest  success.  We  believe  that  the  danger  of 
not  being  able  to  get  away  in  time  is  exaggerated  in  the 
minds  of  the  Germans.  One  only  needs  to  have  light 
troops  and  a  leader  that  knows  his  business. 

We  know  that  the  Germans  claim  that  their  cav- 
alry can  sufficiently  perform  the  duty  that  we  assign 
to  these  advanced  detachments,  and  that  the  more 
satisfactorily  since  it  can  get  away  more  easily. 

We  have  said  what  we  think  about  it,  we  shall  not 
pursue  the  matter  further. 

2.      THE    COMBAT. 

When  they  have  received  their  information  from 
their  cavalry,  the  Germans  occupy  their  positions  in 
accordance  with  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time ; 
not  too  soon,  in  order  not  to  betray  their  positions ;  not 
too  late  to  be  able  to  take  advantage,  if  the  occasion 


[151] 

should  offer  itself,  of  the  extreme  range  of  their  weapons. 
It  is  moreover,  not  necessary  to  occupy  the  whole  posi- 
tion at  the  same  time.     (I.  R.  411,  412.) 

It  is  habitually  the  commander-in-chief  who  gives 
the  orders  for  occupying  the  positions,  and  usually 
he  will  give  the  orders  for  the  opening  of  fire  (by 
the  artillery)  (A.  R.  509,  510).  The  artillery  opens 
fire  with  all  its  batteries  at  the  same  time  and  by  surprise. 
It  directs  its  fire  at  first  upon  the  hostile  artillery,  unless 
the  assailant  shows  big  columns  of  infantry.  (A.  R. 
510.) 

''There  have  been  for  a  long  time,"  says  General 
von  Rohne,  ''discussions  ^s  to  whether  the  artillery  of 
the  defense,  which  will  probably  be  numerically  the 
weaker,  should  not  begin  the  duel  with  the  artillery  of 
the  attackers.  If  the  assailant  does  not  act  with  a 
great  deal  of  prudence,  if  he  doesn't  know  enough  to 
wait  until  all  his  artillery  has  arrived  before  having 
his  batteries  take  their  positions  and  open  fire,  the  de- 
fenders may  hope  to  have  numerical  superiority,  at 
least  temporarily. ' ' 

It  may  be  that  the  defenders  may  have  for  some 
time  a  numerical  superiority,  but  that  is  not  sufficient. 
We  do  not  share  the  General's  opinion;  we  have  already 
said,  and  repeated,  that  the  assailants  can  very  well 
engage  only  a  few  batteries  as  "decoys,"  without  run- 
ning great  danger,  and  if  the  defenders  open  fire  with 
all  their  artillery,  before  the  assailants  have  shown  a 
large  proportion  of  theirs,  they  are  committing  a  great 
mistake,  they  are  betraying  their  positions  prematurely. 

"When  the  fire  has  been  opened  along  the  whole 
front,"  says  further  General  von  Rohne,  "they  (the 
defenders)    must  not   hesitate   to   engage   their  whole 


[152] 

strength.  To  keep  a  priori  a  reserve  for  the  later  phases 
of  the  battle  would  be  giving  all  the  trumps  to  the  ad- 
versary." 

To  engage  all  one's  batteries,  if  it  is  necessary,  to 
gain  the  superiority  of  fire,  yes,  that  is  fighting  the  game 
well ;  but  if  it  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  gain  the  superi- 
ority of  fire,  no ;  it  is  harmful  and  dangerous.  The  bat- 
teries not  engaged  should  remain  available  for  the  in- 
fantry combat  or  for  any  other  need  that  may  arise. 

"When  the  infantry  advances,  the  artillery  should 
abandon  if  necessary  all  defiladed  positions  in  order 
to  fire  to  better  advantage  upon  the  infantry;  but  it 
should  in  the  meantime  keep  the  enemy's  batteries 
under  fire."     (A.  R.  511.) 

"The  howitzers  will  keep  up  the  duel  with  the 
artillery." 

The  field  artillery  is  then  to  act  at  this  stage  of  the 
battle  as  it  does  upon  the  offensive ;  we  shall  not  repeat 
what  we  have  already  said  upon  this  subject. 

The  artillery  regulations  say  further,  (Par. 5 12): 
"If,  even  before  the  beginning  of  the  infantry  attack, 
the  enemy's  artillery  shows  such  a  superiority  that 
nothing  can  be  hoped  for  from  the  artillery  duel,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief may  order  that  the  batteries  be  re- 
moved temporarily  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy." 

Here  is  a  strange  prescription  which  scarcely  agrees 
with  the  prescriptions  of  the  French  regulations.  At  a 
given  time,  then,  the  artillery  of  the  defenders,  its  in- 
feriority having  been  demonstrated,,  is  to  keep  silent 
and  to  leave  free  play  to  the  attackers'  artillery  ?  What 
will  the  defenders'  artillery  be  doing  during  this  time? 

The  regulations  are  ambiguous. 

General  von  Rohne's  manual  will  enlighten  us: 


[153] 

*'It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  batteries  should 
withdraw  into  positions  that  have  been  prepared, 
sheltered  from  fire  in  order  to  get  reorganized,  or 
whether  they  should  remain  in  their  (first)  positions 
and  have  the  men  get  under  cover.  The  solution  to  be 
adopted  depends  upon  circumstances." 

It  seems  then  in  Germany  to  be  fitting  for  the  artil- 
lery to  forsake  the  infantry  in  its  struggle  and  to  with- 
draw for  the  purpose  of  going  and  getting  under  shelter ! 

Outside  of  the  tremendous  support  that  this  with- 
drawal takes  away  from  the  infantry,  it  ought  to  pro- 
duce a  disastrous  moral  effect.  Besides,  how  can  these 
batteries  withdraw?  In  %heir  positions  they  are  so 
vulnerable  that  they  give  up  the  contest ;  what  disasters 
will  not  be  theirs  if  they  bring  up  their  limbers?  We 
see  once  more  how  easily  the  Germans  accept  the  possi- 
bility of  moving  their  artillery  under  fire.  To  remain 
in  their  places  and  let  the  men  get  under  cover  would 
seem  to  us  the  only  possible  solution. 

Again,  the  regulations  add:  "As  soon  as  the  hos- 
tile infantry  advances  for  the  assault,  the  artillery 
should  turn  upon  it  the  fire  of  all  the  guns  without 
waiting  for  orders." 

General  von  Rohne  estimates  that  at  that  moment 
the  batteries  will  have  to  go  into  action  in  positions 
different  from  those  previously  occupied  by  them. 
As,  in  order  to  fire  upon  the  assaulting  infantry,  the 
German  artillery  is  supposed  to  go  into  exposed  posi- 
tions, one  wonders  how  these  movements  of  going  and 
coming  before  a  superior  hostile  artillery  can  be  con- 
sidered as  possible  by  serious  authors. 

The  General  adds,  very  justly:  "The  regulations 
prescribe  that  all  the  batteries  shall  have  but  a  single 


[154] 

objective,  the  infantry.  In  view  of  the  shortness  of 
time  left  at  one's  disposition,  it  is  only  by  the  concentra- 
tion of  all  one's  strength  upon  the  most  important 
target  that  a  turn  of  the  tide  can  be  hoped  for." 

The  heavy  artillery  will  be  able  to  render  very  valu- 
able service  to  the  Germans  on  the  defensive.  Whereas, 
upon  the  offensive,  this  artillery  may  have  to  change 
position,  which  is  extremely  difficult  for  it  to  do,  and 
may  run  short  of  ammunition,  it  is,  upon  the  defensive, 
assured  of  complete  stability  and  can  be  kept  well 
supplied  with  ammunition.  It  is  true  on  the  other 
hand,  that  it  will  have  the  disadvantage  of  having  for 
the  most  part  only  mobile  targets  among  the  assailing 
forces. 

By  its  long  range  fire,  this  artillery  will  be  able  to 
cause  hostile  columns  to  halt  at  great  distances,  especi- 
ally if  they  have  defiles  to  pass  through.  During  the 
artillery  duel,  it  must  seek  to  crush  the  hostile  batteries, 
and  the  Germans  hope  that  it  will  be  able  to  destroy 
the  batteries  whose  positions  can  be  recognized. 
(H.  A.  R.  613,  615.)  This  heavy  artillery  will,  at  the 
moment  of  the  assault,  produce,  by  means  of  its  fire 
concentrated  upon  the  points  where  the  assault  is  being 
made,  a  considerable  moral  and  material  effect.  We 
have  already  discussed  this  matter,  and  will  not  return 
to  it. 

"The  infantry  and  the  machine  guns  will  open 
fire  as  soon  as  the  enemy  presents  tangible  targets." 
(I.  R.  413.) 

It  is  recommended  that  the  machine  guns  seek 
elevated  positions  from  which  they  can  sweep  with  their 
fire  till  the  last,  without  danger,  the  intervals  between 


[155] 

the  occupied  points.  (M.  G.  R.,  412  and  338,  as 
amended.) 

On  the  defensive,  therefore,  it  is  prescribed  to  fire 
at  long  ranges  and  to  fire  a  great  deal ;  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  have  a  vast  supply  of  ammunition. 

We  have  no  remark  to  make  concerning  the  conduct 
of  the  infantry  and  the  machine  guns  upon  the  defen- 
sive. 

The  Germans  accord  a  great  importance  to  the 
machine  guns.  The  new  amendments  to  the  regula- 
tions further  accentuate  the  importance  attached  to 
this  weapon.  The  Germans  believe  that  the  machine 
guns  are  destined  to  render  the  most  valuable  service, 
by  frontal  fire,  as  well  as  by  flanking  fire  on  the  line 
of  defense  and  by  the  enfilading  fire  that  they  may  be 
able  to  deliver  unexpectedly. 

THE  COUNTER  ATTACK. 

The  counter-attack  and  the  counter-offensive  are 
essential  acts  of  the  defensive. 

However,  beyond  the  counter-attack  to  be  made  by 
the  general  reserve  of  the  defensive  to  bring  about  a 
decisive  effect,  the  German  regulations  speak  only  in- 
cidentally of  these  means  of  repulsing  an  attack  and  of 
taking  the  offensive.  In  the  infantry  regulations,  we 
can  hardly  find  anything  more  than  the  following  pas- 
sage bearing  upon  the  matter :  ' '  The  defenders  will  not 
pass  to  the  offensive  until  after  they  have  repulsed  the 
attack.  They  may  attack  in  order  to  drive  out  an 
enemy  entrenched  in  front  of  the  position.  A  prema- 
ture counter-attack  runs  the  risk  of  bringing  about 
the  loss  of  the  position."     (I.  R.  414.) 

The  defenders  who  before  the  later  phases  of  the 


[156] 

struggle,  allowed  themselves  to  be  drawn  out  from 
under  cover  under  the  pretext  of  taking  the  offensive 
would  commit  a  great  mistake.  It  is  one  of  the  ruses 
of  an  assailant  to  draw  the  defenders  out  of  their 
trenches  and  covers  in  order  to  be  able  to  crush  them 
to  better  advantage. 

The  counter-attack  should  be  delivered  at  the  last 
moment,  when  the  enemy  is  getting  ready  for  the  assault 
or  while  he  is  making  it. 

The  counter-attack  often  gained  the  very  best 
results  in  Manchuria,  at  times  when  the  assailants 
seemed  to  be  certain  of  success. 

It  frequently  happened  that  the  Russians,  seeing 
that  their  fire  at  close  range  did  not  succeed  in  stopping 
the  enemy,  rushed  out  in  a  counter-attack.  This  un- 
expected menace  of  the  bayonet  would  succeed  in  re- 
pulsing an  attack  which  seemed  bound  to  be  victorious. 

There  is  found  here  a  curious  and  remarkable  fact 
which  shows  the  predominance  of  the  moral  factors  in 
warfare.  A  force  going  into  an  attack  marches  bravely 
ahead  under  the  violent  fire  of  the  adversaries,  which 
causes  it  to  siiffer  serious  losses;  but  before  the  mere 
threat  of  a  hand  to  hand  struggle,  it  recoils  and  runs 
away. 

This  moral  effect  has  been  manifested  many  times 
in  all  wars,  but  never  so  strikingly  as  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war  where,  moreover,  the  firearms  were  more 
powerful  than  ever.  This  fact  should  be  remembered, 
and  it  clearly  shows  how  the  counter-attack  should  be 
made. 

It  is  curious  that  the  German  regulations  show  no 
lessons  drawn  from  the  last  war  on  the  subject  of  this 
method  of  defense. 


[157] 

As  to  what  concerns  the  counter-offensive,  the 
German  regulations  are  almost  mute.  They  speak  of 
it  only  under  the  subject  of  night  attacks.  "The  re- 
serves of  the  defenders  must  be  ready  to  eject  the  enemy 
with  the  bayonet  in  case  he  succeeds  in  carrying  the 
position."     (I.  R.  416.) 

Although  the  Germans  do  not  believe  in  the  pierc- 
ing of  the  line  of  defense,  and  expect  no  definite  success 
from  the  combat  on  the  front,  it  is  nevertheless  strange 
that  the  regulations  fail  to  speak  of  one  of  the  essential 
defensive  actions. 

Of  course,  in  practice,  the  Germans  will  make 
counter-attacks  and  offensive  ripostes  which  conform  to 
their  general  rules  for  combat ;  it  is  nevertheless  aston- 
ishing that  in  their  regulations  there  should  be  this 
omission  which  we  can  not  explain. 

THE    GENERAL   RESERVE. 

As  in  the  case  for  the  offensive,  the  general  reserve 
of  the  German  defensive  is  the  maneuvering  force  in- 
tended to  win  victory  by  an  enveloping  attack.  This 
general  reserve  is  placed  beforehand  in  rear  of  the 
threatened  flank.  It  is  intended  to  make  a  counter- 
attack against  an  enemy's  force  that  is  trying  to  make 
an  envelopment,  or  to  overlap  itself  the  enemy's  flank 
if  it  can  to  advantage  precede  the  enemy  in  making  a 
decisive  attack. 

To  place  a  strong  echeloned  reserve  in  rear  of  and 
overlapping  the  unsupported  flank  of  a  defensive  posi- 
tion, is  in  conformity  with  the  elementary  principles 
of  tactics,  but  to  place  there  all,  or  nearly  aU  of  the  de- 
fenders' reserve  appears  to  be  a  very  debatable  idea. 

In  any  case,  as  has  been  well  said  by  General  von 


[158] 

Schlichting,  this  reserve  should  not  be  placed  behind 
the  wing  of  the  defensive  position;  it  could  only  form 
there  a  defensive  hook  and,  consequently,  would  pro- 
duce a  diverging  effect.  It  should  be  placed  well  to  the 
rear  and  beyond  the  wing,  so  as  to  take  the  enveloping 
attack  of  the  enemy  in  the  flank,  or  to  overlap  freely  the 
assailants'  wing  in  order  to  fall  upon  it  in  such  a  way  as 
to  obtain  always  a  converging  effect. 

The  general  reserve  should  not  make  its  offensive 
effort  too  soon.  ' '  It  will  make  its  start  when  the  frontal 
combat  is  in  full  swing."     (I.  R.,  414.) 

'  *  It  will  be  accompanied  by  and  protected  upon  its 
flankby  all  the  cavalry  available."     (C.  R.) 

The  observations  suggested  by  the  use  of  the  gen- 
eral reserve  on  the  defensive  are  the  same  as  those  we 
have  offered  for  the  offensive;  it  is  maneuvered  in  a 
manner  similar  to  that  employed  by  the  reserve  in  the 
offensive:  it  maneuvers,  according  to  a  preconceived 
plan,  upon  a  wing ;  it  maneuvers  upon  the  outer  lines  to 
produce  a  converging  attack  upon  a  flank. 

The  Germans  defend  themselves  with  a  precon- 
ceived plan  which  they  can'  not  change;  they  can 
neither  break  through  the  front,  nor  parry  a  blow  that 
might  happen  to  break  through  the  front,  nor  can  they 
take  advantage  of  a  fortunate  circumstance  that  might 
occur  on  the  line  of  combat. 

But,  if  the  placing  in  advance  of  the  general  reserve 
upon  the  unprotected  wing  is  accepted,  it  must  be 
recognized  that  the  regulation  prescriptions  and  the 
tactical  ideas  relative  to  the  use  of  that  reserve  for  mak- 
ing counter-attacks  are  most  judicious  and  worthy  of 
all  approbation. 


[159] 


A  STRATEGICAL  SYNOPSIS. 

It  was  said  at  the  beginning  of  this  work  that  to 
understand  thoroughly  the  tactics  of  an  army,  a  study 
of  its  regulations  is  not  sufficient;  it  should  above  all 
be  known  in  what  manner  they  are  applied. 

We  have  tried  to  show,  in  the  discussions  of  these 
few  pages  the  German  doctrine  from  the  tactical  point 
of  view.  That  doctrine  has  been  slowly  modified  in 
the  past  ten  years ;  it  will  perforce  be  further  modified, 
for  there  is  ceaseless  progress  in  the  utilization  of  the 
forces  of  nature  and  there  is  continual  evolution  in  the 
thought,  the  morale  and  tEe  organization  of  the  races. 

To  complete  the  study  of  this  doctrine  and  to 
understand  thoroughly  its  spirit  and  meaning,  the  Ger- 
man strategy  must  be  studied.  We  shall  at  a  later 
time  undertake  that  study. 

But  in  concluding  these  considerations  of  the  tactics 
of  the  German  army,  we  believe  that  we  have  shown  it 
under  its  true  light  by  outlining  the  general  sense  of  the 
strategical  ideas  on  the  battle  which  are  current  in  that 
army. 

The  great  combat  principles,  which  we  have  studied 
while  speaking  of  the  subject  of  general  tactics,  are 
directly  connected  with  the  strategical  principles  that 
guide  the  armies  in  their  application  of  them. 

The  Germans  have  continued  to  believe  firmly  in 
concentrating  their  armies  in  the  form  of  a  carpenter's 
square*  as    recommended    by    General    de   Moltke. 

*Their  armies  at  the  three  corners  |  ^^ 

of  the  square. — Translator.  j  ^4       X 


[160] 

They  will  offer,  during  the  period  of  concentration,  a 
"relatively  weak''  front  (General  von  Bemhardi),  facing 
the  hostile  frontiers,  and  one  or  several  masses  at  right 
angles  ready  to  fall  upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy  if  he 
takes  the  offensive.  The  front  of  their  masses  will 
generally  be  supported  by  a  fortified  zone  behind  which 
the  concentration  will  take  place,  out  of  which  the 
attack  will  come  "Hke  a  thunderbolt  from  the  clouds." 
(General  von  Bemhardi.) 

Prudence  will  dominate  the  strategical  preparation 
of  the  Germans.  Our  neighbors  do  not  appear  to  be 
inclined  to  take  the  offensive  before  having  assembled 
all  their  means.  There  is  in  their  strategy  the  same 
principle  of  prudence  that  we  have  found  in  their 
tactics :  not  to  attack  until  they  are  ready  with  all  their 
forces  collected. 

The  concentration  at  the  beginning  of  war  is  the 
prelude  of  the  dispositions  to  be  taken  by  the  directing 
authority  in  view  of  preconceived  maneuvers.  It  is 
the  first  act  of  a  studied  plan  of  which  the  second  act 
will  depend  upon  the  enemy,  the  circumstances  and  the 
conception  as  to  the  offensive  held  by  the  general-in- 
chief. 

When  the  concentration  has  been  completed,  Bem- 
hardi, like  de  Moltke,  advises  a  rapid  offensive  in  order 
to  arrive,  at  the  earHest,  at  the  decisive  act,  the  battle. 
The  shock  of  the  two  opposing  fronts  will  produce  that 
battle.  Thanks  to  the  concentration  in  form  of  a  car- 
penter's square,  thanks  to  the  strategic  marches  with 
overlapping  echelons  to  the  front,  or  finally  thanks  to 
the  means  that  permit  rapid  concentrations  upon  the 
theater  of  the  struggle,  the  directing  German  authority 
hopes  to  win  a  decision  by  making  use  of  an  independent 


[161] 

mass  maneuvered  with  exactness  at  the  time  chosen,  on 
a  chosen  zone. 

The  duration  of  the  frontal  combats,  the  rapidity 
of  movement  that  can  be  obtained  by  the  utilization  of 
the  present  means  of  transportation,  will  permit  move- 
ments of  masses  under  time  and  space  conditions  here- 
tofore absolutely  unknown. 

"Nothing,"  writes  General  von  der  Goltz,  "could 
give  to  the  inventive  mind  of  the  general-in-chief  a 
bolder  flight  than  the  liberty  of  action  assured  to  him 
by  the  railroads,  and  military  art  of  the  future  will 
certainly  reveal  to  us  mightier  conceptions  than  history 
has  shown  us  up  to  the  present.  *  *  *  Since  de- 
tours are  almost  without  importance  on  account  of 
the  rapidity  of  conveyances,  one  will  have  always  to 
count  upon  the  contingent  possibilities  of  sudden  move- 
ments of  large  masses  of  troops  by  rail." 

Nothing  could  be  learned  from  the  Manchurian 
war  concerning  the  strategic  utilization  of  railroads.  In 
an  European  war,  especially  in  a  theater  like  that  over 
which  would  take  place  a  Franco-German  war,  the 
density  of  the  railway  lines  would  permit  movements 
on  a  scale  and  with  a  rapidity  hitherto  unexampled. 

The  multiplicity  of  the  railroads,  the  employment 
of  automobiles,  the  utilization  of  balloons  and  of  aero- 
planes now  present  to  the  general-in-chief  new  resources, 
out  of  which  a  superior  mind  will  be  able  to  evolve 
methods  of  warfare  that  will  revolutionize  those  now  in 
use.  The  Russo-Japanese  war  might  easily  be  the  last 
great  war  carried  out  by  means  and  methods  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

We  should  appreciate  the  fact  that  the  new  tools  put 
at  the  disposal  of  armies  are  studied  with  the  greatest 


[162] 

care  and  with  a  remarkable  initiative  by  the  responsible 
authorities  of  the  German  army. 

The  strategic  preparation  for  a  battle,  or  rather 
for  battles,  will  require  a  settled  management,  unyield- 
ing in  its  aims,  a  methodical  preparation,  an  ordered 
and  rapid  execution. 

The  qualities  of  the  German  general  staff,  estab- 
lished by  de  Moltke,  are  a  guarantee  of  a  wise  and  ex- 
tremely careful  strategic  preparation. 

Such-  a  preparation,  however,  can  not  give  good 
results  unless  the  chief  is  endowed  with  a  mind  imbued 
with  the  idea  of  the  offensive  and  possessed  of  an  un- 
wavering will;  now,  if  the  Germans  are  all  for  the  offen- 
sive in  their  tactics,  they  are  so  moreover  to  the  extreme 
in  their  strategy.  They  hold  essentially  to  the  idea  of 
a%ays  getting  the  start  of  the  adversary  and  of  imposing 
their  will  upon  him. 

If  they  permit  the  defensive,  it  is  over  a  secondary 
theater  of  operations,  it  is  in  order  to  gain  time  at  some 
point ;  but  their  offensive  spirit  can  not  accept  the  idea 
of  letting  the  adversary  take  the  lead  in  the  principal 
attack. 

They  will  march  upon  the  enemy  with  all  their 
forces,  not  assembled  together,  but  available,  and  able 
to  reach  him  at  the  proper  time.  The  first  corps  to 
encounter  the  adversary  will  attack  promptly,  as  we 
have  learned  from  our  studies.  The  front  of  the  enemy 
is  thus  entirely  invested  without  delay,  with  all  possible 
Tigor;  time  must  not  be  left  for  the  enemy  to  get  his 
bearings,  to  take  the  initiative  or  to  acquire  any  priority 
whatever.  While  the  direct  offensive  of  one  or  of 
several  units  will  hold  him  fast  in  a  fierce  frontal  strug- 


1 


I 


[163] 

gle,  other  units  will  debouch  at  the  proper  time  upon  a 
flank  and  gain  the  decision. 

The  Germans  claim  that  it  is  superfluous,  useless 
and  bad  to  seek  before  the  attack  to  clear  up  completely 
the  general  situation;  if  one  waits  for  complete  infor- 
mation to  act,  in  strategy  as  in  tactics^  one  will  temporize, 
hesitate  and  lose  the  supremacy  of  priority  in  the  offen- 
sive. 

The  secret  of  victory,  they  say,  rests  above  all  in  a 
firm  will,  keeping  ahead  of  that  of  the  enemy,  executed 
with  lightning  like  swiftness  and  an  indomitable  energy. 

It  is  not  the  situation  which  should  regulate  the 
maneuvers,  it  is  the  rapid  and  unexpected  offensive 
that  should  create  the  situation,  which  the  maneuver- 
ing will  exploit  to  advantage. 

''This  will  to  act  in  accordance  with  a  preconceived 
plan  should  be  pushed  to  such  a  point  that  the  adver- 
sary, notwithstanding  all  the  plans  that  he  may  have 
made,  will  be  subjected  unreservedly  to  the  law  of  our 
initiative. ' '     (General  von  Bemhardi.) 

We  can  but  admire  ruch  bold  and  sound  ideas. 

We  have  thought  it  useful  to  bring  to  mind  these 
high  strategic  ideas.  They  give  a  better  appreciation  of 
the  manner  in  which  our  redoubtable  neighbors  expect 
to  conduct  their  warfare,  and  a  better  understanding 
of  their  general  tactics. 


14  DAY  USE 

RBTURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below, 
or  on  the  date  to  which  renewed.  Renewals  only: 

Tel.  No.  642-3405 
Renewals  may  be  made  4  days  prior  to  date  due. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  unmediate  recall. 

:\ 


# 


^ 


REC'OLD  miiril  -2PM54 


JNTERLIBRAi-y  LOWl 


NOV  2  4  'QB1 


MM'V 


.  OF  CAUIF.,  BERK. 


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